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CAMPAIGNS
OF
King *WILLIAM*
AND THE
Duke of *MARLBOROUGH*;

With Remarks, on the Stratagems by which every Battle was Won or Loſt, from 1689, to 1712.

Alſo a new Syſtem of Military Diſcipline, for Foot in Action, with the moſt eſſential Exerciſe for Cavalry.

By the late Brigadier-General RICHARD KANE, Govenour of *Minorca*.

The SECOND EDITION.

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With a Preface, giving ſome Account of the General and this Book, by an Officer who was intimate with him, and had ſeen it, in his own writing.

LONDON:

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PREFACE.

THIS Work contains General *Kane*'s Memoirs, in his long Service, during two ſucceſsful Wars, under two of the greateſt Generals the World ever knew, the Immortal King *William*, and the Victorious Duke of *Marlborough*; which enabled him to make ſo many judicious, Military Obſervations, on the good Conduct of ſome, and the Miſtakes of others, That 'tis hoped this Hiſtory, (the moſt Authentic extant,) will greatly tend to the Improvement of our young Officers, and the Satisfaction of all; being equal to that of any Writer; conciſe, accurate, and inſtructive; and has at once all that renders a Work of this kind agreeable, and uſeful. He was preſent in theſe Tranſactions. Part I. contains all the Stratagems, and Succeſſes, of the *Britiſh* Force, in reducing the Kingdom of *Ireland*, and in *Flanders*, from 1689, to 1697.

A new Scene of Glory opens in the 2d Part; Battles won, Towns taken in the uſual Form, or ſurrendering without the Formalities of a Siege; Lines paſſed; vaſt Countries over-run. Such a Series of Succeſs, ſuch a Rapidity of Conqueſts, as cannot be matched in Hiſtory, and will tranſmit to lateſt Poſterity, the Immortal Name of *Marlborough*.

Happy

Happy for us, if the Advantages of ten unparallelled Campaigns obtained for us, over our then contemptible groaning (but ſince Tyrannizing) Enemy had not been given up by a moſt ſhameful Peace; by which our Allies were abandoned, our Trade neglected, and perhaps the Foundation laid for moſt, if not all, the ſucceeding Troubles of *Europe*.

General *Kane* ſpent the latter Part of his Life, at his Government in *Minorca*; beloved while living, honoured, and univerſally lamented when dead *. His Memory will ever be dear, ſince all who knew him, allow him to have been one of the compleateſt Officers of his Time, and one of the beſt of Men.

With great Contempt he read ſome Books, which pretended to Teach the whole Military Art; and often aſſured his Friends, that thoſe mean Performances provoked him, to attempt ſomething on the ſame Subject, which, if not perfect, might be free from thoſe groſs Errors and glaring Abſurdities, which abound in them. This Book was copied from a Manuſcript, in General *Kane*'s own writing, which can eaſily be made appear when required.

The Military Schemes are Deſigns of experienced Officers, whoſe Names (had I Authority to mention) would ſufficiently recommend this Work to all Profeſſors of the Art of War.

* General *Kane* was Born 20th *December*, 1661. his firſt Commiſſion was, 1689. Died 19th. *December*. 1736.

CONTENTS to *Millan*'s Succession of Colonels and Establishments of the Navy, Army and Garrisons, &c.

Price Thirteen Shillings Bound.

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N. B. This Edition is as Compleat as I can poſſibly make it; and with Sheets that come to 2*s.* 6*d.* every Year, it may be good forever.

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MEMOIRS

OF ALL THE

CAMPAIGNS of King *William*

IN

Ireland and in *Flanders*, &c.

THE Regiment of Foot that I ſerv'd in, is well known by the Title of the *Royal Regiment* of *Ireland*, from which Regiment I may without Vanity ſay, our *Britiſh* Infantry had the Ground-work of their preſent Diſcipline.

In *Auguſt*, 1689, the above Regiment ſail'd from *High-Lake* in *Cheſhire*, under the Command of Duke *Schomberg*, landed near *Belfaſt* in *Ireland*, and march'd from thence to *Carrick-Fergus*, to which Place we laid Siege, the Duke having between 12 or 14,000 Men in his Army. *Carrick-Fergus* ſurrender'd in a few Days after we came before it, with little Loſs on either Side. 1689.

1689. King *James*, at this Time, was in Poſſeſſion of the whole Kingdom, except *Londonderry* and *Enniſkilling*, whither the Proteſtants fled, and defended thoſe Places to a Miracle. Upon the Duke's landing, he was drawing the *Iriſh* Army together, about *Dundalk*, but upon our advancing thither, he retir'd to *Ardee*. It was the 9th of *September* when we came to *Dundalk*, which the Duke finding to be a ſtrong Paſs, with a pretty good Haven for ſmall Ships to bring him Neceſſaries from *England*, and the *Newry-Mountains* juſt in his Rear, which ſecur'd him behind, and kept open a Communication with the North, where he propos'd to take up his Winter-Quarters, and be ſupplied from thence with freſh Proviſions; whereupon he reſolv'd to advance no farther, but fix here for the remaining Part of the Campaign. He therefore incamp'd on the North Side of the River and Town; he immediately cauſed that Part of the Town which lay towards the Enemy, to be well fortify'd, and alſo threw up a ſtrong Intrenchment from the River to the Mountain, which ſecur'd the Right Flank of our Camp, and from all Attempts of the Enemy: Having thus ſecur'd himſelf on all Sides, he gave Orders for the Army to halt. Our *Dutch* and *French* Regiments ſoon built themſelves good warm Barracks, but our *Engliſh* Regiments being all raw Soldiers, and not knowing the Conſequence of not Hutting, neglected till there was neither Timber nor Straw to be had, ſo that when the rainy Weather came on, our Men died like rotten Sheep. About a Week after our coming thither, Major-General *Kirk* joined us with two Regiments of Foot, which he had brought from *England* for the Relief of *Londonderry*, and alſo by 1500 Men from *Iniſkilling*, which made our Army about 16,000.

King

King *James* headed the *Iriſh* Army at *Ardee*, which was more than double our Number, among whom were 7000 *French*, from whom there came over to us ſeveral Deſerters, who took Service in our *French* Regiments, as *Hugonets*, but were in Reality *Papiſts*, ſent to inveigle our *French*; among whom were many *Papiſts*. The Manner of our mounting the Intrenchment that extended from the River to the Mountain, was, every Evening by Brigades, and drew off in the Morning, and there being three *French* Regiments of Foot, they made up one Brigade. Now theſe Deſerters in a little Time had brought over a conſiderable Number to join in betraying the Camp to the Enemy, when it ſhould come to the Turn of their Brigade to mount the Intrenchment; at which Time they would find Means by changing and chopping with others, (which is a Thing too common among the Soldiers, and ought not to be ſuffered,) that moſt of thoſe Confederates were to be on this Command, and then they were to give Notice to the Enemy, who were to be in Readineſs to march and fall upon us by Break of Day, which they might eaſily have done, being but at eight Miles Diſtance; but this Affair was happily diſcovered, and by ſome of the *Proteſtants* that had been let into the Secret, on which five of the Ring-leaders were hang'd, (one of them was actually a Captain in the *French* with King *James*) and between 2 and 300 ſent Priſoners to *England*. Thus was this ſmall Army providentially preſerv'd, not above two Days before the Thing was to be put in Execution. About the latter End of *September* King *James*, at the Head of his Army, march'd from *Ardee*, and drew up on a Riſing Ground about a Mile from us, expecting the Duke would draw out, and give him Battle; but when he found we kept within our 1689-90

1690. Works, after about an Hour's Halt, he march'd back to his Camp, where he continued till the Beginning of *November*, at which Time he broke up, and went into Winter-Quarters. While we lay at *Dundalk*, the Weather proving very Rainy, and our Men being ill Hutted, the Country Diſtemper got among them to that Degree, that more than two Thirds of our *Engliſh* were carried off by it. 1690. In the Beginning of *June* King *William* landed near *Belfaſt*, and gave Orders for aſſembling the Army at *Dundalk*, which was computed to be ſomething more than 30,000. King *James* at this Time was drawing his Army together, along the Banks of the *Boyne* near to *Drogheda*, who were much about our Number. On the laſt Day of *June*, our King advanc'd with his Army up to the Enemy, and encamp'd within Cannon Shot of them.

As the King was this Evening taking a View of the Enemy, having ſtopt too long in a Place, a Cannon-Ball graz'd on his Shoulder, which rais'd a ſmall Contuſion, however did not hinder him from acting the next Day, being the Firſt of *July*, when he drew up the Army in Order of Battle; but obſerving the Enemy drawn up in great Order along the River, he ſaw it would be a difficult Taſk to paſs it, unleſs he could oblige them to break the Diſpoſition they had made; wherefore he ordered Lieutenant-General *Douglas*, with about 8000 Men to march about two Miles up the River, and there to paſs in order to fall upon their Left Flank. This anſwer'd the King's Expectation; for when they ſaw *Douglaſs* marching that Way, they immediately ſent off a great Part of their Left Wing to oppoſe him. By which their Order of Battle was broke, and their whole Army put into Motion to make good the Ground of their Left Wing; which the King obſerving, march'd down

down immediately, and entered the River while they were in this Motion; ſo that before they form'd, he got over his Front Line and engag'd them, and the ſecond being cloſe at the Heels of them, got ſoon over to the Aſſiſtance of the firſt; and in a ſhort Time after the Enemy was put to Flight, before *Douglas* could come to engage their Left. 1690.

King *James* had poſted himſelf on a riſing Ground in the Rear of his Army, who, as ſoon as he ſaw our Troops paſs the River, was the firſt that fled, and never look'd behind him till he got to *Duncanon* Fort, from whence he ſailed to *France*. The Loſs of the Enemy did not amount to more than 1000 kill'd, and about as many taken. The greateſt Loſs on our Side, was, the brave Duke *Schomberg*, who was kill'd (as it was ſaid, by a *French* Trooper that had ſerv'd in his own Regiment, and deſerted while we lay at *Dundalk* the preceding Year) in the 84th Year of his Age. The *Iriſh*, in a diſperſed Manner, made the beſt of their Way to the *Shannon*.

The *French* Troops, with ſome of the Horſe kept together till they paſs'd the *Shannon* at *Athlone*, from whence they march'd to *Galloway*, where they waited till Shipping came and carried them to *France*. However, the *Iriſh* reſolved to defend the *Shannon*, and ſtand out till they could hear from their King; they therefore drew all their ſhatter'd Troops to *Limerick* and *Athlone*. The next Day after the Battle the King marched the Army towards *Dublin*, where we halted a few Days, until he had ſettled the Government; after which he ſent Lieutenant-General *Douglaſs* with Part of the Army, towards *Athlone*, to try if he could ſecure that Poſt, whilſt the King himſelf march'd with the reſt of the Army towards *Limerick*, and was join'd by *Douglaſs* the Day before he arriv'd;

1690. having been prevented by Lieutenant-General *Sarsfield*, who had rallied Part of the Enemy at *Athlone*.

On the First of *Auguſt*, the King ſate down before *Limerick*, which the River *Shannon* divides into two Parts: The Enemy had ſecur'd themſelves on *Thumond* Side the Water, which prevented the King from inveſting the Town round, and was oblig'd to carry on the Siege againſt that Part of it that lay on our Side the River; we ſoon open'd our Trenches, took an advanced Work, and were raiſing Batteries againſt the Arrival of our Battering-Train, which was on the Road from *Dublin*; of which the Enemy having an Account, and of the ſlender Guard that was with it, they ſent *Sarsfield* with a ſtrong Body of Horſe, who paſſing the *Shannon* at *Killalo*, fell on the Train the 11th of *Auguſt* about Midnight, as they lay at *Cullen*, within eleven Miles of our Camp, where they burnt and deſtroy'd every Thing that could be uſeful to us. This was a well-manag'd Affair of *Sarsfield*'s, and would have redounded much to his Honour, had he not ſullied it with ſo much Cruelty; for tho' there was not the leaſt Oppoſition, yet he put Man, Woman, and Child to the Sword. The King had ſome Account of *Sarsfield*'s Motion, and ſent Sir *John Lanier* to march with a good Body of Horſe to join the Train at *Cullen*; but Sir *John* delay'd the Time, and did not march till ſeveral Hours after his Orders, and loiter'd even on his March, by making unneceſſary Halts; which gave *Sarsfield* Time to do his Buſineſs, and return without the Loſs of a Man. Sir *John*, who had once been a great Favourite of King *James*'s, was ſhrewdly ſuſpected of Treachery: The King only caſhier'd him, whereas he ought to have been hang'd.

Notwithſtanding the Loſs of the Train, the King puſh'd on the Siege with the Train he had, with which

which a conſiderable Breach was made in the Wall, and one of the Towers batter'd down; whereupon he order'd an Aſſault to be made by moſt of the Grenadiers in his Army, and to be ſuſtain'd by 17 Plattoons, of whom our Regiment was one. The Lord *Cutts* led on the Grenadiers, who inſtead of mounting the Breach, follow'd the Enemy that fled along the Covert-way, which drew the Battalions after him, ſo that the Breach was neglected, by which the Affair miſcarried. Our Regiment upon this Occaſion had one Lieutenant-Colonel, one Captain, and five Subalterns kill'd, beſides one wounded. The King meeting with theſe Diſappointments before *Limerick*, drew off (the 30th of *Auguſt*) and leaving the Army under the Command of Lieutenant-General *Gingkill*, he went to *Waterford*, from whence he ſail'd to *England*. 1690.

Upon our marching off from *Limerick*, Part of the Army were ſent under the Command of the Duke of *Wirtemberg*, to aſſiſt the Lord *Churchill* in the taking *Cork* and *Kinſale*, the reſt of the Army were diſpers'd into Quarters, ſo as to form a Frontier againſt the *Shannon*.

In *May*, General *Gingkill* drew the Army together near *Mullingar*, which was computed to be near 24,000. The firſt Place we march'd againſt was *Ballimore*, a Frontier the Enemy had, half-way between *Mullingar* and *Athlone*: this Place being ſituated in an Iſland, in a Lough, held out eight Days. From whence we march'd to *Athlone*, which is divided by the *Shannon*, as that of *Limerick*; that Part of the Town which lay on our Side of the River we took the third Day we came before it; but the other Part was ſtrongly fortify'd with a large ſtrong Tower in the Middle of it, that overlook'd our Part of the Town; and along this deep and 1691.

1691. rapid River they had thrown up a double Intrenchment, and with all their Army, conſiſting of 27,000, lay incamp'd within half a Mile on the Back of the Town, commanded by *St. Ruth*, a *French* General of great Experience. Notwithſtanding theſe Difficulties, our General ſeem'd reſolv'd to puſh at this Place, tho' the Generality of the Army thought it a very hazardous Undertaking.

We firſt threw up a very large ſtrong Intrenchment cloſe to the River below the Bridge, on which Batteries were rais'd for 50 Pieces of Cannon, beſides Mortars, with which we ſoon batter'd down the Face of the Tower that lay next us, and in a manner levell'd the outward Trench along the River; but this avail'd little, unleſs the River was fordable, which never happens but in a dry Seaſon, and this proving ſo, our General wanted to know the Depth of the Water: three *Daniſh* Soldiers, who for ſome Crime lay under Sentence of Death, to whom the General offer'd Pardon, and a Gratuity, if they would ford the River; which they readily accepted, and putting on Armour, they enter'd the River at Noon-Day, keeping at ſome Diſtance from each other: ſome of our Men in the Trenches were order'd to fire as it were at them, but over their Heads, which made the Enemy believe they were Deſerters, ſo did not fire a Shot at them till they had paſs'd the Depth of the River, and ſaw them returning, at which Time they began to fire at them; but our great and ſmall Shot being prepared for that Purpoſe, fired with ſuch Fury upon them, that they were not able to hold up their Heads: ſo the Men return'd with only two of 'em ſlightly wounded. When the General found the River paſſable, he reſolv'd on making a general Aſſault, for which he gave Orders, that 40 Grenadiers out of each Company, and 80 choice Men out of each

each Regiment, ſhould be ready to march down the next Morning, in order to make the Attack. 1691.

This Detachment march'd openly about Ten in the Morning into our Works, at which time all the Hills on our Side were cover'd with Spectators to behold this Action: this brought *St. Ruth* with his whole Army down to the Back of the Town, and crowded it with as many Men as it could well hold.

This put the General off making the Aſſault; ſo towards Evening he order'd the Detachments to march back to Camp, but at the ſame time gave ſtrict Orders, that neither Officers nor Soldiers ſhould be put upon any other Duty, or ſtir from their Regiments, but be ready to turn out at a Minute's Warning. *St. Ruth* ſeeing our Detachment drawing off, return'd with his Army to Camp, ſatisfy'd, that our General would lay aſide all Thoughts of paſſing the *Shannon* at this Place.

That Night and the next Day we did not fire a Shot, nor make Show of any Deſign of a Siege; ſo that a Rumour was ſpread thro' both Camps, that our General finding it not poſſible to paſs the *Shannon* here, was for marching to *Banahar*, to try what he could do there. This confirm'd *St. Ruth* in the Notion he had conceiv'd; whereupon he invited all the Ladies, and Generals of his Camp, to an Entertainmentt on the 22d, the Day our General deſign'd to make his real Attack, the other being only a Feint.

Our General early this Morning plac'd Centinels on all the Hills, to prevent People appearing on them; and about Ten o'Clock there came Orders along the Line for the Detachment to draw out, and march into our Works with all the Privacy imaginable; which we perform'd with that Exactneſs, that the Enemy did not ſuſpect what we were about, but rather

1691. rather thought we were drawing off our Cannon, till about Two o'Clock, we on a ſudden bounc'd over our Works, and were got a good Way into the River before they perceiv'd us; who being, as it were, rous'd out of Sleep in the greateſt Conſternation, and the Cannon and ſmall Shot from our Trenches firing with great Fury over our Heads, ſtruck them with ſuch a Pannick, that they made little or no Reſiſtance; and before *St. Ruth* had any Account of the Attack, we were Maſters of the Town, but not the Caſtle. This, one may believe, ſpoil'd the Entertainment. *St. Ruth* got his Army under Arms, and march'd down with all the Expedition he could, in order to drive us back; but he diſcover'd a grand Miſtake which he had committed, too late to be remedied; for, having left the Works of the Back-Part of the Town ſtanding, they now became a Bulwark againſt himſelf, nor could he pretend to force us thence but by carrying on a formal Siege: ſo that he was obliged to march back with his Army, and leave us in Poſſeſſion of the Town; and early next Morning he decamp'd, and march'd off in ſome Diſorder; at which time thoſe in the Caſtle ſurrendred at Diſcretion, wherein were a Major-General, a Brigadier, and near 1000 Men, beſides 1000 kill'd: We had but 29 Men kill'd, and as many wounded; not an Officer of Note hurt.

Here the old Proverb was verify'd, that *Security dwells next Door to Ruin. St. Ruth* thought it impoſſible for us to paſs the River before he could be down with the Army; and it is moſt certain nothing but Neglect of their Duty was the Occaſion of it: which may ſerve as a very good Leſſon for Officers in general never to think themſelves ſecure on any Poſt or Guard, if the Commanding Officer neglects his Poſt, (as it was here) all under him will do the

ſame; for they ſeeing their General ſecure in himſelf, thought all was ſafe, which made them neglect keeping their Men ſtrictly on their Duty, and having a vigilant Eye on us. Had they done thus, it would have been impoſſible for us to march but they might eaſily ſee us from the Caſtle, and give timely Notice to their General, which would have prevented what follow'd: But all being thus lull'd in Security when we made this unexpected Attack, it was ſuch a Surprize on them, that they rather threw down their Arms, and ran for it, than made any thing of a gallant Reſiſtance, which appears by the Kill'd on both Sides. The great Overſight *St. Ruth* committed, in leaving the Works on the Back-Part of the Town ſtanding, was the only Motive that induced our General to paſs the *Shannon* at this Place. 1691.

Two Days after this Action our Army paſſed the River, and encamp'd near the Ground where the Enemy had lain; and when we had clean'd the Town, and repair'd the Works, we march'd after the Enemy. Our firſt Day's March was to *Ballynaſloe*, where the General had an Account, that the Enemy was ſtrongly encamp'd at *Aughrim* within three Miles of us, and waited for our coming.

Next Morning being *July* 12, our General ſent all our Tents and Baggage back to *Athlone*, and march'd in four Columns up to them, where we found them in Order of Battle, with their whole Camp ſtanding at a ſmall Diſtance in their Rear; which look'd as if they were reſolv'd to win the Day, or loſe all. Their Right was cover'd with a Bogg, which extended along their Front, till it paſſed their Centre; from whence were a Parcel of old Garden-Ditches, which extended to the Caſtle of *Aughrim*, and cover'd their Left Flank.

Here

1691. Here *St. Ruth* ſeem'd reſolv'd to die, or recover the Honour he had loſt at *Athlone*; and indeed he made an excellent Diſpoſition of his Army, and was very active in giving his Orders, and ſeeing his Troops do their Duty in all Parts.

Our General began the Battle about Four in the Afternoon, by attacking them on the Right, and ſo gradually on, till our Right (where was our Regiment) engaged thoſe on their Left, that lined the Garden-Ditches. Our Troops, that engaged their Right and Centre, were hard put to it for a conſiderable Time; and were ſeveral times repuls'd, the Enemy having maintain'd their Ground in thoſe Parts with great Reſolution: But thoſe poſted in the Ditches did not behave ſo well; when we on the Right attack'd, they gave us their Fire, and ran to the next Ditches, and we ſcrambling over the firſt Ditch, made after them to the ſecond; from whence they gave us another ſcattering Fire, and ran to other Ditches behind them, we ſtill purſuing from one Ditch to another, until we had drove them out of four or five Rows of thoſe Ditches into an open Plain, where was ſome of their Horſe drawn. In climbing thoſe Ditches, and ſtill following them from one to another, no one can imagine we could keep our Order: In this Hurry there were Battalions ſo intermingled together, that we were at a Loſs what to do; and certainly their Horſe would have made fine Work with us, if our Horſe had not found Means to get round into the Plain, and engage thoſe of the Enemy: and here we found the Advantage of being train'd up in the Art of breaking our Battalions, which we were at this time very expert at; ſo that while the Horſe were engaging each other, our Commanding Officers, according to the Manner I have deſcrib'd, ſoon drew their Battalions out of this Confuſion,

ſion, and form'd them in Order, by which Time our Horſe having routed thoſe of the Enemy, we then preſt in upon their Centre, who ſtill maintain'd their Ground. But about this Time an accidental Cannon Shot having taken off St. *Ruth*'s Head, whereby their Army was at a great Loſs for want of his Orders, eſpecially Lieutenant-General *Sarsfield*, whom he had poſted with a Body of Reſerve in the Rear, with poſitive Directions not to ſtir from thence until he receiv'd his Orders; and tho' *Sarsfield* ſaw Opportunities of doing great Service, yet he would not ſtir, till he ſaw their whole Army put to the Route, when he was oblig'd to make off with the Crowd without ſtriking a Stroke. 1691.

Thus ended the Battle of *Aughrim*, in which the greateſt Part of the *Iriſh* Army behaved to Admiration; and had not St. *Ruth* been taken off, and had thoſe in the Ditches done their Duty a little better, it would be hard to ſay what would have been the Conſequence of that Day.

The Loſs of the Enemy was computed to be about 17,000 kill'd and taken, with all their Camp and Baggage, and what Cannon they had.

Our Army had upwards of 4000 kill'd and wounded. We halted about a Mile from the Field of Battle, and next Day made the Priſoners bury the Dead; and the Day following our Tents and Baggage being come up, we march'd towards *Galway*, where was a Garriſon of near 2000 poor ſorry Fellows with hardly a Rag on their Backs, who ſurrender'd the third Day after we came before it, having Liberty to march to *Limerick*, whither the greateſt Part of their ſhatter'd Troops had fled. Our General march'd in the greateſt Haſte to *Limerick*, where he found the Enemy had taken up the ſame Ground on *Tumond* Side the River, they had done the preceding

1691. ceding Year, and for the Conveniency of being ſupplied with Neceſſaries, we were oblig'd to take up the Ground on the other Side; but our General ſoon found that *Limerick* was not to be taken in any reaſonable Time, unleſs he could diſlodge the Enemy, and ſo inveſt it round. Now the difficult Matter was, in paſſing the River upon them at this Place, for he could not quit the Ground he was on for the above Reaſon; and the Enemy being ſenſible of this, they kept ſtrict Guards conſtantly patrolling by Night on the River Side, but drew out of the Reach of our Cannon by Day.

However, our General found Means to have a Correſpondence with Col. *Lutterell*, who having a plentiful Fortune in the Kingdom, and loth to loſe it, promis'd when he had the Guard of the River to give us an Opportunity of laying Bridges over it; and when the Night came that he had the Guard he gave us Notice, and order'd his Patroles a different Way from the Place where the Bridges were to be laid, ſo that we laid our Bridges, and paſs'd Part of the Army before Day; and the Morning proving foggy we march'd up to the Enemy's Camp, and were the firſt that carried them the News of our Paſſing, which was ſuch a Surprize to them, that the Foot, moſt of 'em naked, without making the leaſt Reſiſtance made away to the Town, where the Gates being ſhut againſt them, great Numbers were kill'd under the Walls, and alſo a great many of ours kill'd from the Walls, by their too eager Purſuit of them.

The Horſe alſo fled half naked, moſt of them without Bridle or Saddle, away towards the fartheſt Part of the County of *Clare*; and now we inveſted *Limerick*, which brought on the Capitulation, by which they ſurrender'd both Town and Kingdom; which put an End to the Wars of *Ireland*.

In

In *May*, 23 Battalions (of which our Regiment was one) embark'd at *Waterford*, and landed at *Briſtol*; from whence we march'd to *Portſmouth*, where we imbark'd with a Deſign of making a Deſcent into *France*; but when we came to that Coaſt, we found it ſo ſtrongly guarded, that our General did not think proper to land, ſo we return'd to the *Downs*; where we lay until the King, who was then in *Flanders*, ſent Orders for us to ſail to *Oſtend*, where we landed; and march'd to *Furnes* and *Dixmude*. Upon our Approach to thoſe Places, the *French* quitted them; and after we had put them in a better State of Defence, the greateſt Part of our Troops march'd back to *Oſtend*, where we reimbark'd and return'd to *England*; but in our Paſſage met with a violent Tempeſt, in which ſome Ships periſh'd, however our Regiment got ſafe, and quarter'd this Winter in *Briſtol*. 1692.

In *May*, we march'd to *Portſmouth*, and embark'd with ſeveral other Regiments, on board the Grand Fleet, where we ſerv'd this Summer as Marines. The Fleet was commanded by three joint Admirals, Sir *Ralf De Lavel*, Sir *Cloudeſly Shovell*, and Admiral *Killegrew*, and Sir *George Rook* had a Squadron of twenty Men of War to convoy the *Smyrna* Fleet up the *Mediterranean*. Our Admirals had Orders to ſail with Sir *George* till they ſaw him paſt the *Bay* of *Biſcay*, and then return. The *French* had an Account of this, whereupon they order'd their Squadron at *Breſt*, and ſome Ships from *Toulon* to join at *Lagos-Bay*, in *Portugal*, and there wait for the Coming of Sir *George*. And ſuch was the Treachery of thoſe Times, that even ſome of our Admirals were ſuſpected to be in the Secret; when Sir *Cloudſley* preſt the other two to continue but Twenty-four Hours in that Latitude, they ſail'd on, till they heard what 1693.

1693. what might happen to Sir *George*; yet, tho' they knew the *French* were waiting for him, they would not hearken, but ſail'd immediately back.——Sir *George* being ſenſible of his Danger, kept a cloſe Look-out; and upon ſpying the *French*, made a Signal for the Merchants to ſhift for themſelves, while he kept in the Rear of them and made a runing Fight.

The *French* when they ſaw Sir *George*, did at firſt believe that our Grand Fleet had ſtill kept him Company; whereupon they ſlipp'd their Cables, and were ſtanding away for *Cadiz*, till an *Hamburgher* that had ſail'd away from Sir *George* in the Night gave them an Account how Matters were, upon which they tack'd about, and made all the Sail they could after him; but Sir *George* by that Means having got ſo far a-head of them, that only a few light Sailors came up with him, who durſt not come too near, ſo that he return'd ſafe, and but a few of the heavy Sailors of the Merchantmen were pick'd up by the Privateers. Our Troops landed in *September*, and our Regiment march'd to *Norwich*, where we lay about ſix Weeks, and then march'd to *London*, where we were review'd by the King in *Hyde-Park*, and two Days after embark'd at the *Red-Houſe*, from whence we ſail'd to *Oſtend*, where we landed in *December*, and quarter'd until the Spring.

1694. We join'd the Army in *Flanders*. In *May* the King took the Field, and rendezvous'd the Army at *Bethlehem*, near *Louvain*, where he found the ſame compleat 90,000. From hence we march'd to *Roſebeck*, where a Diſpute aroſe about the Rank of our Regiment in particular, which had regimented in King *Charles* the Second's Time out of the old Independent Companies in *Ireland*, and had hitherto taken Rank of all the Regiments rais'd by King *James*

the Second, but now thoſe Regiments diſputed the Rank with us; on which the King referr'd the Matter to a Board of General Officers, and moſt of them being Colonels of thoſe Regiments, would allow our Regiment no other Rank than from our firſt coming into *England*, which was ſometime before the King landed, when he came over Prince of *Orange* on the Revolution; by which we loſt the Rank of eleven Regiments, ſo we took Rank after all thoſe rais'd by King *James*, and before all thoſe rais'd by King *William*. The King himſelf thought the General Officers had acted with great Partiality, but as he had referred the Matter to them, ſo he confirm'd it; and from hence it is, that all Regiments rais'd before (the Union) in *Ireland* and in *Scotland*, are to have no Rank in the Army until they enter upon the *Engliſh* Eſtabliſhment. 1694.

The Duke of *Luxemberg* commanded the *French* Army, computed to be near 100,000, encamp'd near the Plains of *Mount St. Andrea*. The King advanc'd in order to give him Battle, but *Luxemberg* did not ſtand it, but retired behind the *Main*, where there was no coming at him. We lay encamp'd on theſe Plains near ſix Weeks; at length the King form'd a Scheme to get within the *French* Lines at *Point Eſpiere*, in order to which he ſent off the Elector of *Bavaria* with 20,000 Men, to march with all the Expedition he could to ſecure that Paſs; at which Time he ſent the heavy Baggage to *Bruſſels*, and march'd the Army next Morning after the Elector; but this Affair could not be carried on ſo ſecretly but that *Luxemberg* had timely Notice of it; he ſent off the Marſhal *Boufflers* with a ſtrong Body of Horſe and Dragoons with Foot behind them, who got to the Paſs ſometime before the Elector; and

1694-5. *Luxemberg* with the reſt of the Army, march'd with what Expedition they could after him.

The King being diſappointed in this Affair, march'd lower down, paſs'd the *Scheld* near *Oudenard*, and encamp'd on the Plains near that Town, where we lay till our heavy Baggage came up, and then march'd to *Roſelare*, where we finiſh'd the Campaign. Our Regiment had *Ghent* for its Quarters, where we lay every Winter during this War.

This proving a Campaign of Action, I ſhall be more particular.

1695. The King having form'd a Deſign of beſieging *Namur*, took the Field the latter End of *April*, and encamp'd with the main Body of the Army between *Mennin* and *Ipris*, and made a Show as though he deſign'd to attack Fort *Knock*, while the Elector of *Bavaria* and the Earl of *Athlone* (General *Ginkell*) form'd a flying Camp near *Bruſſels*, under Pretence of covering that Part of the Country. The Duke *de Villeroy* commanded the *French* Army (*Luxemberg* being dead) who drew the main Body of his Army towards the King, and encamp'd within his Lines near *Mennin*, while *Boufflers*, with a flying Camp to obſerve the Motions of the Elector encamp'd near *Mons*; however, the Elector found Means to inveſt *Namur*, but could not prevent *Boufflers* from throwing himſelf with a good Body of Troops into it.

As ſoon as the King had an Account that *Namur* was inveſted, he immediately decamp'd, and after he had order'd Major-General *Ellinburg* to march with nine *Britiſh* Battalions, and a Regiment of Dragoons to *Dixmude*, to cover that Part of the Country, he left about 20,000 Men with Prince *Vademont*, to cover the Country about *Gaunt* and *Bruges*, and with the reſt of the Army he made what Haſte he could to *Namur*. Our Regiment was left there with the

Prince, who took up the ſtrong Camp of *Arſiel*, and caus'd a ſtrong Intrenchment to be thrown up in the Front of his Camp. 1695.

Villeroy was not a little ſurpriz'd when he found *Namur* inveſted; however, was pleas'd when he heard that *Boufflers* had thrown himſelf into it with ſo good a Body of Troops; it being at this Time thought to be one of the ſtrongeſt Places in *Europe*, and having in it a Marſhal of *France*, the Marquis *De Guiſcard*, Governor, an experienc'd Officer, with a Garriſon of 14,000 Men, well provided with all Manner of Neceſſaries. Wherefore, before he would attempt raiſing the Siege, he try'd what he could do in theſe Parts; eſpecially if he could but demoliſh *Vademont*, the Siege muſt riſe in Courſe; whereupon as the King march'd off, *Villeroy* drew out of his Lines, and advanc'd with an Army of 90,000 Men towards *Vademont*; but finding him ſtand his Ground, he proceeded with the more Caution, and halted about two Leagues ſhort of him, till he had ſent to *Liſle* for ſome Battering Cannon. This took up ſome Time, which was what *Vademont* wanted, to keep him in Play till the King could fix himſelf before *Namur*. At Length *Villeroy* advanc'd within leſs than half a League of us, and finding the Prince ſtill keep his Ground, order'd a great many Faſcines to be cut in order to attack us early next Morning. He alſo ſent Lieutenant-General *Montill* with a ſtrong Body of Horſe round by our Right, to fall in our Rear, and cut off our Retreat from *Gaunt*, which was three Leagues in the Rear of us. Now the Prince had three Capuchin Fryars for his Spies, one of whom kept conſtantly about *Villeroy*'s Quarters, who found Means to inform himſelf of all his Deſigns; the other two ply'd conſtantly between both Camps without ever being ſuſpected, who gave *Vademont* an

1695. Account of every Thing.——And now the Prince having drawn *Villeroy* ſo near him, he thought it high Time to make his Retreat; he therefore as ſoon as *Villeroy* appear'd, ſent off all the heavy Baggage and Lumber of the Camp to *Gaunt*, and about Eight in the Evening, he order'd Part of the Cavalry to diſmount and take the Intrenchments, and the Infantry to march privately off with their Pikes and Colours under-hand, leſt the Enemy ſhould diſcover us drawing off; and as ſoon as it grew duſkiſh the Cavalry mounted and march'd after the Foot. Soon after *Villeroy*'s Advance-Guard finding Matters very quiet in our Works, ventur'd upon them; who finding the Birds fled, ſent to acquaint the General; on which they march'd after us as faſt as they could. *Montill*, who by this Time had got into our Rear, finding us marching off, thought to have fallen on our Flank; but Sir *David Collier*, with two Brigades, gave them ſuch a warm Reception, that oblig'd him to retire with conſiderable Loſs. Next Morning all our Army was got ſafe under the Works of *Gaunt*, at which Time the Enemy's Horſe began to appear within a Mile of us; whereupon we paſt the Canal that runs from this to *Bruges*, along which a Breaſt-Work had been thrown up. Thus have I given the beſt Account I can of this famous Retreat, in which both Generals were very much blam'd; *Villeroy* for not attacking us as ſoon as he came up, who with ſuch a numerous Army might have over-run us with Eaſe; and *Vademont* for ſtanding his Ground ſo long, and ſuffering Matters to be brought to ſuch a Criſis; for one Day's Time would have ſignify'd but little in the Main. But what he had to ſay for himſelf, was, the Dependence he had on his Intelligence; which indeed by what follow'd, ſhews he had ſufficient Reaſon to truſt them; for he had now a very difficult Part to

act

act in Defence of this Canal, againſt ſo powerful an Army. *Villeroy* march'd immediately down to the Canal, where, for upwards of three Weeks, by Marchings and Countermarchings, he harraſs'd our ſmall Army off their Legs; however, he could not make the leaſt Movement, or form any Deſign, but the Prince had timely Notice of it, and it was very ſtrange he could have ſuch Intelligence, conſidering the Canal that was between us, ſo that the *French* ſaid he dealt with the Devil. *Villeroy* finding he could not paſs the Canal on the Prince, at Length turn'd towards *Dixmude*, where the Prince could give no Manner of Aſſiſtance. 1695.

Here Major-General *Ellinburg*, a *Dane*, who by his perſonal Courage and Merit had rais'd himſelf from a private Centinel to be a Major-General in the *Daniſh* Service, and was particularly recommended to the King by the Duke of *Wirtemberg*, who commanded the *Daniſh* Forces, as a gallant experienc'd Officer for that Command, by his Behaviour here ſurpriz'd all that had ever known him; for as ſoon as *Villeroy* appear'd, he call'd all the commanding Officers together, and propos'd ſending to *Villeroy* to capitulate; to which they all agreed, except the Commander of the Dragoons, who exclaim'd heavily againſt it. However, he being but one, an Officer was forthwith ſent out to *Villeroy*, to demand a Capitulation, who little expected ſo ſudden a Meſſage; he thereupon told the Officer, he would allow them no other Terms than that of Priſoners of War, and withall let them know, if they fir'd one Shot at him he would put every Soul of them to the Sword; and as ſoon as the Officer left him, he advanc'd with the Army, and at once fell to breaking Ground. *Ellinburg*, having before the Officer went out, given Orders that not a Gun ſhould be fir'd, upon the Return of the Officer they baſely ſurrender'd on thoſe

1695. ſcandalous Terms. 'Tis true, the Fortifications were but indifferent; however ſuch a noble Body of Troops, well provided as they were, might very well have held it out till a Lodgment had been made in the Counterſcarp, which they could not have done in leſs than eight or ten Days; after which they might have been ſure of having, at leaſt as good, if not better Terms.

Thus was *Dixmude* ſurrender'd, and *Villeroy*, contrary to a Cartel which had been agreed upon but the Winter before for the Releaſe of Priſoners, ſent them all away, and diſpers'd both Officers and Soldiers throughout the Kingdom of *France*. From *Dixmude Villeroy* march'd to *Deinſe*, into which Place *Vademont*, upon his Retreat from *Arſiel*, had order'd Brigadier *Offarel* with two Battalions; who upon the Arrival of *Villeroy*, ſurrender'd after the ſame Manner as *Dixmude*.

Villeroy having loiter'd away a great deal of Time in theſe Parts, was now for drawing towards *Namur*, but reſolv'd on taking *Bruſſels* in his Way, propoſing to give the Sackage of that famous City to his Soldiers; but *Vademont*, whoſe Intelligence never fail'd him, had timely Notice, and got thither before him, and poſted his Army in ſuch a Manner as prevented his taking the Town, but could not hinder him from bombarding it; by which he laid a great Part of it in Aſhes.

Villeroy thought it high Time to march to the Relief of *Namur*, the Siege of which Place being far advanced; for the King had oblig'd *Boufflers* to deliver up the Town on the 4th of *July*, who retir'd with his Troops into the Caſtle; againſt which his Majeſty was carrying on the moſt vigorous Siege, and battering it with 160 Battering Cannon, and 50 Mortars.

It

It was now the 4th of *Auguſt* when *Villeroy* drew off from *Bruſſels*. He firſt march'd to the Plains of *Fleury*, where he ſtaid till he was reinforc'd from all the Garriſons thereabouts, which compleated to more than 100,000. Upon his marching from *Bruſſels*, *Vademont* march'd and join'd the King, who lay with the Covering Army behind the *Mehaigne*, near two Leagues from *Namur*, and about a League behind him was his Circumvallation Line. The Elector of *Bavaria* carried on the Siege with 20,000 Men. 1695.

The very next Day after we join'd the King, being the 12th of *Auguſt*, four of our *Britiſh* Battalions that were with the Prince, were ordered to the Siege, (of which ours was one) where we arriv'd Time enough to come in for our Share of it. On the 16th *Villeroy* advanc'd towards the King, and encamp'd within a League of him: Next Day he march'd and drew up in Line of Battle within Cannon-Shot of him, where they ſtaid ſome Hours, while *Villeroy* was taking a View of the King's Situation; which it ſeems he did by no Means like, wherefore he march'd back to his Camp, and two Days after he made ſuch another Motion, and plainly ſaw there was no Poſſibility of forcing the King's Camp, without running the Riſque of his whole Army.—— While *Villeroy* was thus amuſing the King, a general Aſſault was order'd to be made, for making a Lodgment on the Covert-way of the Caſtle.—— The Evening before this famous Attack, there came from the King's Camp a Detachment of 2000 Grenadiers and 5000 Fuziliers, who march'd into the Trenches as ſoon as they arriv'd, and the next Morning before Day moſt of the beſieging Army march'd alſo into the Trenches, but were ſo crouded, that our Regiment, with one more, were oblig'd to draw up within the Walls of *Salſine-Abbey*, which was near

1695. half an *Engliſh* Mile from the Place where we were to make our Attack.

Auguſt 20, O. S. About Ten o'Clock in the Forenoon the Signal was given, at which time the Lord *Cutts*, at the Head of the *Britiſh* Grenadiers, ſupported by our four *Britiſh* Battalions, attack'd the Breach that was made by the *Terra Nova*; the *Bavarians* attack'd the Cohorn (where the Elector was preſent.) The *Dutch* attack'd the Works about the *Devil's Knees*, under the Direction of the Duke of *Holſtein-Ploen*; and the Works from thence to the *Maze* were attack'd by the *Brandenburgers*, *Hanoverians* and *Heſſians*, under the Direction of Prince *Naſſau Sarbruck*.

The Lord *Cutts*, with the Grenadiers, were beat off before they got half-way up the Breach, as were alſo two of the Battalions; but our Regiment, and the others that were within the Walls of *Salſine*-Abbey, having a greater Diſtance, could not come up to the Breach till they were beat off; however, we mounted the very Top of it: but by Reaſon of a ſtrange Retrenchment which the Enemy had thrown up on the Inſide, we could proceed no farther; ſo we were obliged to retire, and make the beſt of our Way back.

This was the only Breach made in all their Works; nor could a Lodgment be made there for the high Work of the *Terra Nova*.

The *Bavarians*, and all the other Attacks made the Lodgment they deſign'd on the Covert-Way, which anſwer'd the Deſign of the Attack.

The Loſs the Allies ſuſtain'd on this Occaſion was very conſiderable; which in ſome meaſure might be computed by the Loſs of our Regiment in particular, but do believe we were the greateſt Sufferers of any. We had kill'd our Lieut. Colonel, four Captains, and

ſeven Subalterns; the wounded were our Colonel, three Captains, and 10 Subalterns, with 271 private Men kill'd and wounded. 1695.

The King beheld this Action from a riſing Ground on the Back of the *Salſine*-Abbey, from whence he took particular Notice of the Behaviour of our Regiment, when he ſaw us alone mount the Top of the Breach, and plant our Colours thereon, for which his Majeſty was pleaſed the Winter following to honour the Regiment with the Title of ROYAL of IRELAND, and gave Commiſſions accordingly.

This Attack being over, *Boufflers* plainly ſaw, by the Lodgments that had been made, that another would ſoon follow, which might be of fatal Conſequence to himſelf and Garriſon; he therefore early next Morning made Signals of Diſtreſs from the Top of the Caſtle, which *Villeroy* eaſily perceiv'd; and finding it impoſſible to relieve him, next Morning being the 22d, he ſet Fire to his Camp, and march'd off, which was a Signal to *Boufflers* to make the beſt Terms he could for himſelf; whereupon *Boufflers* the ſame Day beat the Chamade, upon which Hoſtages were exchanged, and a Capitulation entered upon. *Boufflers* would fain excuſe himſelf from treating, but was for putting it upon the Governor, as thinking it beneath a Marſhal of *France* to treat of a Surrender; but the King would by no Means allow of it, nor would the Governor take it upon him: ſo the Elector and *Boufflers* carried on the Capitulation, which was agreed upon as follows; That on the 26th the Garriſon ſhould march out with Drums beating, Colours flying, ſix Pieces of Cannon, as many cover'd Waggons, with ſome other Marks of Honour. According to this Capitulation, *Boufflers* and the Governor marched out at the Head of their Troops, conſiſting of 8000. Our Troops made a Lane for them

to

1695. to march thro' ; as ſoon as they had got clear of the Caſtle, *Mynheer Duckvelt*, one of the Field-Deputies of the States General went up to *Boufflers*, and deſir'd to ſpeak with him by himſelf ; to which *Boufflers* readily comply'd, believing he had ſomething of Conſequence to communicate to him ; but was very much ſurprized when he found himſelf ſurrounded by a Body of Horſe, and told he was the King of *England*'s Priſoner, who had order'd him to be arreſted on account of the Garriſons of *Dixmude* and *Deinſe*, who were detained contrary to the Capitulation that had been agreed on for the Releaſe of Priſoners.

Boufflers in a mighty Rage deſir'd he might ſend to the Elector of *Bavaria*, with whom he had made his Capitulation, the which was granted him ; to whom he complain'd of the Violation of his Treaty, and let him know, that the King his Maſter would not fail revenging the Affront. The Elector, in Anſwer, let him know, that the King of *England* commanded, and that he made uſe of this Expedient to prevent the perpetual Infractions which his Maſter generally made on all Cartels and Capitulations, contrary to the Law of Arms ; whereupon he was forced to ſubmit, and was ſent Priſoner to *Maſtricht*, where he remained till thoſe Troops were ordered back. Soon after the Surrender of the Caſtle of *Namur*, the King drew into the Field, and offered *Villeroy* Battle, but he declin'd it, and march'd within his Lines : ſo nothing was done this Campaign, both Armies going early into Quarters, and ſoon after the Garriſons of *Dixmude* and *Deinſe* were returned, upon which the King order'd a general Court Martial to be held at *Gaunt*, for trying the Commanding Officers of thoſe Garriſons.

Major-General *Ellinburg* ſaid but little in his Defence, but frankly own'd, from the very Moment he received

received Orders for that Command, a Pannick ſeized him, which he could not get over, nor account for. 1695.

The Commanding Officers of the Regiments urged in their Defence, that, as they were under the Command of the Major-General, they thought themſelves obliged to obey. This Pretence had but little Weight with the Court Martial, as appears by their Sentence, which was, that Major-General *Ellinburg* ſhould have his Head cut off by the common Executioner of the *Daniſh* Forces; and all the Commanding Officers that ſigned the Capitulation ſhould be broke, and rendred incapable of ever ſerving the Crown of *England* more; but they recommended the Commanding Officer of the Dragoons to his Majeſty for Preferment.

Brigadier *Offarrel* a Man of long Service, who had always behaved well, had ſomething to ſay for himſelf, *viz.* That *Deinſe* was but a poor fortified Village, hardly ſufficient to keep out a Partizan Party; and the ſlender Garriſon he had in it was not ſufficient to defend it from ſo numerous an Army running over the Works of it, without ſo much as firing a Gun againſt it.

The Commanding Officers alledg'd the ſame, however the Court Martial paſſed Sentence, purely to ſet an Example to others; that the Brigadier ſhould be caſhier'd the Service, and rendred incapable of ſerving the Crown of *England* more, and the Commanding Officer to be ſuſpended for four Months, and then reſtored.

Their great Crime was in not making ſome Shew of Reſiſtance, and firing ſome Cannon at them; nor was it expected that they ſhould ſtand a general Aſſault, for the Deſign of throwing Troops into thoſe Places was only to keep the Enemy employ'd as long as they could: and it was never known, that an Enemy, tho' ever ſo well provided, or aſſured of Suc-

ceſs

1695. ceſs on any Attack, did refuſe a Capitulation when offered; an Inſtance of this we had this very Campaign: Capt. *Withers* of Col. *Calthorp*'s Regiment being poſted in a *Chateau* with only ſix Men, ſtood againſt *Villeroy*'s whole Army for ſome Hours; and when he ſaw they were preparing to ſtorm him, he then beat the Chamade, on which he had the ſame Terms granted him, and himſelf and Men better treated than thoſe that ſurrendred without firing a Shot: which may be a ſufficient Inſtance to all Officers, in regard to their Honour, and the Good of the Service, that they be not too forward in delivering up Places committed to their Charge; nor yet too fool-hardy in ſtanding out till an Attack is once begun: for then it will be too late, I mean the attacking a Breach, or ſuch Works as may be eaſily carry'd; eſpecially when there is not a conſiderable Force to oppoſe.

The King confirm'd the Sentence of the Court Martial, and every thing was executed accordingly.

1696. Notwithſtanding that the King had out-brav'd the Enemy the two former Campaigns, he was now obliged to act on the Defenſive; for the *French* King having clapp'd up a Peace with the Duke of *Savoy* laſt Winter, it enabled him to ſend a greater Number of Troops to the *Netherlands*, than he had any time before; and his Majeſty's great Diſappointments at home from a perverſe Sett of Men, who had continued a Conſpiracy for aſſaſſinating him, was now ſo ſtreightned for Money, on account of calling in the old Coin, that he had not wherewithal to pay the Army; nor could he take the Field a Fortnight after the Enemy: However he made a Shift to prevent them from getting any Advantage.

Villeroy encamp'd with the main Body of his Army on the Plain of *Cambroon*, and *Boufflers* with the remaining Part near *Roſelaire*. The

The King, with the Elector of *Bavaria*, encamp'd with the Groſs of his Army at *Hall*, to cover *Bruſſels*, and that Part of the Country; and Prince *Vademont*, with the remaining Part, encamp'd along the Canal betwixt *Gaunt* and *Bruges*. 1696.

Both Armies lay all this Campaign looking at one another, without one Attempt, which ſeem'd as tho' all Parties grew weary of this long expenſive War; ſo both Armies broke up, and went early to Quarters; and ſoon after a Treaty was ſet on foot at *Ryſwick* in *Holland*.

In *May* both Armies took the Field.

The *French* King, to make a pompous Show in the *Netherlands* in this laſt Campaign of the War, ſent Marſhal *Catinate* with more Troops to join *Villeroy* and *Boufflers*, in ſo much that the Army was prodigiouſly increas'd. 1697.

Theſe three Marſhals drew their Army together on the Plains of *Cambroon*, and were almoſt double our Number.

The King, who encamp'd at *Bois-ſenior Iſſaau*, was obliged to have a watchful Eye over the Enemy; about the Middle of *June* they decamp'd and advanc'd towards us, upon which the King decamp'd and march'd towards *Promel*; but finding the Enemies Deſign was upon *Bruſſels*, he turn'd that Way, and by continuing our March all Night, got thither ſome Hours before them, and took up the ſtrong Camp of *Anderleck*, where we fell immediately to work in throwing up a ſtrong Intrenchment with Redoubts, and other ſtrong Works, which effectually ſecur'd both the Town and Army.

This Security of *Bruſſels* was a very important Affair at this Juncture; for had the Enemy got thither before us, it would have had a mighty Effect in the Treaty of *Ryſwick*, which was now almoſt brought

to

1696. to a Cloſe. The Enemy finding we had ſecur'd *Bruſſels*, ſtop'd ſhort at *Hall*, and ſent a Detachment from thence to lay Siege to *Aeth*; and tho' they knew the Peace would be concluded by the Time *Aeth* would be taken, and that in Courſe it muſt be delivered back, yet ſuch was the Vanity of the haughty Monarch of *France*, that this he would do, to let the World ſee (as he boaſted) it was out of his own Generoſity he gave Peace to *Europe*.

By the Time *Aeth* was taken, the Congreſs at *Ryſwick* had concluded on all Matters, except ſome few Things relating to King *James*, which were ſettled in Camp between the Earl of *Portland* and the Marſhal *Boufflers*, and ſo put an End to this long and bloody War.

In *September* both Armies quitted the Field, at which the Allies ſeparated and returned to their reſpective Countries; our *Britiſh* Troops lay in *Ghent* and *Bruges*, until Shipping arrived at *Oſtend* for carrying us off.

Our Regiment, with the Troops for *Ireland*, ſail'd in *December*, where we continued till the breaking out of the next War, which will be the Subject of the Second Part of my Memoirs.

Queen ANNE's *Wars*.

1700. In 1700 died *Charles* King of *Spain*, who had been languiſhing many Years, on whoſe Death *Lewis* XIV. broke through all the ſacred Ties of the late Peace, to place his Grandſon *Philip* on that Throne, contrary to the expreſs Articles of the ſaid Treaty, and had brought over to his Intereſt the two Electors of *Bavaria* and *Cologne*.

The firſt being Governour of the *Spaniſh Netherlands*, delivered to him all the Garriſons of thoſe Coun-

Countries that belonged to *Spain*; and the latter all the Garriſons that belong'd to his Electorate. Whereupon King *William* form'd another Grand Alliance againſt this ambitious Monarch, on which a freſh War commenced. 1701-2.

In 1701 the *Britiſh* Troops were ordered to *Holland*, at which Time our Regiment with eleven others ſailed from *Cork*, and in the Beginning of *July* arrived in the *Maeſe*, from whence we were diſpers'd into Quarters.

1702. The firſt Thing the Allies undertook this War in the *Netherlands*, was the Siege of *Keyſerſwaert*, a ſtrong Town on the other ſide the *Rhine*, which belongs to the Electorate of *Cologn*, but garriſoned by *France*.

The Allies form'd the Siege of this Place in *April*, on which the *French* King ſent above 60000 Men, under the Duke of *Burgundy*, and the Marſhal *Boufflers*, in order to raiſe the Siege.

On the Arrival of the *French* Army, the Earl of *Athlone* formed a Camp of about 20000 Men, at *Cranenburg*, three Leagues from *Nimeguen*, and two from *Cleves*, in order to cover that Part of the Country, while the Siege was carrying on; in this Camp were moſt of the *Britiſh* Troops.

The Enemy lay encamped about five Leagues in our Front, between whom was a large thick Wood, not paſſable for an Army; they lay on the oppoſite Side of the *Rhine* to *Keyſerſwart*, but durſt not attempt paſſing the River on the Allies; ſo all they could do, was to ſend freſh Troops in Boats over the River by Night, to bring back their wounded.

This enabled the Garriſon to hold out ſome time longer; but when *Burgundy* found that he could not prevent the Allies from taking it, he formed a Scheme to fall on our ſmall Army under *Athlone*; in order

to

1702. to which, as they were beating Tattoo, they decamped on a ſudden. The Duke of *Burgundy* with the right Wing taking his Front round the Wood, by the Way of *Cleves*, and *Boufflers* with the Left, round by the Way of *Genneſp*. My Lord *Athlone* had no Account of the March of the Enemy, 'till twelve o' clock next Day, when on a ſudden he gave Orders to ſtrike our Tents, and to march. Theſe Orders gave us no ſmall Alarm, eſpecially thoſe who had ſent their Horſes this Morning to *Nimeguen* for Forage, which was the Caſe of our Regiment for one; ſo we march'd, leaving our Tents and Baggage on the Ground behind us, never expecting to ſee them more: However, Expreſſes were ſent for the Horſes to throw away their Forage, and make what Haſte they could to bring off the Tents and Baggage, which they very luckily effected.

We continued our March all the Night, but were obliged to take ſomething of a Round to leave the great Road for the Artillery and Baggage; at which Time the Enemies Horſe began to appear on both ſides of us, but their Infantry was a good Diſtance behind; this made us quicken our March, yet before we could reach the Town, a Party of their Dragoons made a Puſh at ſome of our Infantry, which put them in Diſorder; but the Dragoons were ſoon obliged to retreat, and we got ſafe within the Out-works of *Nimeguen*. My Lord *Athlone*, at the Head of the Cavalry, kept in Rear of the Foot, and behaved with great Bravery, but was much blamed for not having better Intelligence; half an Hour more would have brought their Infantry, which would have done our Buſineſs; the Artillery and Baggage having the ſhort Cut, got ſafe.

This ſmall Army narrowly eſcap'd being cut to Pieces for want of good Intelligence, which ſhews the Neceſſity

Neceſſity a General lies under to keep a number of truſty Spies. 1702.

Soon after this Retreat *Keyſerſwaert* ſurrendered, and the Army joined near *Nimeguen*, where the Earl of *Marlbro'* came and took upon him the Command of the Army in the *Netherlands*, which he found compleat 70000 Men. Soon after his coming, he advanced towards the Enemy, who had taken up the ſtrong Camp of *Gennep*, with their Left cloſe to the *Maeſe*.

My Lord *Marlboro'* knew that the Eyes of all the Confederates were upon him, he never having had the like Command before; but eſpecially the States General, who purely to oblige the Queen of *England*, not only placed him at the Head of their Army, but even the Safety of their Country in a great Meaſure depended upon his Conduct: However, as it had always been the Practice of that wiſe State, even in the King's Time, to ſend two of their Council of State with Generals into the Field, who always acted in Concert, they ſent with my Lord two of the moſt experienced Men amongſt them as their Field Deputies, which my Lord could not take ill, ſince it had been their conſtant Practice, tho', as he ever after did, watched all Opportunities to give a bold Stroke at his firſt ſetting out to fix a Reputation.

The firſt Thing the States wanted, was to clear the *Maeſe* of all the *French* Garriſons between *Holland* and *Maeſtricht*, which the Enemy knew, and poſted themſelves in the Way. My Lord *Marlboro'* finding there was no attacking them in the Camp they were in, form'd a Scheme to draw the Enemy after him.

Our Army lay encamped within two Leagues of them, with our Right cloſe to the *Maeſe*, over

1702. which my Lord order'd Bridges to be laid, under Pretence of ſupplying the Camp with Forage from the other Side of the River; as ſoon as the Bridges were finiſhed he made a grand Forage, which looked as if he deſigned to continue for ſome time in this Camp; but the next Evening, on beating the Tattoo, Orders came to ſtrike our Tents to march, whereupon we paſs'd the River, and continued marching all that Night, and till Noon next Day, at which Time we came up with the Caſtle of *Gravenbrook*, in which were three hundred of the Enemy, who refuſing to ſurrender at Diſcretion, ſtood it out about four Hours, till the Caſtle Works were beat about their Ears, and then ſurrendered, and had the ſame Terms as firſt offered. Here the Governor behaved like a Man of Honour and true Judgment; for he would not ſurrender till he was attacked, nor was ſo raſh as to ſtand an Aſſault. From hence we continued our March the ſame Evening, to *Hubert's-Hill*, where we pitch'd our Camp.

The Enemy were ſurprized when they found my Lord had given them the Slip; but were much more ſo, when they found he had got between them and home; whereupon they decamped, and marched along the River till they came within two Leagues of *Vinte*, and then paſſed it, and encamped within three Leagues of the Left of our Army; and were in great Perplexity to get by us.

Marſhal *Tallard* at this Time had a flying Camp of about 12 or 14000 Men in theſe Parts, to take Care of their Lines, to whom the Duke of *Burgundy* ſent to advance towards us, to favour his Attempt.

Our Army had at a little Diſtance in Front a large Heath, over which the Enemy could not avoid paſſing. The Enemy halted in their Camp.

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The Day after they had paſſed the River, and the Morning following they made a grand Forage, as if they deſign'd to make ſome Stay; but my Lord knew very well it was no Camp for them to dwell in; and that That Forage was a Feint to get by him next Morning: He thereupon ordered the Army to ſtrike their Tents, and ſend them with all the Baggage away to *Gravenbrook*, and lie on our Arms all Night, to be ready to fall on the Enemy in the Morning, as they paſſed the Heath. As my Lord judged, it happened; for upon the Enemies beating the Tattoo, they ſtruck their Camp, and marched with all poſſible Expedition, and were entering the Heath by Dawn; at which Time my Lord had the Army under Arms, and ready to march, when the Field Deputies came and pray'd him to deſiſt, notwithſtanding they had the Evening before conſented. My Lord was very much chagrin'd at this Diſappointment; for, in all human Probability, we ſhould have given the Enemy a fatal Blow; ſo my Lord not being willing to do any Thing this firſt Campaign without their Approbation, with great Reluctance complied, and returned with the Army; however he deſired they would ride out with him to ſee the Enemy paſs the Heath, which they did, and were ſurprized to ſee their great Hurry and Confuſion, and confeſs'd a great Opportunity was loſt by their Means. When an Army is under ſuch a Conſternation as the *French* were at this Time, 'tis not to be imagined what a ſmall Matter puts all into Confuſion. Thus they had a narrow Eſcape of being cut to Pieces; 'tis true *Tallard* appeared at a Diſtance, which was the only Motive that induced the Field Deputies againſt engaging; nor could they tell how my Lord *Marlbro'* might behave when he came to engage. 1072.

1702. *Burgundy* and *Tallard* being now joined, their Army out-numbered ours by eight or ten thouſand Men, notwithſtanding my Lord was for giving them Battle; but he found both they and the Field Deputies were for avoiding it.

Next Day my Lord made a Movement with the Army to front the Enemy, where he was obliged to halt for the coming up of our Bread-Waggons and Pay-Maſters, that were waiting at the *Graave* for a Convoy to bring them up; whereupon he made a Detachment of 1600 Men under the Command of General *Opdam* for that Purpoſe; there was an *Engliſh* Brigadier in this Detachment, in which was our Regiment, commanded by Lord *Cutts*. Upon *Opdam*'s marching off, the *French* made a Movement that Way, with a Deſign of falling on him. My Lord was in Hopes this might bring on a general Engagement, whereupon he marched after *Opdam*, keeping at ſuch a Diſtance that he might be ready to ſuccour him in Caſe he ſhould be attacked, on which the *French* halted, who all this Time kept within the incloſed Part of the Country, but my Lord kept out in the open Plains; at laſt *Opdam* brought up the Convoy within a League of my Lord's Camp, at which Time my Lord finding the Enemy had ſtill their Eye on the Convoy, he marched the Army away towards *Peer* and *Dunderſlaugh* Heath, ordering *Opdam* to follow him; by which he was in Hopes of drawing the Enemy into this large Heath. This Bait the Enemy took; for finding my Lord marching on, they came out of the incloſed Grounds with a Deſign of falling on the Convoy; but my Lord kept a watchful Eye on them, and rightly judging the Part of the Heath they would come to, he ſtopt ſhort with the Army, and edged back towards *Opdam*. By this Time the Enemy were drawn ſo far into

into the Heath, that they could not get back without great Danger of having part of their Army cut off; they therefore put on the beſt Face, and drew up in Order of Battle; *Opdam* drew up his Detachment on the Right of the Army, and the Convoy with all the Baggage fell in the Rear. 1702.

Both Armies were drawn up on a noble Heath, within half a Mile of each other, ſo that it was thought impoſſible we could part without Blows; the Cannon on both ſides play'd with great Fury, whereby many Men were killed. About five o'clock my Lord *Marlbro'* having put every thing in Order, was juſt on beginning the Battle when the Field Deputies, who were inſenſibly, as well as the Enemy, brought into this Scrape, came to him, and deſired him not to engage until Morning, that he might have the Day before him; but my Lord told them, the Enemy would not ſtay till the Morning; however, on their preſſing Importunities he did forbear; and, juſt as he ſaid, next Morning there was not one of them to be ſeen, but ſome few of their Squadrons at great Diſtance, bringing up their Rear, and never halted till they had got within their Lines. After this my Lord ſet about clearing the *Maeſe* of the *French* Garriſons; in order to which *Opdam* was ſent off with his Detachment to lay Siege to *Venlo*, and my Lord marched with the reſt of the Army, and encamp'd near *Maeſtricht*, where he lay to cover the beſieging Army.

It was on the 16th of *Auguſt* when *Opdam* came before *Venlo*. We encamped on the Weſt ſide of the River, and carried on our Approaches againſt Fort *St. Michael*, that lay on our Side of the Water. The ſecond Day after our Arrival Prince *Naſſau Sarbrook* arrived on the other Side the River with about 18000 *Pruſſians*, *Hanoverians* and *Heſſians*, who

1702. carried on their Approaches againſt the Town, which lay altogether on that Side.

We carried on our Approaches againſt Fort *St. Michael* by three Attacks; an *Engliſh* Brigade had one of them; theſe Approaches were ſoon carried to the Foot of the Glacis, on which Orders were given to make a Lodgment for attacking the Covert Way, to join our three Attacks by a Parallel Line.

As there happen'd an Affair upon this Occaſion, in which our whole Regiment was concerned, I ſhall be the more particular in my Relation.

Our Regiment mounted the Trenches of our Attack the Morning before this Attack was made; about Noon there joined us the three Companies of Grenadiers that were of our Attack, with five hundred Fuſiliers. About two o'clock the Lord *Cutts*, with ſeveral young Noblemen, came into the Trenches to ſee the Attack carried on. A little before the Attack began, my Lord *Cutts* called the Officers together, and told us, that if we found the Enemy give way with Precipitation, then we were to jump into their Works, follow them, let the Conſequence be what it would. Theſe were fine Orders from a General; but as inconſiderate as they were, we as inconſiderately and raſhly followed them.

About four o'clock the Signal was given; on our advancing, the Enemy gave us their fire and run; we jump'd into the Covert-Way, and purſued; they made to a Ravelin which cover'd the Curtain of the Fort, and a ſmall wooden Bridge which was over a Fauſſee, by which they reliev'd their outward Works; we drove them into the Ravelin, where was a Captain and ſixty Men; we ſoon diſpatch'd moſt of them, the reſt fled over the Bridge, and we, Madmen-like, followed till we got on the Fauſſee-bray, under the Body of the Fort; the Port being ſhut,

ſhut, thoſe that fled before us climb'd it up, which ſhew'd us the Way; for we had no Choice, but to carry the Fort or all periſh; we climbed after them: The Enemy were confounded, and made but little Reſiſtance, ſoon quitted the Rampart, and retired into the Body of the Fort, where they threw down their Arms and called for Quarters, which we gave them, and the Plunder of the Fort to the Soldiers. Thus were the Lord *Cutts*'s unaccountable Orders as unaccountably executed; but had not ſeveral unexpected Accidents occur'd in the Affair, hardly a Man of us would have eſcaped being either killed, drowned, or taken. 1702.

As firſt, the Ditch round the Ravelin was dry, and their own Men ſhew'd us the Way into it; then the unexpected Bridge which led over the Moat, where there was Planks for thoſe of the Ravelin to have drawn after them when they found themſelves attack'd, which the Capt. of the Ravelin ſhould have done, when he ſaw us coming in ſo furious a Manner; ſo that had thoſe Planks been drawn over to their Side, we muſt have made a full Stop here, and the Foremoſt, in Courſe, muſt have been thruſt into the Moat by thoſe that came after, where they muſt have periſh'd, there being eight or ten Feet of Water, and upwards of one hundred Feet over; and again, when we had got over on the Fauſſee-bray, had there been but eight or ten Feet of Brick or Stone-Work under the Sod, as is now practis'd in all Modern Fortifications, we could never have climb'd as we did, nor even as it was, had not the Graſs been long enough for us to hold by; and it may be eaſily judged what the Conſequence muſt have been: But the Succeſs of the Affair crown'd the Event, which got the Lord *Cutts* great Applauſe, of which he boaſted all his Life after, tho' neither he nor any of the Noblemen ſtir'd

1702. one Foot out of the Trenches till we were Maſters of it, except the young Earl of *Huntington*, who ſtole out of the Trenches from them, and kept up with the foremoſt.

Another remarkable Affair happened on the Surrender of the Town, *viz.* An Account came to the Prince, that the *Germans* had taken *Landau*, on which he ordered the Army on both ſides the River, to draw down as near to the Town as they could conveniently to fire; for that Purpoſe, when the Garriſon and Inhabitants ſaw the Army drawing down on all ſides of them, they were ſtrangely ſurprized, believing it was with a Deſign of making ſuch another Attack on the Town, as had been made on the Fort but two Days before: Whereupon the Garriſon got all to their Arms, the Magiſtrates run away to the Governour, begging him to capitulate, and not ſuffer them all to fall a Sacrifice to the Fury of the Enemy. The Inhabitants alſo, Men, Women and Children, came flocking to the Ramparts with white Cloths in their Hands, crying out Mercy, Mercy, Quarter, Quarter. The Governor himſelf was under no leſs Conſternation than the Inhabitants, he diſpatch'd an Officer to deſire a Capitulation; the Prince upon this Meſſage was as much ſurprized as any, and ſent immediately to ſtop our firing, being then in the middle of our ſecond Round, whereupon a Capitulation enſued; and as there were ſeveral Garriſons more on the River to be taken this Campaign, ſo the Prince granted them upon honourable Terms, and the ſecond Day after the Garriſon marched out; and the Day following *Opdam* paſſed the *Maeſe*, and join'd the Prince, and then marched to *Ruremond*, to which we laid Siege, and took it in about two Weeks.

While

While we were carrying on this Siege, my Lord *Marlbro'* ſent a Detachment from the Grand Army, which took in *Stephenſwert* and *Mazewich*, by which the *Maeſe* was clear'd of the *French* Garriſons up to *Maeſtricht*. 1702.

After this the whole Army join'd on *Petersbourg*, a League above *Maeſtricht*, from whence we march'd to *Liege*, where Marſhal *Boufflers* was encamped with the *French* Army, in Hopes to prevent that City's falling to the Allies; but on our Approach he retired within his Lines, leaving eleven Battalions in the Citadel, and two in the Chartreuſe.

The Magiſtrates brought the Keys of the City to my Lord, and received a Garriſon; the Siege of the Citadel was carried on altogether on the Outſide of the Town; and by the 12th of *October* a conſiderable Breach being made, we ſtorm'd and carried it Sword in Hand. The Chartreuſe being an Eye-witneſs of the Fate of the Citadel, ſurrendered on Summons, which ended my Lord *Marlbro*'s firſt Campaign.

The *Britiſh* Troops were ordered to their former Quarters in *Holland*; and when Matters were ſettled for quartering the Troops, my Lord *Marlbro'* went down the *Maeſe* in a Yacht with the Field Deputies; but when he had got below *Venlo*, a *French* Partizan Party from *Guelders* ſeiz'd the Horſes that drew the Yacht, and made them all Priſoners; but the Field Deputies producing the Duke of *Burgundy*'s Paſs, and making them a handſome Preſent, which was what they wanted more than Priſoners, and not knowing my Lord, after rifling the Yacht of ſome valuable Things, they let them paſs, and they got ſafe to the *Hague*.

The Queen having laſt Winter created the Earl Duke of *Marlborough*, he came early in this Spring, and 1703.

1703. and after he had ſettled Matters with the *States* about the Campaign, he gave Orders for the *Britiſh* and *Dutch* Troops to aſſemble near *Maſtricht*, under the Command of the Veldt-Marſhal *Auverquerque*, whilſt he with the *Pruſſian*, *Hanoverian*, and *Heſſian* Troops undertook the Siege of *Bonn*, which he obliged to ſurrender in leſs than three Weeks; which clear'd the *Rhine* of the *French* to *Philipſbourgh*. From *Bonn* he march'd with thoſe Troops to *Limburg*, which alſo ſurrender'd in a ſhort Time: After which he came and join'd the Veldt-Marſhal. Whilſt the Duke was employ'd in taking theſe Places, the Duke *de Villeroy* came at the Head of the *French* Army, to try what he could do with the Veldt-Marſhal, who, upon *Villeroy*'s advancing, drew under the Cannon of *Maſtricht*; notwithſtanding which he drew up his Army within Cannon Shot of us, and made a Show as if he would attack us, and fell to cannonading with great Fury; but what with the Cannon of our Camp, thoſe from the Works of the Town, and from *Peterſburg*, ſoon made him weary, and oblig'd him to draw off. On the Duke's joining us he march'd within Lines, where he kept the remaining Part of the Campaign.

The Duke follow'd, and encamp'd about a League from him. Theſe Lines were prodigious ſtrong, and extended from *Namur* to *Antwerp*, that took in all the *Spaniſh Netherlands*. While we lay here the Duke ſent a Detachment to take in *Huy* on the *Maeſe*, half Way between *Liege* and *Namur*, which Place ſurrender'd in about a Fortnight; ſo that now the Elector of *Cologn* had not one Place left him in his whole Electorate except *Guelders*, which being ſituated in a Moraſs, and not eaſy to come at, a Blockade was form'd about it, which it ſtood almoſt a Year, and then ſurrender'd. After the taking of *Huy*, the Duke

Duke made ſeveral Marches and Countermarches along the Lines, to try if he could get within them, but to no Purpoſe; for *Villeroy* kept ſuch a watchful Eye on all his Motions that the could make nothing of it. The remaining Part of this Campaign paſt without any other Action, than that between *Boufflers* and *Opdam* at *Eckerengen:* Both Armies went to Quarters about the Middle of *October*. 1703.

The Elector of *Bavaria*, whoſe Ambition led him to no leſs than the Imperial Crown, had laſt Year, with the Aſſiſtance of *France*, carried all before him in the Empire, and in all Probability would this Year have drove the Emperor out of *Vienna*, had not the Duke of *Marlborough* undertaken his glorious Expedition into *Germany*, which he carried on with ſo much Secreſy, that puzzled all the Politicians of the *French* Court to find out his Deſigns. He came over early this Spring, and after conſulting with the *States General* on this great Undertaking, he gave Orders for the Troops in theſe Parts, that were to act under him, to march and aſſemble at *Roremund*, where we arrived the Beginning of *May*; from whence we march'd to *Juliers*, where the Duke came and took a Review of theſe Troops; but more particularly of the *Britiſh* Troops of our Nation, whom we found to be 19 Squadrons of Horſe and Dragoons, and 14 Battalions, computed to be about 14,000 effective Men. From *Juliers* we continued by ſeveral Marches thro' the Electorate of *Cologn* to *Coblentz*, where we were join'd by the *Pruſſian* and *Hanoverian* Auxiliaries. 1704.

It had been given out that we were to act on the *Moſſelle*, and not only our own Army, but even the Court of *France* did the ſame; wherefore they order'd the Marſhal *Villeroy* to march with 40,000 Men from the *Netherlands* to the *Moſelle*, and he was by this

1704. Time arriv'd at *Treves*. This March of *Villeroy*'s freed the *States* from the Apprehenſions they were under of the *French* over-running their Frontiers when the *Duke* was march'd off.

We halted here two Days; after which to the Surprize of us all, we croſs'd the *Moſelle* and the *Rhine* both at this Place, and march'd through the Country of *Heſſe-Caſſel*, where we were join'd by the Hereditary Prince of that Country with a Body of *Heſſians*, which compleated the Duke's Army to 40,000. Having paſs'd through *Heſſe*, we march'd through the Electorate of *Mentz*, and ſo through the *Palatinate* of the *Rhine*, till we came to *Heidelhere*; here we halted four Days, nor was it publickly known, till we came here, whither the Duke deſign'd.

From hence we march'd through the Country of *Wirtemberg*, towards the *Danube*. *June* 16, *O. S.* we join'd the Imperial Army, under Prince *Lewis* of *Baden*, at *Gingen* or *Heſpach*. A grand Council of War was held, wherein it was agreed that the Prince of *Baden*, in Conjunction with the Duke of *Marlborough*, ſhould act againſt the Elector of *Bavaria*, and that they ſhould command alternately; while Prince *Eugene* obſerv'd the Motions of *Villeroy*, who had hitherto obſerv'd the March of my Lord *Marlborough*, and was now arriv'd at *Straſburg* on the *Rhine*.

The 19th our two Generals took a View of their Army, and found them to be about 80,000. The 20th, we march'd and encamp'd within Sight of the Elector and Marſhal *Marſhin*, who commanded the *French* that had join'd his Camp at *Dillingen*, a ſtrong Poſt on this Side the *Danube*; their Army were 70,000. The Elector apprehending our Generals had a Deſign upon *Donawert*, ſent off this Evening Count *d'Acro* with 18,000 Men to ſecure that Poſt. Our Generals finding there was no attacking the Enemy in the Poſt they were in, marched

next Morning to *Hermerdingen*, leaving the Elector behind us. The 22d of *June*, *O. S.* the Duke's Day of Command, he march'd by Three in the Morning at the Head of 30 Squadrons, three Regiments of Imperial Grenadiers, and a Detachment of 7000 Foot, the whole Army marching close after him, and as we march'd off from the Left the *British* Troops led the Van. About Noon the Duke came up to the River *Wrentz*, a League from *Donawert*; which being a deep still River, and the Enemy having broke down the Bridge, took the Duke some Hours to repair and lay others, that it was past Four before he got to *Donawert*, where he found Count *Acro* hard at Work in fortifying the Hill of *Schullingberg*, which lay close to this Town, on which he form'd a Disposition for attacking. About Six o'Clock all the *British* Troops being come, he order'd the Attack to be made. The Enemy maintain'd their Posts with great Obstinacy for an Hour and ten Minutes, but at Length were forced to give Way, when our Men made a most terrible Slaughter. Count *Acro*, with the greatest Part of them made down the Back of the Hill to the *Danube*, where was a Bridge of Boats, but the Crowds pressing on it, it broke, by which great Numbers were drown'd. 1704.

The Count, with several Officers of Note, saved themselves by their Horses swimming the River. This Loss was computed to be about 7000 kill'd, 2000 drown'd, and 4000 made Prisoners; with the Loss of all their Artillery, Tents and Baggage. Our Loss was also very considerable, having near 5000 kill'd and wounded.

When the Elector saw us pass his Camp at *Dillingen*, he cross'd the *Danube*, and made what Haste he could to succour *Acro*, but arriv'd only Time enough to behold his Fate. He turn'd to the Right

1704. and march'd to *Auſburg*, where he ſtrongly intrench'd himſelf under the Cannon of that City, and ſent an Expreſs to *Villeroy* to ſend him forthwith a ſtrong Reinforcement, or all muſt be loſt: On which *Villeroy* ſent off the Marſhal *Tallard*, with 60 Squadrons and 40 Battalions of the beſt Troops he had.

On the Elector's turning to *Auſburg*, he ſent to the Governor of *Donawert* to ſet Fire to the Magazines, which were very conſiderable, and retire; this muſt have ſet the whole Town on Fire; wherefore the Magiſtrates found Means to give our Generals timely Notice, on which early next Morning they order'd Bridges to be laid both above and below the Town, to cut off his Retreat; which the Governor perceiving, had only Time to ſet Fire to one of the Magazines and fled. The Inhabitants ſoon ſtifled the Fire, and threw open their Gates.

We halted here two Days after the Action, and paſſing the *Danube* march'd towards the *Leck*, which bounds *Bavaria* from *Swabia*; and having paſs'd this River, we came to a ſmall fortify'd Town call'd *Rain*, which took us four Days: And being in the Country of *Bavaria*, Parties were ſent abroad to plunder the Country, but not ſet Fire to any Place. This our Generals did to try if it would draw off the Elector from the Intereſt of *France*, which had that Effect, that it ſet a Treaty on Foot for that Purpoſe; and a Stop was put to our plundering Parties. As ſoon as *Rain* ſurrender'd we march'd to *Heidelberg*, which was the utmoſt Extent of our March into *Germany*.

This was within a League of *Auſburg*, from whence we had a fair View of that City and the Elector's Camp; we lay here about a Month, during which Time the Treaty was carried on, and our Generals had great Hopes of its ſucceeding, but all this was only

only Grimace; for as ſoon as the Elector had an Account that *Tallard* was got through the *Black-Foreſt*, and arriv'd at *Ulm*, he abruptly broke off the Treaty. Our Generals finding themſelves thus impoſed on, ſent Parties to plunder and burn all the Villages and Towns as far as the Gates of *Munich*. 1704.

The Elector was an Eye-witneſs of the Calamity of his Country, which irritated him to Revenge more than mollify'd him to Compaſſion; wherefore on his joining *Tallard*, he reſolv'd to vent his Fury on the Country of *Wirtemberg*.

On our ſecond Day's March, juſt as we were pitching our Camp, Prince *Eugene*, who march'd from the *Rhine* with 20,000 Men to obſerve *Tallard*'s March thro' the *Black-Foreſt*, and had left them under the Command of the Duke of *Wirtemberg* at the ſtrong Camp of *Munſter*, came riding along our Line, and went to the Duke's Quarters, where they ſettled the Operations of the Campaign, and form'd a Scheme for ſending the Prince of *Baden* out of their Way; who being an old captious General, was not for running Hazards. The Duke of *Marlborough*'s Caſe was ſuch, that unleſs he did ſomething more to free the Empire from the War, he knew what his Fate would be upon his Return to *England*; and Prince *Eugene* being a ſucceſsful puſhing General, and who plainly ſaw that unleſs ſomething extraordinary was done while the Duke was in the *Empire*, the Elector of *Bavaria* would at length carry the Imperial Crown, and then all *Europe* muſt ſubmit to him and the *French* King; ſo that this was the critical Juncture, on which not only the Fate of the *Empire*, but that of *Europe* depended.

Prince *Eugene* and the Duke having thoroughly weigh'd theſe Matters went to the Prince of *Baden*'s Quarters, and propoſed to him his undertaking the

Siege

1704. Siege of *Ingoldſtadt* with 20,000 *Germans*, and the Duke at the ſame Time march'd with the reſt of the Army, and join'd Prince *Eugene*'s Troops at *Munſter*, where our Generals had an Account of the Junction of the Elector and *Tallard*, and of their paſſing the *Danube* at *Lawengen*, which was about ſix Leagues off our Camp. Next Morning our Generals rode at the Head of a ſtrong Body of Horſe in order to mark out a Camp on the Plains of *Hockſtet*, but when they came within Sight of it, they perceiv'd the Enemies Quarter-Maſters laying out a Camp on it, and the Front of their Army entering the Plains. Our Generals ſtay'd ſome Time to obſerve their Manner of Incampment, and then return'd with a Reſolution of giving them Battle next Day, and as ſoon as they return'd to Camp, they gave Orders for ſtriking our Tents, and to ſend them with all the Baggage to the Hill of *Schulenberg*, and prepare for Battle. Next Morning being the 2d of *Auguſt*, *O. S.* or 13th, *N. S.* our Army, conſiſting of 181 Squadrons and 67 Battalions, march'd by Break of Day in Eight Columns to the Enemy, who were about three Leagues from us.

The Duke of *Marlborough* receiv'd the Sacrament this Morning, and on mounting his Horſe ſaid, *This Day I conquer, or die.* A noble Inſtance of the Chriſtian and the Hero.

When we came within Sight of the Enemy, Prince *Eugene* with the Imperialiſts ſtretch'd away to the Right, and drew oppoſite the Elector, and Part of the Troops under *Marſin*; and the Duke with the Troops he brought up with him, ſtretch'd to the Left, and drew up oppoſite *Tallard*, and the Right of *Marſin*. About eight o'Clock we began to form our Lines, at which Time the Enemy ſet Fire to all the Villages that might be of any Cover to us, and

the Cannon on both Sides began to fire with great Fury. 1706.

The Elector, *Tallard*, and *Marſin*, went to the Top of the Steeple of *Blenheim*, from whence they had a fair View of our whole Army: The Elector and *Marſin* were for drawing the Army as cloſe to the marſhy Ground they had in their Front, as was poſſible, and not ſuffer a Man over but on the Points of their Bayonets; but *Tallard*, a haughty proud *Frenchman*, was of a different Opinion, for he ſaid, that would be no more than making a drawn Battle of it. Therefore he ſaid, the only Way to get a compleat Victory would be to draw up their Army at ſome ſmall Diſtance from the Moraſs, and ſuffer us to come over to them, and the more that came over the more they were ſure to kill.

Neither the Elector nor *Marſin* could perſuade him out of this Notion; they both very much diſſatisfied, and, dreading the Conſequence, left him, and went to their Poſts.

When our Army came in Sight of them, their whole Camp was ſtanding, which they ſoon ſtruck, and ſent to the Town of *Hockſtet*, about half a Mile in their Rear.

The Situation of the Ground and Diſpoſition of the French *Army.*

They had on their Right the River *Danube*, and the Village *Blenheim* ſtanding cloſe on the Bank of it; on their Left was a large thick Wood, from whence runs a ſmall Rivulet, which empties itſelf into the *Danube* at *Blenheim*; this Rivulet made the Ground along their Front in moſt Places very Marſhy. In giving an Account of this Battle, I ſhall be the more particular, in relating what paſt between the Duke of *Marlborough* and Marſhal *Tallard*, between whom

1704. the greateſt Streſs of it was fought. When *Tallard* found our General's Reſolution for attacking them, which at firſt he could hardly believe, he to make ſure Work on his Side, threw into the Village of *Blenheim* 28 Battalions and 12 Squadrons of Dragoons commanded by the Marquis *de Hautville*, who had Orders, that when he found our Army paſs the marſhy Ground, he was then to march out and fall on our Rear, by which *Tallard* propoſed to have us between two Fires, and then he could not fail of what he propoſed; he alſo order'd two more of his Battalions with ſix of thoſe under *Marſin* into the Village of *Aberclaw*, which lay towards their Centre; theſe were alſo to march out and join the Troops from *Blenheim*; he alſo placed ſome Foot in the two Mills that ſtood on the Rivulet between *Blenheim* and *Aberclaw*.

The reſt of his Troops, being 48 Squadrons and ten Battalions, he drew upon the Heighth of the Plain near half a Mile from the marſhy Ground, to give our Troops an Opportunity of paſſing over to him. This was the Diſpoſition *Tallard* made of his 60 Squadrons and 40 Battalions which he brought from the *Rhine*. But the Elector and *Marſin* made a quite different Diſpoſition of their Troops; for they drew up cloſe to the marſhy Ground, and would not ſuffer a Man to come over to them. Thus was their whole Army form'd for receiving us, which conſiſted of 163 Squadrons and 83 Battalions, with 120 Cannon and Mortars; and we had but 64: So that our Army was 18 Squadrons more than they, and their Army 16 Battalions more than ours.

The Duke of *Marlborough* obſerving the Diſpoſition *Tallard* had made, ſaw immediately what he deſign'd; whereupon he order'd General *Churchill*, with 19 Battalions to attack the Village of *Blenheim*,

and Lieutenant-General *Wood*, with eight Squadrons to ſupport him in Caſe of Need. Here all our *Britiſh* Infantry were engag'd: He alſo order'd Prince *Holſtein-beck*, with ſix Battalions to attack the Village of *Aberclaw*, and two Battalions to attack the Mills. 1704.

A little before One the Signal was given, at which Time Brigadier *Roe*, at the Head of two *Britiſh* Brigades, led on the Attack of *Blenheim*, but were repuls'd with conſiderable Loſs. The Brigadier himſelf was kill'd, and the Brigades purſued by ſome Horſe that were on the Flank of the Village; but upon the coming up of the reſt of our Infantry, their Horſe retreated, and the two Brigades being ſoon rallied, came again to the Charge, ſo that we drove the Enemy from the Skirts of the Village into the Body of it, which they had fortify'd after the beſt Manner they could in ſo ſhort a Time; in which this great Body of Troops were ſo pent up and crowded, that they had not Room to make Uſe of their Arms. We made ſeveral Attempts to force in upon them, but could not, in which we loſt a great many brave Officers and Soldiers, whoſe Lives might have been ſaved, had General *Churchill*, and a great many others of our warm Generals been adviſed to have halted where we were forced to do it at laſt, which was about 150 Paces from them, where we drew up in great Order ready to receive them when they offered to come out upon us, by which they were ſo hemm'd in, that they were of no further Uſe to their Army this Day, tho' they have been blamed by a great many, for not forcing themſelves thro' us, and join *Tallard* in the Field: but thoſe that were of that Opinion knew nothing of the Matter; for, conſidering the Situation they were in, it was impoſſible for them to draw up in any Manner of Order.

1704. But ſuppoſe they could, they muſt be put into great Diſorder in coming out over the Works they had made; ſo that before they could put themſelves into any Order to attack us they would be mow'd down by our Platoons, which they found by Experience; for they made ſeveral Attempts to come out upon us, but we cut them down as faſt as they appeared: ſo that, had there been double their Number, it was impoſſible for them to force their Way, conſidering the Order we were in to receive them.

Thus was this great Body of *Tallard*'s Army rendred incapable of doing him any Service in the Field, where he very much wanted them.

Let us ſuppoſe what the Duke was doing in other Places; all that Prince *Holſtein-beck* had to do was to prevent the Troops in *Aberclaw* from coming out.

The Duke having thus ſecured himſelf from the Attack in the Rear, he then ordered Col. *Palmes*, with three *Engliſh* Squadrons of Horſe to paſs over before him; who not meeting with the leaſt Oppoſition, drew up on the other Side at ſome Diſtance from the marſhy Ground, to give Room for our Lines to form behind him.

The Duke followed *Palmes*; the Mills were attack'd, but thoſe that were in them ſet them on Fire, and made off: Both Cavalry and Infantry which the Duke kept with him in the Field, which were not above 10 or 12 Battalions, paſſed over as well as they could, and formed as faſt as they got over: *Tallard* all this while, as a Man infatuated, ſtood looking on, without ſuffering either great or ſmall Shot to be fired at them; only when he ſaw *Palmes* advanced towards him, he order'd five (ſome ſay ſeven) Squadrons to march down, and cut thoſe three Squadrons to Pieces, and ſo return. The Officer that commanded

commanded the *French* Squadrons, as ſoon as he had got clear of the Line, ordered the Squadrons on his right and left to edge outward, and then to wheel in upon the Flanks of *Palmes*; which *Palmes* perceiving, ordered Major *Oldfield*, who commanded the Squadron on his right, and Major *Creed*, who commanded that on his left, to wheel outwards, and charge the Squadrons coming down upon them. And not in the leaſt doubting their beating of them, ordered them, when they had done that, to wheel in upon the Flanks of the others; and he at the ſame time would charge them in the Front. Accordingly every thing ſucceeded; ſo that theſe three Squadrons drove their five or ſeven back to their Army. This was the firſt Action in the Field, which took up ſome Time, and gave the Duke an Opportunity of forming his Lines; and now there was a fair Plain, without Hedge or Ditch, for the Cavalry on both Sides to ſhew their Bravery; there being but few of the Infantry to interpoſe, and they drawn up ſeparately from the Horſe. 1704.

When *Tallard* ſaw ſo many of his Squadrons beaten by three, he was ſtrangely confounded; whereupon he advanced with all his Cavalry to charge the Duke, at which time he expected the Troops in the Villages would have marched out, and fallen on his Rear; but the Duke having taken effectual Means to prevent that, was now advancing with his Squadrons to meet him.

The *Gendarmes* (of which *Tallard*'s Horſe moſtly conſiſted, and in whom he placed his greateſt Confidence, believing there was not any Troops in the World able to ſtand before them) began the Battle, giving a moſt furious Charge, and broke thro' Part of our Front-Line; but the ſecond Line coming up made them retreat faſter than they came on, which

1704. cooled thoſe Gentlemen's Courage, for they never made ſuch another Charge; upon which our Squadrons advanced, and charged in their Turn: And thus they charged each other for ſome Time with various Succeſs, till at length the *French* Courage began to abate, and charged but faintly; ſo that they gave Ground as our Squadrons advanced, till they got on the Height where they were firſt drawn up: where their ten Battalions had ſtood while the Horſe were engaged, but now advanced, and interpoſed with their Fire; which put a Stop to our Squadrons, till our Foot and Col. *Blood*'s, with nine Field-Pieces laden with ſmall Shot, came up, which kept them employ'd. This gave a Reſpite of Time to the Squadrons on both Sides to put themſelves into Order, after the Hurry and Confuſion that conſtantly attend ſuch Actions. During which Time, *Tallard* ſent to *Blenheim*, for thoſe Troops to come out to join him; but they were neither able to help him, nor themſelves: He alſo ſent to *Marſin*, but he ſent him Word, that he had too much Work on his own Hands.

The Duke of *Marlborough*, after this Breathing-Time, being freed from the Fire of their Foot; and finding their Horſe had no great Stomach for renewing the Battle, but rather ſeemed in a tottering Condition, gave Orders to all his Cavalry to make a Home-Charge upon them, which they did with ſuch Reſolution, that it decided the Fate of the Day; for they were not able to ſtand this Charge; and our Squadrons breaking thro' their very Centre, put them to an entire Retreat: thirty of their Squadrons fled towards a Bridge they had on the *Danube* between *Blenheim* and *Hochſtet*; but by a Crowd ruſhing upon it, it broke, and our Squadrons purſuing with great Fury, very few, which made that Way, eſcap'd being

being kill'd, or drowned. *Tallard* himſelf made that Way, but finding the Bridge broke, he returned up the River towards *Hochſtet*, but was taken before he got thither: the reſt of their Horſe made towards *Lavingen*, but were not purſued far. 13 Battalions were all cut to Pieces, to a Man, not one of them eſcaping, but ſuch as threw themſelves down among the Slain; I rode thro' them next Morning as they lay dead in Rank and File. 1704.

No General did ever behave with more Calmneſs of Temper, and Preſence of Mind, than did the Duke of *Marlborough* on this Occaſion; he was in all Places wherever his Preſence was requiſite, without Fear of Danger, or in the leaſt Hurry, giving his Orders with all the Calmneſs imaginable.

Now let us ſee what was doing between Prince *Eugene*, the Elector, and *Marſin*.

As I ſaid before, thoſe two Generals ſtood at the very Brink of the marſhy Ground; and all that Prince *Eugene* could do, could not force them to give an Inch of Ground, till the Duke having diſpatch'd *Tallard*, and was drawing ſome Squadrons that Way, which the Elector and *Marſin* perceiving, and finding *Tallard* draw out of the Field, they immediately put themſelves on the Retreat, by readily forming their Troops into three Columns, and march'd off with great Dexterity and Expedition.

By this time the Duke was drawing down to fall on them as they march'd off; but a Body of Troops being obſerved in the Rear of them, and their Cavalry, which form'd a Column to cover the Infantry, marching in great Order, he halted, believing theſe in the Rear to be a Rear-Guard they had form'd to cover their Retreat; and Prince *Eugene* by this time having got a good Body of his Troops over, and juſt ready to fall on their Rear, ſeeing the Duke's

1704. Squadrons marching down, took them to be ſome of *Tallard*'s coming to join the Elector, which occaſioned him to halt, for the reſt of his Troops to come over to him; upon which our Generals ſent their Aid de Camps to know how Matters ſtood with each of them; in the mean time the Elector and *Marſin* got over the Paſs of *Morſtingen*, Night coming on, and our Troops very much fatigued, our Generals purſued no farther. The Troops in *Blenheim* ſeeing their Army drove out of the Field, ſurrendred at Diſcretion, but thoſe in *Auberclaw* made a Shift to get off with *Marſin*.

Thus have I given the moſt exact Account of this famous Battle, that I could poſſibly gather from the ſtricteſt Enquiry I could make among the Troops that had engaged in moſt Parts: for next Morning I rode thro' the greateſt Part of the Field of Battle, where I made the beſt Remarks and Obſervations to inform myſelf of it.

The Loſs of the Enemy was computed to be about 40,000, kill'd, drowned, and taken, with all their Artillery, Tents, and Baggage, beſides a very great Booty. Our Army had near 14,000 kill'd and wounded: thoſe under Prince *Eugene* ſuffered moſt. I ſhall ſay nothing as to the Conſequences that attended this famous Battle, more than that it decided the Fate of the Empire, fixed the Imperial Crown in the Houſe of *Auſtria*, and was the firſt fatal Blow that *Lewis* XIV. had received during his whole Reign.

The Elector and *Marſin* continued their March all the Night, and never made a Halt till they got to *Ulm*, where they ſtaid but one Day, and then made the beſt of their Way thro' the *Black Foreſt*, and ſo joined *Villeroy* on the *Rhine*.

The

The Afternoon after the Battle our Army marched to *Lawingen*, where we halted till our Tents and Baggage came to us, and then marched to *Ulm*, from whence we marched in four Columns thro' the Country of *Wirtemberg*, and joined again at *Philipſburg*; there we paſſed the *Rhine*, and encamped on *Spireback*, a Place remarkable for a Victory obtained the preceding Year by *Tallard* over the Prince of *Heſſe*. 1704.

Our two Generals waited here for the coming of the Prince of *Baden*, who could never forgive them for robbing him of a Share of the Glory of the late Victory, to whom *Imgoldſtadt* ſurrendred, as ſoon as they heard of the Defeat of their Army; he arrived about the 20th of *Auguſt*, O. S. as did alſo all the Troops that were guarding the Lines towards *Straſbourg*, which compleated our Army to 135,000 Men; whereupon it was agreed, that Prince *Lewis* with all the Troops that were not in the Battle ſhould lay Siege to the unfortunate Town of *Landau*; and to carry on the ſame under the King of the *Romans*, who was at this time upon his Departure from *Vienna*; whilſt the Duke and Prince *Eugene* with their Troops were to march to *Cronweſſenberg*, and there to cover the Siege.

Villeroy had drawn all the Troops he could muſter up to *Landau*, to try if he could prevent its falling into the Hands of the Allies; but, on the Approach of our Army, he marched off, and never offered the leaſt Diſturbance after.

While the Siege of *Landau* was carrying on, the Duke of *Marlborough* conſidering the great Difficulties he would have in carrying on the Siege and War in the *Netherlands*, which was crouded with a Number of the beſt fortify'd Towns in *Europe*, beſides the ſtrong Lines which ſurrounded them, had now formed a Scheme for carrying on the War along the *Moſſel*,

1704. *Moſſel*, thro' the Countries of *Luxemberg* and *Lorrain*.

Whereupon it was agreed in a Council of War, that Prince *Lewis* of *Baden*, with 40,000 *Imperialiſts*, ſhould early next Spring join the Duke on the *Moſſel*; upon this, the Duke ordered the Prince of *Heſſe* to march with the *Pruſſian*, *Hannoverian*, and *Heſſian* Troops, that were in *Britiſh* Pay, towards *Treves*, himſelf going along with them, where, after he had taken in that City, and cleared the *Moſſel* of all the *French* Garriſons from thence to *Coblentz*, he returned to *Cronweſſenberg*, leaving the Prince with his Troops to take Care of thoſe Quarters for the Winter.

Laudau held out till the latter End of *November*; but the Duke finding it was not in the Power of the Enemy to raiſe the Siege, ſent off the *Britiſh* and *Dutch* Troops about the Middle of *October*. The Infantry went down the *Rhine* in Boats as far as *Nimeguen*, from whence they diſperſed into Quarters, and the Cavalry marched by Land the ſame Way they came up.

1705. In the Beginning of *May*, according to the Scheme the Duke of *Marlboro'* had formed at *Cronweſſenberg*, he marched from *Maſtricht* with the ſame Number of Troops as laſt Year, thro' the Country of *Limburg*, up to the *Moſſel*, and encamped off that River two Leagues above *Treves*, where the Prince of *Heſſe* join'd him with thoſe Troops the Duke left with him. Here the Prince of *Baden* was to have joined him; but the *Germans* being now freed from the *Bavarian* War, were backward in ſending their Quotas ſo early into the Field as they ought to have done, and Prince *Eugene* having been obliged to go into *Italy* with a Body of Troops to aſſiſt the Duke of *Savoy*, as he was like to be hard preſſed this Summer by *France*; all which prevented the Prince of

Baden

Baden from joining the Duke, as it had been agreed upon: However, he gave the Duke Hopes, that in a little time he would be able to join him at *Elft*; upon which the Duke croſſed the *Moſſel* and the *Saar*, and marched to the Defile of *Taveren*, and advanced to *Elft*, where he waited upwards of a Month for the coming of the Prince: but whether it was for the Want of the *German* Troops, or the Grudge he bore him on account of the Battle of *Hochſtet*, or both together, he at length ſent Word he could not come. 1705.

Marſhal *Villars* commanded the *French* Army in theſe Parts, who lay ſtrongly encamped at *Sirk*, two Leagues from us, with 70,000 Men; and tho' our Army did not exceed 40,000, yet he never offer'd the leaſt Diſturbance. During this time the Duke was hard preſs'd by the Elector of *Bavaria* and *Villeroy* in the *Netherlands*, where the Velt-Marſhal had not an Army ſufficient to oppoſe them: for they had by this time taken *Huy*, and were marching to *Liege*, whereupon the States ſent an Expreſs to the Duke, praying him to make what Haſte back he could to their Aſſiſtance.

Thus was the Duke of *Marlboro'* diſappointed in the noble Scheme he had formed for carrying the War thro' *Lorrain* into the Heart of *France*: for, had Prince *Lewis* performed his Part, the *Netherlands* would ſoon be drained of the *French* to defend themſelves at home. The Duke having received this Expreſs, prepared for marching back with what Expedition he could; and being apprehenſive that *Villars* might attempt falling on his Rear, as he was paſſing the Defile of *Taveren*, he therefore, on beating Tattoo, decamp'd, and march'd all the Night; and by the time it was Day, ſeeing none of *Villars*'s Troops appear, we entred the Defile, and paſſed it without

1705. without the leaſt Moleſtation from *Villars*, tho' he was near double our Number. Having got thro' this dangerous Defile, which was a narrow Paſſage between two Mountains, more than a League in Length, the Duke proceeded to the *Netherlands* with all the Expedition he could; ſo that we were not above half the Time returning that we were in going. When we came near *Aix la Chapelle*, the Duke received an Expreſs from the Velt-Marſhal, that the Enemy were in Poſſeſſion of the City of *Liege*, and carrying on a vigorous Siege againſt the Citadel; on which he march'd off with the Horſe and Dragoons, with all the Grenadiers behind them, leaving Orders with General *Churchill* to make what Haſte he could with the Infantry after him. The Duke joined the Veldt-Marſhal that Evening at *Peterſburgh*, but the Elector and *Villeroy* hearing of it, early next Morning marched off from *Liege*, and never halted till they got within their Lines.

As ſoon as our Infantry joined the Duke, he march'd after the Enemy, and encamp'd within a League of their Lines, each Army being about 80,000; from hence the Duke ſent a Detachment to retake *Huy*; during which Time he had formed a Scheme for paſſing the Lines, which we managed as follows: The Elector and *Villeroy* finding the Duke encamped ſo near their Lines, did imagine he had a Deſign to ſurprize them by ſome ſudden Attempt; wherefore, they drew as cloſe together as they conveniently could, leaving only ſmall Guards to take Care of the Lines on each Side of them.

The Detachment being returned after taking *Huy*, the Duke put his Project in Execution.

The Enemy had the *Mehaign* about half a League on their right, and about three Leagues on their left

left they had two Barriers for the Conveniency of the Country People paſſing to and fro. 1705.

The Duke got in with a Gentleman whoſe Eſtate lay in thoſe Parts, therefore wanted the *French* out of his Neighbourhood, and their Lines demoliſh'd; this Gentleman acquainted the Duke with the Barriers, and procured him truſty Guides to direct him in the Night to them.

Whereupon on the 6th of *July*, O. S. about Noon, the Veldt-Marſhal decamp'd, and march'd with the *Dutch* Troops towards the *Mehaign*, and ſoon after the reſt of the Army ſtruck their Tents, and lay on their Arms, at which Time a Detachment of 10,000 Men under the Command of Count *Noailles* and Lieutenant General *Ingoldsby* were ordered to draw up on the Right of the Army, where they alſo lay down on their Arms, The Enemy ſoon had an Account of all this, from whence they concluded that the Duke had a Deſign of attacking them by Break of Day next Morning, and made a Diſpoſition accordingly to receive us. *Villeroy* moved towards his Right to obſerve the Veldt-Marſhal, and the Elector with their Left Wing, edg'd to the Right to make good his Ground, there they lay on their Arms all Night, expecting us in the Morning.

As ſoon as it grew dark, *Noailles* and *Ingoldsby* marched with their Detachment away towards the Right to the Barriers, having a good many Pioneers with them; the Army followed cloſe after them, and the Veldt Marſhal at the ſame time faced about, and made what Haſte he could after us.

Thus we continued marching all the Night. By the Time Day appeared, *Noailles* and *Ingoldsby* came up to the Barriers, where they found only a Lieutenant and forty Men guarding each of them, who giving one fire, ſcour'd off; upon which they entered

1705. entered the Lines and drew up on the other ſide, and the Pioneers fell to work in throwing them down, and enlarging the Entrance.

The Duke, who kept at the Head of the Right Wing of Horſe, and cloſe to the Detachment, paſt immediately, and drew up the Squadrons as faſt as they got over.

The Enemy a little before had got ſome Notice of our March and Deſign, whereupon the Elector ordered the Marquis *D'Allegar* and Count *Horne*, with the left Wing of their Cavalry to march with all the Expedition they could, to prevent our paſſing the Lines at the Barriers, while the Elector followed with the Infantry; but when *D'Allegar* and *Horne* came near the Barriers, they found the Duke at the Head of his Cavalry ready to receive them; however, they march'd reſolutely down, and the Duke advanced eaſily to meet them, ordering the Infantry as they paſt to follow him. The Enemy charged with great Reſolution; but were repulſed, and obliged to retire. By this Time the Elector arrived with part of his Infantry, on which he advanced and repulſed the Charge.

The greateſt Part of our Infantry on the right Wing, being now got over, drew up behind the Horſe. The Duke receiv'd the Elector in his Charge, and broke thro' his Squadrons, and was advancing briskly after them, but was ſtopt by the Fire of ſome Foot that were privately poſted in a hollow Way; on which our Foot came up, and drove them from thence. The Elector by this Time had rallied his Squadrons, and the Duke now advanced upon him, and charged him with ſuch Reſolution that entirely broke all his Squadrons, and put them to the Rout; ſo abandoning the Foot they had with them, they fled outright, and never rallied more.

Here

Here it was, that the ten *Bavarian* Battalions threw themſelves into the Hollow Square, and march'd off in Spite of all our Cavalry, our Foot being ſo very much fatigued, that they could not poſſibly get up to them. This ſhews what Reſolution and keeping good Order can do. 1705.

Villeroy was making what Haſte he could to aſſiſt the Elector; but finding him defeated, he turned ſhort, and made the beſt of his Way to *Lovain*, where he found him with the Remains of his ſhattered Troops of the left Wing. The Duke having thus baffled the Enemy out of thoſe prodigious Lines, halted for the coming up of the Veldt-Marſhal, whoſe Troops were ſo very much fatigued, that we could not poſſibly follow the Enemy, but lay on our Arms here all Night, nor could we march after them till twelve next Day. Upon our coming up to *Lovain* we found the Enemy encamp'd on the other ſide the *Dyle*, a deep, ſtill River, running thro' the Town, with marſhy Grounds on each ſide of it. After we had lain incamp'd within Cannon Shot of them about ten Days, the Duke made an Attempt for paſſing the River about two Leagues above the Town; but the Enemy being now much more on their Guard, than when in their Lines, got thither time enough to prevent it. After this he made another Attempt to paſs at the Head of the *Dyle*; but on his coming he found them ſo poſted, that he withdrew again; whereupon he ſpent the remaining part of the Campaign in levelling the Lines to the Ground.

In the Beginning of *May*, the Duke aſſembled the Army at *Burklone* near *Maeſtricht*, where he had an Account that the Elector and *Villeroy* were aſſembling the *French* Army on the Plains of Mount *St. Andrea*, on which the Duke advanced to *Hannoy*, which brought the Enemy to *Ramellies*, which was but three 1706.

1706. three Leagues from us; whereupon the Duke, the very next Morning, being the 12th of *May*, O. S. and *Whitſunday*, without waiting for the *Daniſh* Horſe, that were almoſt a Day's March behind, advanc'd in eight Columns to the Enemy, our Army conſiſting only of 117 Squadrons, the *Daniſh* Horſe included, and 80 Battalions. The Enemy had 132 Squadrons and 90 Battalions. The Elector and *Villeroy* with two Enginiers, under Pretence of Hunting, having viewed all the Ground from *Lovain* to the *Main*, pitched on *Ramillies* for giving Battle to the Duke of *Marlbro'*; whereupon they made the Enginiers draw a Plan of the Ground, with a Diſpoſition of the Order of Battle, and ſent it to Court by one of the Enginiers, for the King's Approbation; the King ſeemed highly pleaſed, and all his Politicians, with the Scheme; and were in Hopes it would give a Check to the Duke of *Marlborough*'s Succeſſes; he therefore ordered them ſuch a Number of Troops, as they required, wherein were a great part of the Houſhold. The Nature of the Ground and Diſpoſition they made of their Army was thus, *viz.* They had the *Main* on their Right, with the Village *Tavier* on the Banks of it; a little from thence was the Village *Franquinier*; into thoſe Villages they threw a good Body of Foot and Dragoons, their Horſes being link'd at a ſmall Diſtance behind them. Between the Villages were two Lines of Foot interlined with ſome Dragoons. From *Franquinier* to the Village of *Ramillies*, a fine Plain, on which they drew up moſt of their beſt Cavalry, interlined with their beſt Infantry, and drawn up in three Lines; here they knew the main Streſs of the Battle muſt be fought; therefore they crowded all their beſt Troops. In the Village of *Ramillies*, which lay ſomething to the left of their Center, they placed twenty Battalions with

with ſome Cannon, as they had done in the other Villages. From *Ramillies* runs the River *Geet*, which makes the Ground in moſt Places very ſwampy; along this River they drew up only a ſingle Line of their Infantry, which extended to *Offuſe*, and ſo on to *Autereglier*s, which covered their left Flank. This was the Situation and Diſpoſition the Duke of *Marlbro'* found the Enemy in when he came up to them. 1706.

There was a riſing Ground on our ſide of them, from whence the Duke had a fair View of their Diſpoſition; and at once, that the Streſs of the Battle muſt fall in the Plain, where they appeared very formidable; wherefore he immediately form'd a Scheme for obliging them to break thro' all their fine Plan; ſo that, in leſs than an Hour, without firing a Shot, he obliged them to break their Diſpoſition in the Centre, where they had placed the great Dependence of the Succeſs of the Battle.

The Right of our Army drew up on this riſing Ground, oppoſite their Left, along the *Geet*, from whence our Line extended into the Plain, and ſo on to the *Mehaign*.

The Duke obſerving the Enemies Left ſo thinly man'd, and tho' he plainly ſaw there was no attacking them in that Part, yet the firſt thing he did was to order our right Wing to march down, as if he deſigned to attack them firſt there. This anſwered what he expected; for as ſoon as the Elector and *Villeroy* ſaw our right Wing marching down on their Left, they were ſtartled; whereupon they in a great Hurry ſent off from the Plain a great many of thoſe Troops to ſuſtain their Left, which put the reſt on the Plain into ſome Diſorder, in making good the Ground of thoſe that march'd off. The Duke ordered our Right to retire eaſily back without altering

1706. our Aſpect, which we did, till the Rear Line had got on the Back of the riſing Ground, out of Sight of the Enemy; at which Time the front Line halted; and the Duke ſent Orders to the Rear Line to face to the Left, and march with what Expedition they could away to the Centre; this the Enemy did not in the leaſt perceive. The Duke having thus brought Matters to bear, rides down to the Centre, whither he had ordered the greateſt part of his Cavalry, as well as Infantry to be drawn up; and after he had put all things in order for attacking the Enemy, he ſent to the Veldt-Marſhal to begin the Battle on the Left with the *Dutch* Infantry, their Cavalry being drawn away to the Center. As ſoon as the Veldt-Marſhal had begun the Battle, the Duke ordered four Brigades of Foot to attack the Village of *Ramillies*, which being done, he ordered the Squadrons and Foot in the Center to advance and charge the Enemy in the Plain.

Here the Cavalry charged each other for a conſiderable time with various Succeſs, the Foot on both ſides often ſtopping the Squadrons in their Career. The Duke finding the Enemy maintain their Ground with great Reſolution, ordered all his Squadrons to advance briskly, and give them a Home Charge. In this Hurry the Duke was unhorſed, and in great Danger of his Life, but Col. *Bringfield* his Gentleman of Horſe being at hand with led Horſes, ſoon remounted him; but as he was holding the Duke's Stirrup, a Cannon Ball took off his Head. At the Time our Cavalry made this Home Charge on the Enemy, up comes the Duke of *Wirtemberg* with the *Daniſh* Horſe, who falling on their Flank next to the Village of *Franquenier*, charg'd them with ſuch Fury that it put them into great Diſorder, and purſuing his Blow drove them on their Center, which put the Whole into Confuſion. The Duke did not ſlip this

Op-

Opportunity, but preſſed home till he put them to the Rout. The Elector and *Villeroy* did all they could to keep up the Troops, but in vain. The Houſhold Troops, who had hitherto behaved with great Bravery, rallied and came again to the Charge; but the *French* Fire, which on all firſt Onſets ſeems very furious, was now ſpent; and beſides, their light Horſe took to Flight, and could never be brought to rally, ſo the Houſhold were forced to follow, abandoning their Foot to the Fury of our Troops, to be cut to Pieces to a Man, which is generally the Fate of Foot that are interlin'd with Horſe when they are once routed, and eſpecially when the other Foot are up with them. 1706.

Thus was the main Body of the Enemy, on which the Fate of the Day on both Sides depended, put to an entire Rout. The Veldt-Marſhal by this Time had routed their Right Wing, and drove them out of the Villages; moſt of whom fled towards *Charleroy*. The Troops in *Ramillies* maintain'd that Poſt with great Reſolution, till they ſaw their main Body drove out of the Field; at which Time they quitted the Village, and made towards their Left Wing; but as they could not get out but in great Diſorder, our Horſe fell in with 'em, and cut moſt of them to Pieces.

Their Left Wing and the Front Line of our Right, where our Regiment was, ſtood looking on all the while without ſtriking a Stroke.

When the Elector and *Villeroy* ſaw they muſt yield to Fate, they made the beſt of their Way towards *Louvain*, picking up all the Stragglers they could by the Way, and ſent them to their Left Wing; but the Duke purſued them cloſe with the Horſe, leaving Orders for the Foot to follow as faſt as poſſible. The Foot continu'd marching till about One

1706. in the Morning; and after a Halt of near two Hours began our March again. The Duke purſued ſo cloſe that he got between their Left Wing and *Lovain*, which made them diſperſe throughout their whole Country. The Elector and *Villeroy* finding they could make nothing of it at the *Dyle*, went on to *Villrood*, in Hopes of making a Stand at that Canal; but the Duke being cloſe at their Heels, they made off from thence, and never look'd behind them till they got to *Liſle*.

The Duke halted with the Horſe at *Greenbury* for the Foot, who continued on a diſorderly March, making as few Halts as poſſible, till they came up with the Duke, where we halted till our Tents and Baggage came, and then march'd on to *Aloſte*, and ſo to *Ghent*.

Thus ended the famous Battle of *Ramillies*, in which the Duke of *Marlborough* acted the Part of a moſt conſummate General, not only in gaining ſo great a Victory over the Enemy, who had ſo great Advantage both in their Situation concerted, as well as Number of Troops; but alſo in purſuing the Advantage that accrued thereby: The Conſequence of which was, the Conqueſt of all the *Spaniſh* Netherlands. Moreover, the demoliſhing their old Lines, and taking the ſtrong Fortreſs of *Menin*; in the Siege of which our Regiment was employ'd, when we paid for our looking on at *Ramillies*.

The Remarks I ſhall make on this famous Battle is, to ſhew our young Gentlemen that have never been in Action, the dangerous Conſequence of a General breaking his Order of Battle; the Nature of which ought to be well weigh'd and conſidered; eſpecially when he is on the Defenſive, before the Enemy comes up with him. It was the Feint the Duke of *Marlborough* made with his Right Wing, that made

made them alter their Plan of Battle, which always occaſions Diſorder by ſo ſudden and unexpected an Alteration; and one might imagine that the Elector and *Villeroy*, who had rode ſo often over thoſe Grounds, ſhould have known them better than the Duke of *Marlborough*, and not to have been thus amus'd by him. 1706.

The Intent of their interlining Foot with their Horſe on the Plain, was to ſuſtain the Horſe in Caſe of a Repulſe, under the Shelter of whoſe Fire they may eaſily rally again; for the Horſe never care to come within the Fire of the Foot; wherefore the Duke was oblig'd to do the ſame; for in this Caſe they may be of great Uſe to the Horſe: But then the Horſe are to take great Care whenever they happen to break, that they ride not in upon the Front of their Foot; if they do, they will as ſurely fire upon them as they would upon the Enemy.

The Foot that are poſted after this Manner, are to take great Care that they ſpend not all their Fire at once, leſt the Enemy's Horſe take that Opportunity of breaking in upon them, which the Foot will be too apt to do, unleſs the commanding Officer give the Officers of the Platoons great Caution of being very careful in obſerving ſuch Orders as he ſhall give, on whom all their Behaviour depends; for in this Caſe there may be Occaſion only to fire ſometimes from the Right and ſometimes from the Left, and half their Fire from either will be ſufficient at once. The Foot that are poſted after this Manner are in a dangerous Situation; if they loſe the Day they are entirely cut to Pieces, not One in a Hundred eſcapes, nor can they poſſibly expect Quarter, in the Hurry and Confuſion all are in at ſuch a Juncture.

The Duke of *Marlboro*'s Conduct on his Purſuit is worthy Obſervation; how many Inſtances have we

1706. in Hiſtory of great Victories being obtain'd, that have turned to little or no Advantage, for want of purſuing the Blow, while the Enemy were in a Pannick and Conſternation?

As to the Loſs on both Sides, I refer to the publick Papers; ſo ſhall ſay no more of the following Part of the Campaign, only that it was taken up in the Sieges of *Oſtend*, *Menin*, and *Aeth*.

Antwerp and *Dendermond* ſtood a Blockade for ſome time; the Magiſtrates of all the reſt of the Towns came to the Duke with their Keys, and made their Submiſſion: ſo, after having demoliſh'd the Enemies old Lines, which had been the Barrier to *France* ſince their Conqueſt in the *Netherlands*, we in *October* went into Quarters.

1707. The ill Succeſs of the Elector and *Villeroy* put old *Lewis* on ſending the Duke of *Vendome* to command in their Stead; but with poſitive Orders not to hazard a Battle, unleſs it were in the Defence of their Lines, which were thrown up laſt Winter.

The moſt remarkable Thing in this Campaign was our dirty March to *Soniers*, which was as follows: The Duke being encamp'd at *Meldert* near *Louvain*, *Vendome* came out of his Lines, and encamp'd at *Gennep*, within four Leagues of us, but kept a watchful Eye on the Duke; who he knew would be for attacking him, if he ſhould give him the leaſt Opportunity: which was very true; for when the Duke found him encamp'd ſo very near, he lay very quiet for about a Month, till on the 30th of *June*, on beating Tattoo, the Duke decamp'd on a ſudden, and ſending away the heavy Baggage to *Louvain*, march'd all the Night towards *Vendome*; and by the time it was Day, had got the right Wing of Horſe very near him; who at this time had juſt ſtruck his Camp, and march'd off in great Hurry:

on

on which he order'd Count *Tilly* to advance with the Horſe, and engage him till the Army came up; but the Country wherein *Vendome* was, being full of Incloſures, *Tilly* could not come at them for Want of the Foot, who were a great Way behind; ſo that they could not come time enough to his Aſſiſtance, by which *Vendome* march'd off at his Leiſure. The Duke finding the Foot fatigued with their Night-March, order'd the Army to incamp, and the Horſe to get Forrage; which *Vendome* perceiving, thought the Duke had given over his Deſign; therefore encamp'd at *Seneff*, two Leagues from us. 1707.

When the Duke found he halted ſo near him, as ſoon as it grew dark he march'd again towards him; but it now fell a raining to that degree, that our Men could hardly ſtand under it; however we made a Shift to get up with them by the time it was Day, which *Vendome* little expected, who immediately ſtruck his Camp, and march'd off in great Confuſion: but, as the Rain continued with Violence, ſo that the Infantry could neither keep their Arms dry, nor come up to aſſiſt the Cavalry, otherwiſe he would have paid for his halting at *Seneff*; he therefore made never another Halt till he got within his Lines at *Mons*, from whence he did not ſtir more this Campaign. The Duke finding the Enemy gone off, and the Rain continue, turned to the Right, and encamp'd at *Sonier*, and tho' it was not more than two Leagues from our former Ground, the Horſe marching before the Foot, made the Ground ſo miry, that a great many Men periſh'd in the Sloughs; and it was three Days before the laſt of our Foot got up. Our Army lay here Weather-bound a full Month before we could get hence; and as nothing of Conſequence happen'd after, I end this Campaign.

1708. The *French* King finding he could do nothing in *Flanders*, reſolv'd on trying what he could do with the *Pretender* in *Scotland*; the diſaffected Party of that Kingdom having often ſollicited him to ſend the *Pretender* to them, on which they would do Wonders: this put Old *Lewis* on fitting out a Squadron of 24 light Ships at *Dunkirk*, commanded by the Chevalier *Forbin*, who in the Beginning of *March* ſail'd with the *Pretender* and a Body of Troops towards the *Firth* of *Edinburgh*.

England had timely Notice of their Deſign, and had order'd Sir *George Byng* with a good Squadron to watch *Forbin*'s Motion; however, could not prevent his ſailing out of *Dunkirk*, and had got 18 Hours ſtart of him: Sir *George* follow'd, keeping along the *Engliſh* Coaſt, *Forbin* having kept on the other Side the Channel along the Coaſt of *Holland*.

There was upon this Occaſion 10 *Britiſh* Battalions from *Flanders* order'd to embark at *Oſtend* on board Tranſports, and ſail under Convoy of Admiral *Baker*, who had ten Men of War for that Purpoſe. We ſail'd to *Tinmouth*, where we lay on board, waiting the Event of Sir *George*, who had by this time got near the Mouth of the *Firth*: But *Forbin* keeping on the oppoſite Shore, when he ſtood over, found he had overſhot his Poſt, wherefore was forced to tack to recover it: but, as he was juſt upon ſtanding in to the *Firth*, he perceived Sir *George*, upon which he tack'd again, and crouding all the Sail he could, ſtood away towards the Coaſt of *Denmark*; and having clear light Ships, out-ſail'd Sir *George*, and got back to *Dunkirk*. Thus ended this famous Expedition, after which our ten Battalions ſail'd back to *Oſtend*, and landed the 14th of *April*.

In the Beginning of *May* the Duke aſſembled the Army at *Tarleank*, between *Louvain* and *Bruſſels*, where

where he waited for the coming of Prince *Eugene*, who was on a full March from the *Rhine* with 30,000 *Germans* to join him. 1708.

Old *Lewis* having fail'd in his *Scottiſh* Expedition, had now form'd another Project to be tranſacted in the *Netherlands* this Campaign; wherefore he had augmented his Army to 110,000, with whom *Vendome* encamp'd between *Soniers* and *Chirre*: Here the Duke of *Burgundy* came, and took the Command of the Army, who was accompany'd by the Duke of *Berry*, and the *Pretender*, under the Title of the *Chevalier de St. George*: On *Vendome*'s advancing to *Soniers*, the Duke march'd to *Hall*, in order to cover *Bruſſels*, on which he thought the Enemy had a Deſign.

The Project that he thought had been concerted in the Court of *France* for the Operations of this Campaign was this: The Elector of *Bavaria*, when Governor of the Low Countries, had liv'd after a moſt profuſe Manner, which gained much on the Affections of the People, eſpecially among the Ladies, and ſtill kept up a ſecret Correſpondence among them; and had now brought Matters to bear, that the Magiſtrates of moſt of the Towns were to deliver them up to the *French*, whenever their Army appeared before them.

My Lord *Marlboro'* (whoſe Intelligence in the Court of *France* never fail'd him) had timely Notice of all this, wherefore it was that he had ſent to Prince *Eugene* to come to his Aſſiſtance. *Burgundy* had the Command of the *French* Army, yet the Management was wholly in *Vendome*; ſo, according to the above Scheme, towards the latter End of *June*, he decamp'd very ſilently, upon beating Tattoo, and never halted till he came before the Gates of *Ghent*, which the Magiſtrates threw open to him, and receiv'd Lieut.Gen. *Lamott* with 20,000 Men,

1708. Men, 5,000 of which he ſent that Night to *Bruges*, which did the ſame.

Vendome puff'd with this Succeſs, march'd next Morning to the *Scheld*, in hopes to get into *Oudenarde* after the ſame Manner; but my Lord *Marlboro'* was before-hand with him there: for, next Morning, after *Vendome* had ſtole this March of him, he decamp'd, and follow'd as faſt as he could, and got to *Oudenarde* before him; upon which *Vendome* croſſed the *Scheld* at *Gaver*, thinking to get home that Way. Upon the Duke's coming to *Oudenarde*, he order'd Bridges to be laid over the *Scheld*, a little below the Town, and the Foot to paſs as they came up, while he at the Head of the Horſe paſs'd thro' the Town, and drew up between *Vendome* and home, who begun now to wiſh he had never undertook their fine Project, and was at a Loſs what to do: to return to *Ghent*, was to be penn'd up in a Corner of the Country, and cut off from his Garriſons; and he knew the *Germans* would join the Duke in a few Days; he therefore reſolved to ſtand a Battle; and tho' he was at leaſt 10,000 Men ſtronger than the Duke, yet he would not venture to attack him, but drew up his Army behind a ſtrong Piece of Ground, having the *Scheld* with a great many Incloſures on his left, with the Village *Greenheim* in the Front of the Incloſures, from whence was a marſhy Ground full of Trees and Bruſh-Wood, which extended to a riſing Ground, whereon was a noble Plain, on which he drew up all his Cavalry interlined with ſome Foot: Behind the marſhy Ground, and ſo on to the *Scheld*, he drew up all the reſt of his Infantry, and placed in the Village ſome Foot and Dragoons; he alſo caus'd a great many Trees to be cut down in the marſhy Ground, to obſtruct our Paſſage.

This

This was the Diſpoſition *Vendome* had made of his Army. 1708.

The Duke ranged the greateſt Part of his Infantry from the *Scheld*, along the marſhy Ground; and in the Plain drew up all the Cavalry, keeping with him 15 Battalions of the *Dutch* Foot under the Command of the Prince of *Orange*. Before the Duke had form'd his Lines, Prince *Eugene* came up in Perſon, but had left his Troops two Days March behind.

The Battle began by attacking the Village near the *Scheld*, which being advanced ſomething from their Line, they quitted with little Oppoſition; upon which our Infantry acted on the marſhy Grounds, and attack'd their main Body of Foot, who ſtood their Ground with great Reſolution; at the ſame time our Cavalry on the Plain advanc'd on theirs with ſuch Reſolution, as made them give Way at once; nor did they make one brave Charge all this Day, but ſtill gave Ground as our Horſe charged them. Our Infantry here engaged theirs; ſo that they gave no Diſturbance to our Horſe, who alſo ſhrunk back with their Horſe: thus we kept preſſing on them in the Plain till we drove them paſt the marſhy Ground, they never making one gallant Puſh all this While: at length our Horſe drove reſolutely in upon them, which entirely broke them, and put them to the Rout; nor could all their Generals get them to rally again, ſo as to give the leaſt Aſſiſtance in helping to bring off their Foot, thoſe of their Foot in the Plain undergoing the Fate that attend all Foot in the like Caſe.

Their Infantry that defended the marſhy Ground behaved very gallantly, inſomuch that our Foot could not force them from thence, till the Prince of *Orange* came on their Flank with the 13 *Dutch* Battalions he

1708. had with him; and they ſeeing their Horſe drove out of the Field, made down to the Incloſures on the *Scheld*, where our Horſe could not come at them, nor could the Foot follow them, being very much fatigued; however, they pour'd their Fire in upon them as they were going off, which did great Execution.

Vendome with his ſhater'd Troops made the beſt of his Way to *Ghent*, nor did he think himſelf ſafe till he had got thorough the Town, and encamp'd along the Canal to *Bruges*. There were kill'd and taken of the Enemy about 10,000; and were it not for the Incloſures along the *Scheld*, hardly any of their Foot would have got off.

Our Foot ſuffer'd moſt on this Occaſion; nor did the Duke purſue them much further than the Field of Battle, on which we lay all Night.

Next Day a Detachment was ſent to ſecure the Enemies Lines at *Warneſton*. The *Germans* being arriv'd, our Generals reſolv'd on the Siege of *Liſle*; a bold Undertaking; Whereupon we marched, and inveſted that famous City: However, the Marſhal *Boufflers* found Means to throw himſelf with a good Body of Troops into it; ſo that the Garriſon conſiſted of 14,000 effective Men, beſides a great Number of the Inhabitants, who did good Service during the Siege. The Out-Works and Fortifications, together with the Citadel, were *Vauban*'s Maſter-Piece, whereon he had exerted the utmoſt of his Skill, and was ſaid to be a hazardous Undertaking of our Generals.

The ſecond of *Auguſt*, O. S. our Army ſate down before *Liſle*; Prince *Eugene* undertook the Siege with 50 Battalions and 40 Squadrons (our Regiment being one, wherein we ſuffer'd very much) while the Duke

Duke of *Marlboro'* with the reſt of the Army co- 1708.
ver'd him.

The *French* Court, who expected great Matters from this Campaign, were very much ſurpriz'd and chagrin'd on the Defeat of their Army at *Oudenard*; but were Thunder-ſtruck when they found their Lines demoliſh'd, and their beloved City of *Liſle* inveſted: Whereupon they immediately ordered the Duke of *Berwick* to march with a ſtrong Detachment from the *Rhine* to the *Netherlands* to aſſiſt *Vendome* in raiſing the Siege. *Berwick* came, and encamp'd between *Doway* and *Tournay*, to cover that Part of the Country from our Parties.

I ſhall take no Notice of the Progreſs of this famous Siege, more than the Stratagems uſed by the Generals on both Sides; the one for carrying it on, and the other for raiſing it. *Vendome* lay encamp'd on the Canal (from whence the Princes of the Blood, with the *Chevalier*, went home by the Way of *Newport*) till the Arrival of the Duke of *Berwick*, at which time he march'd thro' *Ghent*, and keeping the *Scheld* on his Right, marched up that River, till he came near *Tournay*, where he croſs'd it, and join'd *Berwick*: and now being much ſuperior in Numbers, gave out, that he would oblige our Generals to raiſe the Siege; whereupon he advanc'd towards the Duke, upon which Prince *Eugene* came and join'd him with what Troops could be ſpared from the Siege, leaving the Prince of *Orange* to command in his Abſence. *Vendome* advanc'd within Cannon-ſhot of the Duke, and fell to cannonading each other with great Fury for the whole Day after; on which he retired at a ſmall Diſtance: upon which the Duke cauſed an Intrenchment to be thrown up in the Front of his Camp, to prevent any ſudden Surprize, and Prince *Eugene* returned again to the Siege. In a few

Days

1708. Days after, *Vendome* advanced a ſecond time, which brought Prince *Eugene* again from the Siege, and both Armies fell again to cannonading, which continued till Night; when they lay on their Arms till Morning, at which time our General expected to be attack'd, but they fell to cannonading again. Our Generals finding this waſted their Ammunition much, and that our Men were pretty well cover'd by the Intrenchment from their Fire, therefore grew ſparing of it. This *Vendome* very well knew therefore, when we abated in our Fire, and that it would be too hazardous to attack us: beſides, he found no Ardor in his Troops to it; he therefore formed a Deſign for cutting off our Communication from our Garriſons on the other Side the *Scheld*, from whence we had all our Stores and Proviſions; he therefore drew off in the Night, and marched to the other Side of the *Scheld*, and ranged his Army along the Banks of that River, and threw up a ſtrong Intrenchment all the Way to *Oudenard*, carrying it round the Town by *Gaver*; by which he effected his Deſign, and was confident our Army could not ſubſiſt long before *Liſle*: but the Duke foreſeeing the Difficulties that would ariſe from thence, had ſent an Expreſs to *England* for Lieut. Gen. *Earl*, who at this time was embark'd with 6000 Men for *Spain*, and lay Wind-bound, to ſail to *Oſtend*: ſo the Wind that prevented his ſailing to *Spain*, brought him to *Oſtend*, with a great Quantity of Stores and Proviſions; as alſo great Quantities ſent from *Holland*; from whence he ſent, ſoon after his Arrival, a large Convoy of all manner of Neceſſaries, which were much wanted at the Siege: On which the Duke march'd with the Covering-Army to *Roſilare*, to facilitate the Convoys that were to come from *Oſtend*, whence he ſent Major-Gen. *Webb* with 6000 Men to bring up

this

this first Convoy. *Vendome* saw that the Fate of *Lisle* depended in a great measure on its Arrival; wherefore he ordered Lieut. Gen. *Lamott* to march with 24,000 Men to intercept it. *Lamott* came up with *Webb* at the Wood of *Winnendale*, who drew up his Men to all the Advantage the Ground would admit of. *Lamott* fell to cannonading him, but *Webb* ordered his Men to lie flat on the Ground; by which the Cannon did little, or no Hurt: after this *Lamott* attack'd him several times, and was as often repuls'd. 1708.

The Duke having an Account of the March of *Lamott*, ordered Lieut. Gen. *Cadogan* with a Body of Horse to the Succour of *Webb*; who, upon the hearing *Lamott*'s Cannon, made all the Haste he could to *Webb*'s Assistance; on whose appearing *Lamott* left the Field with great Precipitation, leaving all his Cannon; and this grand Convoy arrived safe, which may be said was the taking of *Lisle*. *Webb* gain'd great Honour by this gallant Action, tho' a great deal was owing to *Lamott*'s ill Conduct; and *Webb* spoil'd all, by boasting too much of it.

Boufflers having been too profuse of his Ammunition at the Beginning of the Siege, began now to want Powder; who found Means to acquaint *Vendome*, who could find no other Way of supplying him, but by ordering the Duke of *Luxemberg* with 2000 choice Horse, each of them taking 100 lb. of Powder behind him, and so to make a bold Push for throwing themselves into *Lisle*: whereupon they advanced with great Boughs in their Hats along the Causeway that leads from *Doway*; and marching in great Order up to our advanc'd Guard, who, upon challenging them, answered, they were *Germans* of our Army, that had been on an Out-Command, and were returning with Prisoners they had taken; upon which

1708. which the Officer let them paſs: but coming to the next Guard, the Officer examining them more ſtrictly, they then clapp'd Spurs to their Horſes, and rode by the Guard as hard as they could drive towards the Town; but the Officer firing on them, gave the Alarm; ſo all that were in their Way turn'd out, and fell firing at them, killing a good many of them, and ſetting Fire to their Baggs of Powder; however, the foremoſt drove on, ſo that near 1000 of them got into the Town in a Cloud of Smoak; for riding in a Crowd, the Baggs which our Men had ſet Fire to, ſet Fire to others, by which a great many were blown up; thoſe that were behind made backwards to *Doway*: but a great many were kill'd before they got clear of our Camp. This Affair happened the very Day of *Winnendal* Fight.

There came two other Convoys ſafe from *Oſtend*, which did the Buſineſs, and that was all; for ſoon after *Vendome* found Means to cut off our Communication with *Oſtend*, by taking the Poſt of *Leffingen*, and then cutting the Dykes, laid all that Country under Water: but this was too late, for *Boufflers* was, on the 12th of *October*, obliged to ſurrender the Town, and retire with his Garriſon into the Citadel, having not above 5000 fit for Service.

About this time the Elector of *Bavaria* with 12,000 Men came before *Bruſſels*, expecting that the Inhabitants would riſe in his Favour: but tho' their Inclinations were good, yet ſeeing how Matters went, kept them quiet; and Count *Paſcal* the Governor, with a Garriſon of 5000 Men, behaved with great Bravery. The Elector made a Lodgment on the Counterſcarp, and a Breach in the Wall; but by a vigorous Sally of the Garriſon, he was drove from the Counterſcarp with a conſiderable Loſs. The Duke hearing the Elector was ſate down before *Bruſſels*,

ſels, reſolved on the Relief of it; therefore marched towards the *Scheld*, leaving Prince *Eugene* in Poſſeſſion of the Town of *Liſle*, to carry on the Siege of the Citadel. 1708.

Upon the Duke's approaching the *Scheld*, he made two Detachments, one under the Command of the Earl of *Orkney*, and Count *Loatain*; the other under Lieut. Gen. *Cadogan* and Brigadier *Evans*: the former march'd to *Gaver*, the latter to *Kirkhoven*, where they both paſs'd the *Scheld*, without the leaſt Oppoſition, to the great Shame of the Arms of *France*, and Surprize of all Men; upon which the *French* abandon'd all their mighty Works they had thrown up along that River, ſome making towards *Tournay*, but the greateſt Part towards *Ghent*, leaving moſt of their Cannon behind them. The Duke march'd with the Main of his Army to *Kirkhoven*, where having paſs'd the *Scheld*, he march'd to *Bruſſels*; but, on the Elector's hearing he had paſs'd the *Scheld*, he ſtole off in the Night, and made the beſt of his Way to *Namur*, leaving all his Cannon, Ammunition, and Wounded behind him. Soon after this *Boufflers* ſurrendred the Citadel of *Liſle*, and *Vendome* march'd home by the Way of *Newport*, leaving *Lamott* with about 20,000 Men to defend his new Conqueſt of *Ghent* and *Bruges*: but the Duke diſlodg'd him from thence before he put the Army into Quarters; for he ſate down before *Ghent* on the 7th of *December*, and on the 24th *Lamott* ſurrendred, having Liberty to march home after *Vendome* with all his Troops. Thus ended this great and long Campaign, with Diſgrace and Mortification to the *French* Court.

This was a very wet Spring, our Army could not take the Field till the latter End of *May*. The Duke open'd the Campaign near *Mennin*, where Prince 1709.

1709. *Eugene* join'd him with his *Germans*, our Army being upwards of 100,000, advanced to the other Side of *Liſle*.

The *French* King being diſpleaſed with the Conduct of the Duke of *Vendome*, ſent this Year the Marſhal *Villars* to command in his Stead, who drew his Army together at *Pont a Vendine*, within the new Lines they had thrown up laſt Winter. Our Generals advanced and encamp'd within leſs than two Leagues of him, and rode out next Morning to take a View of his Situation, which made him believe they deſign'd to attack him in that Poſt; wherefore he ſent immediately to *Tournay* and *Doway* for a great Part of the Troops that garriſon'd thoſe Places, to join him.

Upon our beating Tattoo this Evening, Orders came along the Line for us to ſtrike our Tents, and march. This made us believe that our Generals did really deſign to attack their Lines next Morning; but on our marching off to the Left, which was quite the contrary Way, we could not tell what to think of it; yet, when Day appear'd, were not a little ſurprized to find ourſelves before the City of *Tournay*, which we immediately inveſted. This was no leſs a Surprize on *Villars*, eſpecially ſince he had drain'd the City of the beſt of its Troops, there being not above 5000 Men left to defend the great Number of Works that were about it; nor was it now in the Power of *Villars* to return thoſe Troops.

SIEGE of TOURNAY.

This was a nice Fineſſe of our Generals, worthy a Remark. The *French* Court was ſurprized when they heard of it, wherefore they ſent Marſhal *Boufflers* with a Reinforcement of Troops from the *Rhine*, to join

join *Villars*, by which his Army was 15000 more than ours. I ſhall not take Notice of the Progreſs of the Siege, more than that Prince *Eugene* undertook it, while the Duke cover'd him; (our Regiment, tho' employ'd in the Siege of both the Town and Citadel of *Liſle*, was alſo at the Siege of both Town and Citadel of this Place, and were great Sufferers at both.) The Marquis *De Surville*, who commanded, ſurrendred the Town on the 19th of *July*, and retired into the Citadel; which is certainly one of the beſt fortify'd Places by Art that is in the World, there being more Works a great deal under Ground than above, which made our Approach very difficult; inſomuch that we were obliged to carry great Part of our Works under Ground, by which, and the ſpringing their Mines, we loſt great Numbers of Men: However, they having but a ſlender Garriſon, their Men were fatigued out of their Lives, ſo were obliged to ſurrender on the 22d of *Auguſt*. 1709.

This important Place being taken, our Generals deſign'd on *Mons*; in order to which the Prince of *Heſſe* was ſent with a ſtrong Detachment before to diſlodge a Party of Dragoons that were poſted near *Mons*, the Army marching ſoon after him; but, upon the Approach of the Prince, the Dragoons drew off - - - - When *Villars* found *Tournay* inveſted, he paſs'd the *Scharp*, and encamp'd between that River and the *Scheld*, and marched that Way, in hopes of getting thither before them: but finding they had got before him, he ſtopp'd ſhort at *Malplacquet*, and finding it a ſtrong Situation, reſolved upon maintaining that Poſt, in order to give what Diſturbance he could in our carrying on the Siege: whereupon he immediately fell to work in throwing up a ſtrong Intrenchment, and cutting down Trees in the Wood

1709. that cover'd him, laying them acroſs to prevent our coming at him.

Our Generals finding *Villars* poſſeſſed of this Ground, reſolved to diſlodge him: they march'd up to him the ſame Afternoon, and after taking a View of his Situation, were for attacking him at once; but, as our RightWing and ſome Battalions that were left to level the Works of *Tournay*, were not yet come, and the Day far ſpent, they deferr'd it till Morning: however, both Armies cannonaded each other with great Fury, and *Villars* kept his Men at Work all Night; ſo that in the Morning his Army ſeemed to be drawn up within a ſtrong Fortification. His Right was cover'd with a Moraſs with Intrenchments and Hedges before him; in his Left he had the Wood of *Sart*, and along his Front were ſeveral Woods interſperſed with Trees cut down, and Intrenchments thrown up one within another; inſomuch that it was generally believed our Generals would not venture to attack them; and eſpecially ſince they could carry on the Siege of *Mons* without coming to that Extremity: but wanton with Succeſs, ourTroops come up, on the 31ſt of *Auguſt*, O. S. and the Attack was made about half an Hour after Eight in the Morning. General *Schulemberg*, with the *Germans* on the Right, attack'd the Left of the Enemy in the Wood of *Sart*; the Duke of *Argyll*, with Part of the *Britiſh* Troops, attack'd the Intrenchments about *Tanniers*. Lieut. Gen. *Withers*, with the Right of the *Britiſh* and Auxiliaries, attack'd thoſe about *Blarengiers* and *Malplacquet*; and the Prince of *Orange* at the Head of the *Dutch* attack'd their Right, and thoſe in the Wood of *Lamert*.

Thus was *Villars* attack'd by our Infantry in all Parts at once, our Cavalry drawn up cloſe in the Rear, till our Infantry, after a long and bloody Diſpute,

pute, broke in upon them in all Places, and put 'em to the Rout; at which time the Cavalry fell on them, and made a moſt terrible Slaughter: however, tho' *Villars* behaved with great Courage and Reſolution, and was carry'd wounded out of the Field, yet *Boufflers* made a gallant Retreat towards *Queſnoy*, and drew within their Lines that were between that Place and *Valenchinis*. Our Generals had enough of this Battle; for they did not offer to purſue, after we had drove them a little Way from their Works, but reſted ſatisfy'd with being Maſters of the Field. It was the moſt deſperate and bloody Attack and Battle that had been fought in the Memory of Man; and both our Generals were very much blam'd for throwing away ſo many brave Men's Lives, when there was no Occaſion: It was the only raſh Thing the Duke of *Marlboro'* was ever guilty of; and it was generally believ'd that he was preſs'd to it by Prince *Eugene:* and this very Battle gave the Duke's Enemies a Handle to exclaim againſt him, in ſaying he was a Man delighted in War, and valued not the Lives of Men. 1709.

The Battle laſted from Eight in the Morning till Three in the Afternoon. The Loſs was computed to be near 18,000 kill'd and wounded on each Side; but we took a great many Priſoners, with all their Artillery. After the Battle we inveſted *Mons*, which ſurrendred the 9th of *October*, and then both Armies went into Quarters.

Our two Generals, reſolved to puſh on the War in theſe Parts, aſſembled the Army near *Tournay*, in the Beginning of *April*, before the *French* could get into the Field; by which we paſs'd their Lines, on the 9th, at *Pont a Vendin*, without the leaſt Oppoſition, from whence we march'd to the Plains of *Lens*. 1710.

1710. *Villars* at this time was aſſembling his Army behind the *Scharp*; but on our advancing towards him, he retired with Precipitation behind the *Senſett*, leaving ſome of his Tents and Baggage behind him: on which we inveſted *Doway*, in which and Fort *Scharp* were a Garriſon of 1000 Men, commanded by Lieut. Gen. *Albergotty*, an old experienced Officer.

Soon after *Doway* was inveſted, *Villars* having got all his Army together, drew from behind the *Senſett*, and encamp'd on the Plains before *Arraſs*; and, according to the *French* Way of Gaſconading, gave out, that he would make our Generals repent their ſitting down before *Doway*: upon which the Duke drew the Covering-Army on the Plains before *Doway*, and made a Diſpoſition for receiving him, whilſt Prince *Eugene* was carrying on the Siege.

Villars advanc'd within Cannon-ſhot of us, and made a Shew of attacking us, on which Prince *Eugene* join'd us with what Troops could be ſpared from the Siege; but they ſoon found this was only a *French* Air of *Villars* to retard the Siege: whereupon the Duke order'd a ſlight Intrenchment to be thrown up in the Front of his Camp, and Prince *Eugene* return'd to the Siege, and *Villars* march'd back to the Plains of *Arraſs*. Notwithſtanding *Albergotty* made a very gallant Defence in diſputing every Inch of Ground, and making ſeveral deſperate Sallies, in which great Numbers were kill'd on both Sides; yet he was obliged to ſurrender both the Town and Fort *Scharp*, on the 15th of *June*. This Siege was no ſooner over, tho' *Villars*'s Army much out-number'd ours, than he retir'd behind the *Senſett*, ſo that there was no coming at him, nor laying Siege to *Arraſs*: on which our Generals laid Siege to *Bethune*, which ſurrendred the 20th of *Auguſt*. After which we inveſted

veſted both *St. Vincent* and *Arre* at the ſame time. The firſt of theſe Places ſurrendred in a ſhort time; but *Arre*, very ſtrong by Art and Nature, held out a long Siege, and did not ſurrender till the latter End of *October*; *Villars* all the while never offering to ſtir from behind the *Senſet*. This Siege over, both Armies went into Quarters. 1710.

I am now come to the laſt Campaign the Duke of *Marlboro'* ever made. Our Affairs in *England* having taken another Turn, the Queen, ſoon after the Death of her Boſom-Friend, the Prince of *Denmark*, was ſo infatuated as to change her old truſty Miniſtry, and brought in a Sett of vile Creatures, that were entirely in the *Pretender*'s Intereſt, who overturn'd all that had hitherto been doing; and tho' *France* was reduced to the laſt Extremity, and not able to hold out another Campaign, yet did theſe perfidious Men prevail ſo far on this weak Woman, the Queen, as to court *France* for a Peace, in order to bring in their beloved *Chevalier*: But this being foreign to my Purpoſe, I ſhall wave that Matter, and return to our Campaign. In order to which, the Duke of *Marlboro'* ſhew'd ſome of the fineſt Schemes and Turns in War, that is to be found in Hiſtory; therefore I ſhall be the more particular in relating it according to the beſt of my Judgment and Knowledge. 1711.

The Beginning of *May* our Army rendezvous'd near *Doway*, where both our Generals came to the Head of us; but our Cabinet-General at Home, and the Court of *France*, had ſo concerted Matters, that broke all the Meaſures our Generals had taken for putting an End to the War this Campaign; for *France*, inſtead of ſending a powerful Army into the *Netherlands*, to withſtand our two Generals, order'd only between 80 and 90,000 under *Villars* to guard the

1711. new Lines they had thrown up laſt Winter, having ſent all the Forces they could ſpare to the *Rhine* from all Parts, in order to ſend the Elector of *Bavaria* with a Body of Troops into his own Country; as alſo for diſturbing the Election of the preſent Emperor *Charles* the Sixth, which was to be held at *Francfort* this Summer. This oblig'd Prince *Eugene* to march with his Troops with what Expedition he could to the *Rhine*; and our Miniſtry, to prevent the Duke from doing any thing againſt *Villars*, ſent for about 6000 of our *Britiſh* Troops to go upon their famous *Canada* Expedition; ſo that my Lord *Marlborough* was left alone with an Army not quite 75,000, and notwithſtanding *Villars* was more than 10,000 more than the Duke, yet he had poſitive Orders from his Court not to hazard a Battle, unleſs it were in Defence of his Lines, which was now the laſt Barrier *France* had on their Side to cover their Country; for old *Lewis*, at this Time, having coin'd a new Army of *French* Guineas, fought his Battles with much more Succeſs in our Cabinet, than his Army could do in the Field; wherefore all that *Villars* could do was to keep the Duke of *Marlborough* out of his Lines, which conſidering the Strength and Nature of them, one might imagine was no great Hardſhip upon him, for they were the ſtrongeſt that ever *France* had, being juſt on the very Brink of the Kingdom.

Soon after Prince *Eugene* march'd off, the Duke advanc'd into the Plains of *Lens*, having his Left within half a League of *Doway*, in Hopes it might tempt *Villars* to draw out of his Lines, and give him Battle on theſe Plains; but *Villars* took Care to obſerve his Orders, and would not ſtir a Foot from thence, whereupon the Duke form'd one of the no-

bleſt

bleſt Schemes that ever was projected by a General, which was as follows. 1711.

That Part of *Villars*'s Lines wherein he lay encamp'd, had a large deep Moraſs in the Front of them, near an *Engliſh* Mile over, which was occaſion'd by the *Senſett* branching out in ſeveral Channels from *Arraſs*, which made this Moraſs extend all the Way from thence to *Bouſhain*, over which were two Cauſeways, for the Conveniency of the Country People. *Villars* had theſe in his Front, and on our Side of one of 'em was a ſtrong Fort call'd *Arleux*, in which he kept a ſtrong Garriſon. The Duke wanted to have *Villars* himſelf demoliſh this Fort. He ſaw he could take it when he pleas'd, and demoliſh it when he had done, but he knew as ſoon as he was march'd from thence, *Villars* would ſoon come and rebuild it; but ſhould he pretend to fortify it, then he expected as ſoon as he was march'd off, *Villars* would come and retake and demoliſh it. According to this Scheme the Duke made a Detachment of as many Battalions and Squadrons as were requiſite for that Purpoſe, under the Command of Lieutenant-General *Rantzaw*, an old experienc'd Officer; and order'd that this Detachment ſhould incamp on the Glacis of *Doway*, two ſmall Leagues from *Arleux*, there to lie till Matters were got ready for the Siege. The Lieutenant-General thinking the Detachment ſafe under the Cannon of *Doway*, took up his Quarters in Town, as did alſo the commanding Officers; and thoſe that lay in Camp took Example of their Commanders, and thinking themſelves ſecure, were not troubled about keeping ſuch Out-Guards as were neceſſary.

Villars having an Account of the careleſs Encampment of this Detachment, ſent a good Body of Horſe and Dragoons over the Cauſey of *Arleux*, and from

1711. from thence when it grew duſkiſh march'd with all the Silence imaginable towards our Detachment, ſo that about One in the Morning he took them Napping, without being challeng'd by one Centinel, fell in upon the right Flank of the Horſe, where they made great Havock; but the Quarter-Guards of the Foot, taking the Alarm, fired at them: This alarm'd the Foot, who running to Arms even in their Shirts, attack'd them with the greateſt Fury, and put a Stop to their advancing any further than the Horſe; but had they not fallen to plunder as they did (a bewitching Thing to all Soldiers, whereby many a Battle has been loſt, and brave Deſigns fruſtrated) they might have cut the whole Detachment to Pieces, and have had the Plunder when they had done. *Villars* finding the Foot had got to their Arms, order'd his Men to retire, who did with little or no Loſs to themſelves, but had kill'd and wounded a great many of our Troopers, and carried off moſt of their Horſes.

This was the only Affront the Duke of *Marlborough* receiv'd during the whole War, nor indeed could the Blame be imputed to him. However, this may be a Caution to all Officers from the General to the Subaltern, never to think themſelves too ſecure, let the Command be what it will; for could any Thing ſeem more ſo, than this Detachment, that was under the Cannon of ſuch a fortified Town as *Doway*, and our grand Army incamp'd ſo near them? which makes good the old Proverb, *Security dwells next Door to Ruin.*

The Duke was not a little ruffled on this Occaſion, nor was *Villars* leſs elated, or the *Paris* Gazettes wanting in magnifying the Thing, and ſounding the Praiſe of *Villars.*——However, this Mouthful of Moon-ſhine did not laſt long. In a few Days after the Duke order'd the ſame Detachment to march and lay

lay Siege to *Arleux*, who made themſelves Maſters of it in about eight Days. *Villars* with the whole *French* Army, then within a Mile of 'em, ſtood looking on this Fort being taken. The Duke ſeem'd very intent in having the Breaches repair'd, and new Works added to it, and appointed Engineers to ſee thoſe Things done. However, in a few Days after, the Duke leaving but a ſlender Garriſon therein, yet made a Shew of repairing the old and going on with the new Works. He march'd the Army fifteen Leagues on a Stretch away to the Right, pitching his Camp at *Coat* near *Heſden*, and gave Orders to the Army to lay in good ſtore of Forage; but we were no ſooner ſat down in this Camp, but an Expreſs came from the Governor of *Arleux*, that *Villars* had beſieged him; and as the Breaches were not repair'd, nor any thing done for ſtrengthning it, he muſt be obliged to ſurrender, unleſs he was ſoon relieved. On which, the Duke order'd Lieutenant General *Cadogan* to march with forty Squadrons, and all the Grenadiers of the Army, to the Relief of *Arleux*; but by the Time *Cadogan* got to *Lens*, he had an Account that *Arleux* was taken, and that the Enemy were hard at Work in demoliſhing it. Thus far the Duke ſucceeded in his Scheme; but on the Return of *Cadogan*, he ſeem'd very much chagrin'd, and ſaid he would be revenged on *Villars*, and attack him in his Lines. By this Time, *Villars* having attended the Duke in his March hither, was encamp'd between the Head of the *Senſet* and *Heſden*, where there was neither River nor Moraſs, but a plain champaign Country; but then the Lines were prodigious ſtrong, with a double Fauſſee before them: And *Villars* hearing that the Duke reſolved to attack him, made all the Preparations he could for giving him a warm Reception. He not only drained the Garriſons of 1711.

1711. of *Arras* and *Cambray*, of whatever Men could be ſpared, but he alſo drew all the Troops that were in the Lines far and near to join him; and being puffed with his late Succeſs, wrote to his Maſter to let him know, that he had now brought the Duke of *Marlborough* to his *Ne plus ultra*, which was the Duke's *Motto*.

In the mean Time, the Duke ſeem'd very peeviſh, and would ſee but little Company, and ſeemingly reſolved upon attacking *Villars*. In order to which, he drew off the heavy Baggage, with four Battalions and twelve Squadrons, to take Care of it, and to march towards *Doway*. Two Days after, he ſent off all the heavy Train with more Battalions and Squadrons, and the Day following he ſent off all the Train (to four of the lighteſt Field Pieces) with all the Lumber of the Camp, and more Battalions and Squadrons, not leaving ſo much as a Coach or Chaiſe for himſelf or any General Officer. In this flying Condition he next Day march'd the Army to *Villerbrulen*, within a ſhort League of *Villars*, who was now ſatisfied that the Duke was in earneſt; for we had no ſooner arrived at their Camp, but the Duke gave Orders for the Horſe and Dragoons to cut Faſcines. Early next Morning, being the twelfth of *July*, O. S. the Duke and moſt of the General Officers rode out at the Head of eighty Squadrons and all the Grenadiers of the Army, to take a View of the Lines and of *Villars*'s Situation.

Brigadier *Durell* commanded our *Britiſh* Grenadiers, of whom I deſired Liberty to ride out with the Duke, who readily conſented. The Duke, with a Crowd about him, rode as near the Lines as their Cannon would permit; along which he rode a League and half, having a fair View of them, and the Nature of the Ground before them. He often ſtopt, and

and ſhew'd the General Officers how he would have the Army drawn up before Day next Morning, and pointing with his Cane to the ſeveral Places the Attacks ſhould be made. This he ſpake openly in the hearing of all about him, and as it were with a Confidence of Succeſs; when at the ſame Time, every one with him were ſurprized at this raſh and dangerous Undertaking, and believed it proceeded from the Affront *Villars* had put upon him, and the ill Treatment he had of late received from the Queen and her Miniſtry, which had now made him deſperate. After he had made his Obſervations, and given ſuch Orders as he thought fit, he return'd to Camp, and gave Orders for the Army to prepare for Battle. 1711.

The Duke was no ſooner return'd to Camp, but *Cadogan* ſlipt privately away, taking with him only forty *Huſſars*; and now both Armies were full of the Event of the next Day. The Enemy long'd for its coming, that they might have ſome Satisfaction for the many Affronts they had received. On the other Hand, Things on our Side had a quite different Effect; we knew our Artillery was gone off, the Army weaken'd by ſeveral Detachments ſent with it, and the Enemy reinforced, ſo that they were double our Number. Yet for all this, we ſtill had Hopes that the Duke had ſomething more in his Head than we could penetrate into. At length Tattoo beats, and before it had done, Orders came along the Line, to ſtrike our Tents immediately, and in leſs than half an hour, the whole Army was on their March to the Left. This ſurprized us all, nor could any of the Generals imagine the Deſign of it.

We continued our March all the Night, favour'd with a full Moon and fair Weather. About Break of Day, the Duke received an Expreſs from *Cadogan*, that he and Lieutenant-General *Hompeſch*, Go-

1711. vernor of *Doway*, had, a little before One o' Clock, paſs'd the Cauſey of *Arleux* without Oppoſition, and were actually in Poſſeſſion of the Enemies Lines; upon which, the Duke, who kept at the Head of our March, expecting the Event, rode off with all the Horſe and Dragoons of the Left Wing; ſending Orders to every particular Regiment, to continue their March with all the Expedition they poſſibly could. This was ſurprizing indeed, a Thing none ever dream'd of. When *Villars*'s Spies brought him an Account of our Army being on their March to the Left, he believed it to be a Feint of the Duke's to draw him off from the Poſt he was in, ſo that he did not ſtir from thence till he had an Account of *Cadogan*'s paſſing the Lines at *Arleux*. This was no leſs a Surprize to the Marſhal, than it was to us; it put him beyond his Reaſon, he immediately put the Army on their March, while he with only one Hundred choice Dragoons, rode off like a Man diſtracted, to ſee how Matters were at *Arleux*. Thus he rode, without any Conſideration, till he fell in with *Cadogan*'s advanced Guards, not knowing where he was, till he perceived them ſurrounding him; and having now no other Way to eſcape being taken, he order'd the Dragoons to throw themſelves into the Ruins of an old Caſtle that was at Hand, while he with only two more, rode thro' an Opening of our Horſe, who not minding him, follow'd the Crowd, by which he eſcaped; but the Dragoons were all made Priſoners without firing a Shot.

Our Army continued marching with all the Expedition we poſſibly could, every Regiment making the beſt of their Way, without minding their Order of March, or waiting for thoſe that fainted, or dropt behind. The Enemy did the ſame; ſo that it was a perfect Race between both Armies, in trying who ſhould

ſhould come firſt up with *Cadogan*; but as we had the Start, ſo we kept a Head of them, though they had the ſhorter Cut. When we came on the Plains before *Arraſs*, our Foot march'd within View of the foremoſt of their Horſe, and ſometimes within a Mile of each other; and nothing could prevent our coming to Blows, but the *Scharp* which we paſt at *Victry*, the *Senſet*, and Moraſs, that was now between us; and as we kept a Head of them, ſo we join'd *Cadogan* before they could come up to diſturb him. But more than one half of our Foot dropt behind; nor did they all come up till two Days after; ſeveral fainted and died by the Way: But as our Right Wing of Horſe brought up the Rear, ſo the Duke ſent them Orders to ſee all the Foot before them. This was a March full 13 Leagues. 1711.

Now the Manner of *Cadogan*'s paſſing the Lines is as follows. The Duke having carried on his Scheme as above, to his reconnoitring the Lines, and *Cadogan*'s ſlipping out of the Camp, who made all the Haſte he could to *Doway*, where he arrived a little after Ten at Night, and found Lieutenant-General *Hompeſch*, on the Plain before the Town, at the Head of 22 Battalions and 40 Squadrons (who were moſtly the Troops the Duke ſent off, under Pretence of guarding the Lumber of the Camp) whereupon they march'd directly to *Arleux*; where there being none to oppoſe them, they laid Planks, and repair'd ſuch Places of the Cauſey as *Villars* cauſed to be broke down, upon his marching from thence, and ſo entered the Lines. Thus was this noble Scheme as well executed as projected, which was entirely the Duke's own framing, and let none into the Secret, but the Field Deputies, Prince *Anhault* the *Pruſſian* General, *Cadogan*, and *Hompeſch*. He had alſo contrived Matters ſo, as to have the Advantage of a full Moon and

1711. and a fine Night. *Cadogan* would have found it a difficult Taſk to repair, and the Army to paſs the Cauſey in a dark Night. Providence ſeem'd to favour the Deſign.

Next Morning, the 14th, we found *Villars* with his Army drawn up in Order of Battle, about half a League in our Front, with his Right towards the Works of *Cambray*, his Left cover'd by a Moraſs, and along his Front were ſeveral deep hollow Ways. Our Army lay here on their Arms three Nights, waiting for the coming up of the laſt of our Men; *Villars* not in the leaſt offering to diſturb us, but ſeem'd ſatisfy'd in ſtopping us here; for we could not advance, without forcing him to a Battle to very great Diſadvantage: nor could we move to the Right, for the Garriſon of *Arraſs*, which would be too great an Undertaking, conſidering the Difficulties that would attend the beſieging it: and on our Left lay the River *Scheld*, about a League and half from us, which being deep and ouzy, was dangerous to paſs in the Face of ſo numerous an Army; and to return would be altogether as dangerous, beſides the Diſgrace. Whereupon the Duke's Enemies in the Army, who became Creatures of the Miniſtry, began to arraign his Conduct in not conſidering theſe Difficulties, particularly the Lord *North*, tho' in our paſſing the Lines, run out mightily in Praiſe of the Duke; but now he, and others of our Time-ſerving Gentlemen, began to rail heavily againſt the Duke. But my Lord *Marlboro'* ſoon ſtopp'd their Mouths, and convinc'd them, that he had not only conſider'd all their ſuppoſed Difficulties that ſhould ariſe upon this Occaſion; but that he had carry'd his Scheme ſo far, as to the ſecuring a Poſt in this important Paſs into *France*; whereupon the Day after all our Army had got over the Paſs, he march'd in Order of Battle at Noon-

Noon-Day over a fine Plain towards the *Scheld*, along the Front of *Villars*'s Army, who now and then ſaluted us with a Cannon, as our Army came to the *Scheld*. The Duke drew them up facing *Villars*'s Right Wing, where both Armies ſtood looking on each other, while our Bridges were laying, which took us till near Sun-ſet, at which Time the Duke finding *Villars* did not offer to ſtir from his Ground, he order'd the Army to paſs. Gen. *Roſs* with the Right Wing of Horſe, and ſome Grenadiers were order'd to bring up the Rear; and by the Time it was Day-Light, our Army was paſs'd, the Bridges taken up, and we on a full March to *Bouchain*. 1711.

Villars not offering the leaſt Attempt to diſturb us in paſſing, which ſhews what a Terror the Duke of *Marlboro'* ſtruck into *France*, who were but the other Day the Bullies of all *Europe*; and it alſo ſhews, that all their former Conqueſts were not ſo much owing to the Bravery of their Troops, as to the Perfidiouſneſs of their Grand Monarch.

Bouchain being the Poſt which my Lord had fix'd upon, is ſtrongly ſituated in this great Moraſs that was the Barrier of the Kingdom, at which Place the *Scheld* and *Senſet* joins; wherefore, for carrying on the Siege, he was obliged to divide his Army. He therefore the next Morning after he came before it, order'd Bridges to be laid on the *Scheld* and Moraſs below the Town: and Gen. *Fagel*, with 30 Battalions and 40 Squadrons, to paſs over, in order to carry on the Siege on that Side, which was the moſt commodious Part to be attack'd, and alſo for keeping open our Communication with *Doway*, and other Garriſons on that Side.

Villars, to prevent our taking *Bouchain*, exerted the uttermoſt of his Skill. The Day we came before it he march'd his Army on that Side the *Scheld*, and

1711. encamp'd with the greateſt Part along the River, as near *Bouchain*, as the Moraſs and the Duke's Army would permit him; the other Part he paſs'd over the Moraſs and *Senſett*, and encamp'd them on the Height of *Waverſhein*, within leſs than a League of *Bouchain*, where they fell immediately to work in fortifying that Poſt with a very ſtrong Intrenchment round the Top of that Hill, from whence they had a Communication-Line thro' the Moraſs along the *Senſett* to the Town, by which *Villars* propoſed to prevent our carrying on the Siege on that Side. When the Duke firſt ſaw *Villars* take Poſt on that Hill, he thought it was with Deſign to fall upon *Fagel*; whereupon he order'd him to march back the ſame Evening he had paſs'd (our Regiment was here with *Fagel*) and early next Morning Lieut. Gen. *Cadogan* with 20 Squadrons, and 16 Battalions, was order'd to join *Fagel*, and march to the other Side again. *Villars*'s Men continued hard at Work all the Night and next Day on the Hill of *Waverſhein*; whereupon the Duke ſeeing that Poſt would be very troubleſome to us in carrying on the Siege, order'd the next Morning all the Troops on this Side to march, and diſlodge thoſe on *Waverſhein*. When we were got near the Intrenchments, ſeveral Companies of Grenadiers were order'd to march away to the Regiment to the Top of the Hill, in order to attack that Part of the Works. When we were got thither we were poſted in a ſtanding Field of Wheat, within leſs than 80 Paces of them, where we waited for Orders to begin the Attack. I muſt confeſs I did not like the Aſpect of the Thing; beſides, we thought the Duke had kept on the other Side to obſerve *Villars*, leſt he ſhould attack his Camp while we were attacking the Intrenchments: But while I was thus muſing, up comes the Duke alone, and

placed himſelf a little on the Right of my Company, from whence we had a fair View of moſt of their Works. Certainly, nothing ever gave me more Pleaſure than the Sight of the Duke at this Juncture: he ſtaid about five or ſix Minutes, and return'd; during which Time, I was in much more Pain for him than myſelf: for we plainly ſaw their Cannon pointed upon him, and the Intrenchment as full of Men as it would hold, and only waited their coming on. 1711.

But my Lord had not been longer gone than he ſtood by us, when Orders came for us to draw off, which we were not long about; and before the Enemy perceiv'd us going off, we were got ſo far down the Hill, that we were under their Fire before they let fly at us, ſo that we got off without the Loſs of a Man, tho' they pour'd Vollies of great and ſmall Shot after us. All the reſt of the Troops drew off at the ſame Time, after whom they alſo fired their Cannon with great Fury, and kill'd ſeveral Men. The Duke ordered the Troops to march faſter than ordinary, to get out of Reach, which *Villars* perceiving, drew out all the Horſe he had there, and preſſed hard upon our Rear; this made us ſtill make the more Haſte till we had got on the other ſide a riſing Ground that was before us; when we paſſed the Right of it, the Duke ſeeing *Villars* ſtill preſſing on, ordered all his Squadrons to face about; and as ſoon as *Villars* appear'd on the Top of the Hill, they charg'd him with ſuch Reſolution, that they broke through thoſe that firſt appeared, and had certainly either kill'd or taken *Villars*, had not a Brigadier, who ſeeing his General in this Danger, come up with freſh Squadrons to his Relief, which ſav'd the Marſhal, but the Brigadier and his Squadrons paid dear for it; for he was deſperately wounded and taken Priſoner, and moſt of his

1711. Men cut to pieces, and *Villars* with the reſt of his ſhattered Squadrons ſcour'd back as faſt as they could. This Brigadier, when *Vendome* commanded, had taken *Cadogan* Priſoner on a Foraging Command, and had treated him with great Civility; and now *Cadogan* having it in his Power, made a ſuitable Return; he ſent him in his Coach to his own Quarters, and there had all the Care that was poſſible taken of him, till he was thoroughly recovered and cured of his Wounds, and then ſent back.

As ſoon as this Flouriſh of *Villars* was over, the Duke call'd all the Ingiiniers together to know whether they could carry on the Siege without removing the Enemy from *Waverſhein*; to which all anſwered in the Negative, except Col. *Armſtrong*, who ſaid that it was to be done, and that he would undertake the moſt difficult Part. The Duke knowing the Capacity of the Man, was very well pleas'd, and bid him proceed; for he was reſolv'd to have *Bouchain*, coſt what it would; all that he had done would have ſignified nothing without it.

Upon which ten Battalions, and as many Squadrons were ordered to march as ſoon as it was dark, into the Valley that was between the riſing Ground on our Side and *Waverſhein*, where we ſtood to our Arms all Night, while Col. *Armſtrong* with 5000 Workmen were throwing up Works on the riſing Ground behind us. When Day began to appear, we were ordered to draw out of the Valley; the Horſe march'd ſtraight to their Ground, and the Foot into the Works that were thrown up, where we were ſurprized to find a noble large Redoubt with a double Fauſſee before it, the Standard of our *Britiſh* Train flying, and a Battery of 24 Cannon mounted, with which the Colonel ſaluted the Enemy at *Waverſhein*; he had alſo carried on an Intrenchment from this Redoubt

doubt down to the Moraſs, which was a prodigious Work for in one Night. 1711.

Our ten Battalions were reliev'd in the Evening, at which Time we pitch'd our Tents, which was the firſt Time our Regiment had done ſo ſince we march'd from *Villarbrulin*, this being the 25th of *July*. Colonel *Armſtrong* having finiſh'd his Work, proceeded with a Line of Circumvallation, from the Redoubt round our Camp to the Bridges below the Town, and ſo round the Duke's Camp, till he brought it to the *Scheld* above the Town; after which, with great Labour and Fatigue, and a vaſt Number of Faſcines, he carried this prodigious Work through the Moraſs, tho' the Enemy by ſhutting up the Sluice of *Bouchain* had rais'd an Innundation therein; and, having laid Bridges both over the *Scheld* and *Senſet*, he attack'd and drove the Enemy out of the Communication Line, and ſo clos'd his Circumvallation, by which all Relief was cut off from *Bouchain*. This was a moſt ſurprizing Undertaking of the Colonel's, who by conſtant Application finiſh'd it in leſs Time than could be imagined, by which he deſervedly gain'd great Applauſe. And now the Communication between *Waverſhein* and the Town being cut off, we open'd our Trenches, and in leſs than three Weeks the Governor was obliged to ſurrender, the Garriſon being made Priſoners of War, notwithſtanding our Trenches were cannonaded, as well from *Waverſhein*, as the Town.

Thus ended the Duke of *Marlbro*'s laſt Campaign, which may truly be reckon'd amongſt the greateſt he ever made.

And now, after this great Man had reduced the Common Enemy of *Europe* to the laſt Extremity, had taken the laſt Barrier of his Kingdom, which lay now open to the Allies, his Army diſpirited, and

1711. their Courage, and his whole Nation in a moſt miſerable Condition; I ſay, after he had done all theſe great Things ſo much to the Honour of the *Britiſh* Nation, was he ignominiouſly traduc'd, and turn'd out of all Employ, and even forc'd to fly his Country, of which he had been ſo great an Ornament; and this done by a Set of vile profligate Men, who had inſinuated themſelves into the Favour of the weak Queen, and were at this Time carrying on a ſcandalous underhand Treaty with the Grand Enemy of *Europe*. But I am here wandering out of my Way, ſo ſhall leave that ungrateful Subject, and proceed to the laſt Campaign of this War.

1712. In the Beginning of *May*, the Duke of *Ormond*, a good-natur'd, but a weak and ambitious Man, fit to be made Tool of by a Set of crafty Knaves, came over Captain General in the Room of the Duke of *Marlbro'*, and aſſembled the Army near *Doway*, where Prince *Eugene* came with a much greater Number of *Germans* than he had had at any time before, ſo that our Army conſiſted of 295 Squadrons, and 145 Battalions, which amounted to 122,000 fighting Men. Prince *Eugene* at his firſt coming had ſome Intimation from *England* that the Duke was not to act againſt *France*, on account of a ſeparate Peace between *England* and *France*, which was near a Cloſe; upon which the Prince went to the Duke, and deſir'd to know if he had ſuch Orders, that he might take his Meaſures accordingly. The Duke aſſured him, that his Orders were as full as ever the Duke of *Marlbro*'s were; and that he was ready to march againſt the Enemy when he pleaſed. The Prince was highly pleaſed at this; ſo three Days after, being the 1ſt of *May*, our whole Army march'd, and paſſing the *Scheld* a little below *Bouchain*, we advanc'd and encamp'd at *Selemvery*, near the Borders of *Picardy*.

cardy. *Villars* was at this Time encamp'd with his Left at *Cambray*, and his Right extending along the *Scheld* towards the upper End of that River, whoſe Army did not exceed 100,000. ——— Upon our coming to this Ground, the Duke and Prince agreed to ride out next Morning to take a View of *Villars*'s Situation. Accordingly Orders were given for all the Grenadiers in the Army, and 100 Squadrons to march by Break of Day, in order to cover our Generals; and according to theſe Orders we march'd. Our *Britiſh* Grenadiers being on the Left, advanced into *Piccardy*, where we found nothing but empty Houſes, the Peaſants being all fled with their Effects; but upon our returning to Camp in the Evening, we found the Face of Affairs quite chang'd from the glorious Expectation of marching towards *Paris*, to that of a full Stop put to our Carreer; for our Managers at Home being apprehenſive that the Duke's Ambition might prompt him to do ſomething that might overturn all their Meaſures; therefore they ſent Sir *Thomas Hanmer* Expreſs to the Duke, with Orders for him not to act againſt *France*, until he received further Inſtructions. Sir *Thomas* thought to have overtaken him at *Doway*; but when he came to *Tournay*, he had an Account that the Army decamp'd that Morning, and were in a full March towards *France*: This made Sir *Thomas* ſpeed away from thence; ſo that it was One in the Morning before he arriv'd at the Duke's Quarters. ——The Duke ſent the Prince an Account of his Orders, and deſired to be excus'd, in that he could not ride out with him according to Promiſe. Thus ended the Glory of the *Britiſh* Arms after a moſt inglorious Manner. 1712.

It has been much diſputed, Whether the Duke of *Ormond*, upon ſo extraordinary an Occaſion, might not

1712. have refus'd obeying thoſe Orders Sir *Thomas* brought, conſidering they were not ſign'd by the Queen, but only by *Bolingbroke?* However, be that as it will, had the Duke done as his brave Father the Earl of *Oſſory* did at the Battle of *St. Dennis*, near *Mons*, who at that Time commanded the *Britiſh* Troops under the Prince of *Orange*, and having received poſitive Orders from King *Charles* II. not to engage in any Action againſt *France* while the Treaty of *Nimeguen* was carrying on, which Orders he ſhew'd the Prince: After ſome Time the Prince ſent for him, and told him he deſigned next Morning to attack the Enemy, and deſir'd to know what he would do upon that Occaſion. To which the Earl anſwer'd, Your Highneſs knows my Orders; yet when-ever I ſee you engag'd, I will not look on, but will rather loſe my Head than the Honour of my Country; and accordingly, next Day, he, at the Head of the *Britiſh* Troops, did Wonders. And what was the Conſequence? why truly the King would not venture to call him publickly to an Account, leſt he ſhould incenſe the Nation, who glories in nothing more than the Behaviour of their gallant Troops; and tho' he got a private Reprimand from the King, yet he had the Thanks and Approbation of the whole Nation; and had the Son follow'd the Example of his brave Father, pray who durſt have call'd him to an Account, when it was evident the Conſequence muſt have turn'd to the greateſt Advantage, both to the Nation and common Cauſe of *Europe?* But alas! this weak Man was ſtrangely impos'd upon by the Lord *Bolingbroke*, who not only made him his Tool, but had alſo impos'd both on the Queen, and the whole Nation, by his baſe underhand Dealing with *France*, and his bringing about that ſcandalous Treaty of *Utrecht*.

Not-

Notwithſtanding this Diſappointment, Prince *Eugene* rode out, and reconnoiter'd *Villars*, who at firſt Sight of our Troops thought our whole Army was on their March to *France*, which ſtrangely alarm'd him, and thought the Duke of *Ormond* thro' Ambition of Glory had been prevail'd on by Prince *Eugene* to break thro' what he had been aſſur'd was privately concerted between both Courts; whereupon in a great Hurry he order'd his Train and heavy Baggage to make the beſt of their Way to the other Side the *Soam*, and was getting ready to decamp; but he ſoon found out the true Meaning, and was alſo inform'd by a Courier from the Duke of the Orders he had receiv'd, which put *Villars* into a better Humour. Prince *Eugene* finding how Matters went, reſolv'd to make the beſt of his Time. While the Duke continu'd in thoſe Parts, he therefore propos'd the taking of *Queſnoy* and *Landreſcis*, and drawing a Line from the latter to *Bouchain*, the which would cover his Garriſons, and alſo block up *Valenſhein* and *Conde*; whereupon he deſir'd the Duke would cover him, while he was carrying on thoſe Sieges, which the Duke promis'd to do, ſo long as he continu'd here, but at the ſame time told him that he expected Orders every Day for his marching off, and then he muſt take Care of himſelf; upon which the Prince march'd to *Queſnoy* with the *German* and *Dutch* Forces; at which time he poſted the Earl of *Albemarle* with a Body of 14,000 Men at *Denain*, two Leagues below *Bouchain*, on the *Scheld*, to keep open a Communication with the Garriſons on the other Side, from whence he was to have all his Stores, *&c.* *Albemarle* fell immediately to work in fortifying his Poſt, and the Duke lent him as many of his Pontoons as laid two Bridges over the River, Prince *Eugene* having Occaſion to make uſe of his own at the 1712.

1712. the Sieges; ſo that he left more than laid one Bridge. The ſame Day the Prince march'd to *Queſnoy*, the Duke with his *Britiſh* and Auxiliaries croſs'd the *Sele*, and encamp'd at *Chateau-Cambreſſis*, which lyes juſt on the Borders of *Picardy*; here we lay with the *Sele* in our Front till *Queſnoy* was taken. Prince *Eugene* having taken that Place, march'd to *Landreſſeis*, which was the greateſt Overſight that General ever made, conſidering, that at this Juncture the *French* had deliver'd *Dunkirk* into the Hands of the *Engliſh*; that *Villars* was greatly reinforced from the *Rhine*, and all the Garriſons about him; and that the Duke of *Ormond* had receiv'd his Orders for marching off with his Troops.

Next Day, after the Prince ſate down before *Landreſſis*, the 16th of *July*, *O. S.* the Duke march'd off with his *Britiſh* Troops; but all the Auxiliaries, except two *Holſtein* Regiments, one of Foot, and one of Dragoons, refuſed marching with him; the reſt march'd, and join'd Prince *Eugene*. Our firſt Day's March was to *Uvointeſeck*, near *Bouchain*, where a Ceſſation of Arms between *England* and *France* was declared at the Head of every Regiment; for which the Duke expected great Huzza's, but inſtead of that, nothing was heard but a general Hiſs and Murmur through the whole Camp, which gave the Duke and his Creatures great Offence, and they term'd it the height of Ingratitude, for bringing them from having their Brains knock'd out. *Villars*, the ſame Day, declared the like Ceſſation of Arms in his Camp, and ſent Officers of Diſtinction to compliment the Duke upon it. This Evening the Duke ſent to *Denain* for the Pontoons he lent the Earl of *Albemarle*; nor could all that either the Earl, Prince *Eugene*, or the Field Deputies ſay, prevail with him to leave them but for eight Days, and they would lie under

under any Obligation to return them to any Place the Duke ſhould name; but he would upon no Account leave them behind him, ſo had them taken up, and they met us on the March. Next Day we had a Report, how true I can't ſay, that two *French* Engineers in Diſguiſe went with thoſe that went to take up the Pontoons; who made ſuch Obſervations on *Albemarle*'s Works, as ſerved their Purpoſe. However, I cannot believe the Duke knew any thing of it; but his Conduct in this Affair was very much cenſured, and gave his Enemies a Handle to ſay, that Matters had been concerted between him and thoſe ſent by *Villars*. 1712.

Our ſecond Day's March was to *Auchrin*.

Next Morning very early, as we were preparing to march, we heard great fireing towards *Denain*; on which we concluded that *Villars* was attacking that Poſt; which was confirm'd the Day following, by a fulſome Letter from the Marſhal to the Duke; wherein, after giving an Account of the Action, and the Succeſs attending it, he then extols the Duke to the Skies, for his conſummate Conduct and Courage, his Loyalty to his Royal Miſtreſs's Commands; and concludes, that the Courage of the Allies was gone off with the brave *Britiſh* Troops.

This Letter the Duke took Care to have made known to the Army, ſeveral Copies of it being handed about, which indeed ought rather to be burnt; for it made thoſe that wiſh'd well to the Allies believe, that he had not acted fairly by them. 'Tis moſt certain, that the Want of the Pontoons was the Loſs of *Denain*; for Prince *Eugene* having ſome Notice of *Villars*'s Deſign, march'd the Evening before the Action, with the greateſt Part of his Army, from *Landreſſeis*, and was up Time enough to have ſuc-

1712. ſuccour'd *Albemarle*; but by the Time he got to the *Scheld*, the Bridge was broke by the Crowd of Baggage they had been ſending over; ſo that he was not able to give *Albemarle* the leaſt Aſſiſtance, but look'd on, and ſaw his Fate. From *Auchin*, we continued by eaſy Marches to *Ghent*;

Which put an End to this War, and our ſcandalous Part of the Campaign.

ORDER of BATTLE of ye ALLIED A


H.R.H.W.D. of CUMBERL

Count Konigseg Field


Prince of Waldeck.

General ..... Cronstrom ..... De Wen

Lieut.t / Major / Brigad.r } Gen.l {
- Coenders . Vanderduyn ..... Aylva .....
- Schack .... Hompech ..... Rumff . Villars . Zoute .... Zastrow.
- ..... Schlippenback ..... Salis . Halchet . Efferen .....



Lieut.t / Major / Brigad.r } Gen.l {
- ..... Prince de Hesse Philipstadt ..... La Lippe . Schwartsbourg .....
- ..... Sandoville . Canebourg ..... Veldtman . Lindtman .....
- ..... Schagen ..... Vriberyet ..... Sturler . Elias . Bourmania ... Bosel



	1743. Lines. 1		2		3		Total Men.		Cannon Pounds		Mortars	Pounds	1744. Lines. 1		2		3		Total Men.		Cannon Pounds		Mortars	Pounds
	Sq.n	Bat.n	Sq.n	Bat.n	Sq.n	Bat.n	Horse	Foot	6	3			Sq.n	Bat.n	Sq.n	Bat.n	Sq.n	Bat.n	Horse	Foot	6	3		
Britiſh	10	20	9	9			4264	13559	24				25	23	24	9			5194	17800	10	30	4	25
Hanover.ns	16	11	16	10			3018	12063	28				17	7	14	6			5513	10755		26		20
Heſsians.	4	3	4	9			1264	5068	12															
Hollandts	11	7	11	7					16		4		22	15	22	13					6	20	4	30
Auſtrians	5	7	5	7	14	8C			20				5	4	5	4	12				4	8	4	16
Total	46	38	43	36					100		4		33	29	55	32	12	1			20	84	12	91

EXPLANATION { Red ..... Engliſh. Yellow .. Hanover.ns Blue ..... Dutch. Green .. Auſtrians.

ARTIL

Body of R

Lieut. / Major } Gen.l {



ED ARMY in FLANDERS {30 Ap. / 11 May} 1745.


MBERLAND CAPT. GEN.
g Field Marſhall.

De Wendt.

Ligonier — Campbell.

Zaſtrow. Ponſonby. E. Albemarle. Launay — Onſlow.


Ingoldſby. Churchill — Crawford.



urg — Hawley.

Howard. St. Clair. Montiguy — Bland.

ia ... Boſelager — Skelton.



TILLERY.



ody of Reſerve.

ut. } Gen.l { Molcke / Forgatch
jor }





	1745. Lines. 1		2		3		Total Men.		Canon Pounders 6	3	12	Cohorns	Howitzers
	Sq.s	Bat.s	Sq.s	Bat.s	Sq.s	Bat.s	Horſe	Foot					
Britiſh	15	11	11	8	.	1	4656	16170	10	27	6	25	4
Hanover.[23]	8	3	8	2	.	.	2840	4135		12		.	.
Dutch	18	10	19	10	3	.			4	22		30	5
Auſtrians	.	.	.	.	8	2C				.		.	.
Total	41	24	38	20	11	15			14	61	6	55	9

Britiſh not in ¶ Lines of Battle include ¶ 3 laſt Reg.ts

1748. 1 Batt. — 1744. 3 Batt. — 1745. 3 Squad. 7 Batt.

1743 ¶ Drag. were 2 Squadrons.




uard House
Magazine
reat Spur
LONDON - DERRY
P. 2.
BOYNE R.
Camp
N. Town
Bridge
Faughan Water
1 Mile.
1 2 3 4 5
English Miles
Lanarm
Old Fleet Harb?
CARRICKFERGUS
Road
Castle
Danger
BOYNE.
Drogheda
Camp
1 Mile
SELIOT R.
Tenter
Fr.
Wirtemberg's Qrs
Qrs
A
4 or 5 Foot
2. Ships w.th Provisions
1. Boggs




NAMUR as TAKEN 20 Aug 1695



a L[d] Cuts } Assault at y
b Rivers ss } Breach of y
c La Caves } Assault
d Swerins } at y Castrotte &c
e Eng } Approaches
f Dutch } for Trenches
g .....
h Batteries
i Bridge of Comun[n]
k Castle
l City
m Casrot } Fort
n Cohorn }
o Demi Bastion
Terra Nova Cohorn

p Brussells } Gate
q Iron
r S[t] Nicholas
s } Lines of Comun[n] } Castle my Cohorn
t } in y Siege
u } Lodgements made } by y Engl[s] Dutch 17 Jy
v } on y Demi Bast[n] 23 Jy
w } w[ch] we took y Stone Line
x } after y Assault 30 Au[g]

y Lower Town
z } Retrenchm[t] } Attacked by
& } in y Siege
1 Stone Line
2 Terra Nova



Line of Serjeants.

Officers in the Rear.

9th Capts Compof Granad	Colonl	Majr	2d	4th	6th	8th	7th	5th	3d	1st	Ll. Col.
			CAPTAINS				COMPANY				
	1 3 5 7	1 3 5 7 9	1 3 5 7 9			8 6 4 2	10 8 6 4 2		8 6 4 2		
	Captains	Lieutenl	Ensignl			Ensign	Lieutenl		Captain		

1 Lieut. Capt. 2 Lieut. — Serj. Majr. Orderly Bk. Col. — Majr. Lt. Col. — Adj.

BATAT[n] READY FOR EXERCISE.

In SENIORITY RANK & FILE, 3 Feet between each Comp.[y] 10 each Rank, Drumers &c. 2½ each Man.

1.

Serjeants

Officers

Grenadiers	Rank	Front Rear	Half File	Half File
	6			
	5			
	4			
	3			
	2			
	1			

2.

Grenadiers	1st ½ Rank on the Right	2d ½ Rank on the Left	2d ½ Rank on the Right	1st ½ Rank on the Left
	1st Division	3d	4th	2d

3.

Serjeants

Officers

Grenadiers

2 Ranks upon the Left are Doubling their files to y[e] Right by Divisions.

4.

Battalion in 4 Divisions at Close Order, Ready to Wheel or March.

Grenadiers

1st Col. 3d 4th 2d Ll Col

5.



1 Battalion in 14 Platoons told off in their several Firings, and Grand Divisions.

6.



6 Platoons of ẏ 1st. Fire perform. their Fire.

7



3d. Firing.

8.



Retreating 2d. Fire facing ẏ Enemy.

9.



Front drop their Muzles & ẏ 1st. Fire Perform.

10.




Front having Fired Face to ẏ Right & Left by Platoons & March to ẏ Rear.

11.



Wheeld to ẏ Right in Platoons for Street Firing.


12.





Street Firing.


13.

1 HOLLOW SQUARE FORM'D to Advance or Engage
Post Granadiers to Recharge
Advance or Retreat
Officers &c. Placed Proper











BATTALION in GRAND-DIVISIONS HOLLOW-SQUARES &c.


Battalion in N.° 1. 2 Dutch Squares. 3 Square by Grand Divisions.





3.d Reg.ts method of Firing 3/4 Reg.t & Forming 3/4 Firing 3/4 Square









Fire 1 Batt.a as Numb.d in the Squares *





HOLLOW-SQUARE ATTACK'D
By HORSE on all Sides







BATALIONS at Siege

	1	2	3	Undetach	Total each
British	5	5	5	2	17
Prussians	4	4	4	2	14
Hanover^{ns}	4	3	4	2	13
Dutch	14	15	14	7	50
Danes	3	3	3	1	10
Total	30	30	30	14	104

For Roster General &c. (Plate 7.)

A REGIMENT Drawn up to form a BATTALION of 10 COMPANYS in SENIORITY. 50 P. Men & Corporals in Rank & File, 3 Feet between each Comp.^{y}. 10 each Rank & 2½ each Man.





AGHRIM. LINE of BATTLE

AGHRIM LINE of BATTLE 12 July 1696

Storys Hist. of Ireland.
47 Squad. Horse, 28 Batt.ns Foot ... ENGLISH ... 17000 in y.e Field

L.t Gen.l Ginckell
Duke Wurtemberg

IRISH in y.e Field 5000 Horse. 20000 Foot.

Maj.r Brig. / Gen.l: La Forrest, Eppinger ..... Tetteau, La Mellionier ..... Mackay, Bellasis ..... L.t G.l Scravemore, Villers

Epinger, Epinger, Manpouilli, Boncour, Donep, Scefcad, La Forest, Danish, Greben, Belcastel, DuCambon, LaMellionier, Brewer, Bellasyse, Foulks, L.t G. Hamilton, Herbert, Gen.l Hamilton, Kirk, Villers, Ruvigny, Langston, Oxford, Wynie, Leveson

Maj.r Brig. / Gen.l: Holstaple, Shack ..... Count Nassau, Pr. Hesse ..... Talmash, Stuart ..... Ruvigny, Leveson

Epinger, Epinger, Ginckel, Redesell, Zulistein, Nienheuse, Schack, Danish, L.t Cutts, Pr. Hesse, Lloyd, Nassau, Meath, Lisburne, S.t John's, late Hamilton, Tiffin, Earle, Stuart, Byerly, Woolsley, Lanier, Wynie, Cuningha

1 SQUADRON 48 Men 16 FILES.
Rear / Center / Front — Rank
3 / 2 / 1 — File

Fig.2. 1 Wheel to the Right.


4 Wheels to the Right.

4 Wheels to the Left.

XII SQUADRONS DRAWN-UP 3 Deep *at* CLOSE-ORDER;


12 Feet *From the* Fore Feet *of the* Front Rank, *to the* Fore Feet *of the* 2d & *so on to the* Rear,

12 SQUADRONS MOUNTED N°. *of* Men & Files *in each*		Length *of each* Rank *from* Right *to* Left 2 Feet 7 Inch. *ea.* Man		OUTSIDE CIRCLES *of* ye RANKS in Wheeling *a* Squadron exceeds *viz.t* the			
				SECOND ye FRONT.		THIRD ye SECOND.	
Men	Files	Feet	Inches	Feet	Inches	Feet	Inches
48	16	41	4	1	8 ½	4	9 ½
60	20	51	8	1	4 ½	3	11
72	24	62		1	1 ¾	3	4
84	28	72	4		11 ¾	2	10 ¾
96	32	82	8		10 ¼	2	6 ⅔
108	36	93			9 ¼	2	3 ¼
120	40	103	4		8 ¼	2	¾
132	44	113	8		7 ½	1	10 ½
144	48	124			7	1	8 ⅔
156	52	134	4		6 ½	1	7
168	56	144	8		6	1	5 ¾
180	60	155			5 ½	1	4 ½



XI

BATTALION making its 3 FIRINGS.



Return of y^e Reg^t. of Foot Comanded by

Officers						Staff Officers					Serj^ts Drum		Rank & File							Since last Return			
Colonel	L^t Col.	Major	Capt^ns	Lieut^s	Enfigns	Chaplain	Adjut^t	Q^r M^r	Surgeon	Surg^n Mate	Serjeants	Drummers	Corporals	Centinels	Furlo'	Party	Recruits	Sick	Effective	Defective	Entertain^d	Dismiss'd	Deserted	Dead

Strength of his Majesty's 1^r. Regim^t. of Foot Guards

Officers &c. Present							Rank & File		Officers Absent						
Field Officers	Captains	Lieut^ts	Enfigns	Serjeants	Corporals	Drummers	Centinels	Wanting to Comp^t.	Colonel	L^t Col.	Major	Captains	Lieutan^ts	Enfigns	
4	24	32	24	84	84	55	1979	9							

Return of L^t C^o Troop of y^e Hon^ble C^o Reg^t of Horfe

MEN									HORSES					
Name	Age	Size	Compln	Born County	Born Town	Lifted by	Lifted when	Trade	Furlo' or Recruit	Age	Size	Bought by	Bought when	Mark	N^o	Aillment

REGIM^t DRAGOONS REVIEW'D 26 A^pr 1745 by Gen^l.

Field Officers & Captains	Absent	Serv'd Years	Lieut^ts	Absent	Serv'd	Cornets	Absent	Serv'd	Q^r M^rs	Absent	Serv'd Years	Serjeants	Corporals	Drums	Hautbois	P. Men	Sick Men	Sick Horses	on Furlo	Total Men	Total Horses	Want to Comp^t Men	Want to Comp^t Horses	Want to Comp^t Reason		
Col. J.		9	Cap^t L^t C.		6	R.			J.		1															
L^t C^o C.		3	L.		7	Y.			T.		7															
Maj^r H.		8	A.		5	C.			Y.		2															
Captain N.		5	N.		8	H.			M.		6	12	2	2	1	57				65	65					
Captain M.		7	M.		3	A.			J.		3															
Captain J.		6	A.		9	R.			L.		5															
Total 6			6		6				6			12	12	12												

Chaplain Adjut^t Surgeon & Mates Reckond.
Officers or Men if Absent, y^e Reason why.
Q^rs Cleard every Month. Complaints redreſs'd at all times.

Arms &c. their Condition
Bad Horſes to be Exchang'd, or Sold
Dragoons Exercis'd as Horſe or Foot
Reported to y^e Commiſsary G^l &c.

RAMILLIE ORDER of BATTLE, $\frac{23}{12}$ May 1706

H.H.P.& D. MARLBOROUGH CAPT. GEN.& COM^rs L^t. AUVERQUERQUE V^t M^r.

C^t TILLY GEN. HORSE.

CHURCHILL GEN. FOOT.

Lieu^t / Maj^r. Gen^l / Brig^r

Dopff. Vander Nath. — Oostfrise. Prin. d'Avergne. — Dedem. Villate. — Soutelande. — Spar. Collier. — Orkney. S^t Paul. Withers. — Dompre. Vittinghoff. P. Wil. Hesse. — Lumley. Roff. Wood.

Zubert VanEck. — Wasenaer Argyll. N. Windenberg. Zitte. — Capol. — Mackartney. Webb. — Powel. — Palm. Hay.

Dopff Drag^rs — Carabiniers — Blue Guards — Tilly — Cralingen — Wurtemberg — La Lech — Rochfort — Fents — Eck Neil — Oostfrise — Dutch Guards — Argyll — Bothwick — Collyer — Murray — Bechamer — Zoutelande — Delan — Nassau Wedenberg — Le Royal — Prelod Van Hesse — Nassau Walloon — Brensdorff — Capol — Oxenstiems — Hessian — Holstein Sonderburg — Dan^h Guards — Schouten — Mackartney — Eyans — Churchill — Mordaunt — Webb — Sabin — La Cau — Orkney — Godfrey — Palmquist — English Guards — Dompre — Powel — Athlone — Chancloss — Purchapel — Opdam — Dutch Life Guards — Dutch Guard Drag^rs — Wood — Windham — Shomberg — Cadogan — Lumley — Roy^l Scots / Irish Drag^rs

Lieut / Maj^r / Brig^r Gen^l

Hompesch. S^t Laurent. Grouvesteyn. — Pr. Holsteyn Beeck. Muray. Berensdorff. Hamilton. — Oxenstierna. Welderen. — Ingoldsby. Pallant. Meredith. — Oyen. Athlone. Baldewyn.

Beudits — Drag^rs — Smettau — Prof Orange — Epegh — Emmings — Grouvestein — S^t Laurent — Driesbergh — Teynegal — Schlangenburgh — Orange — Salish — Albemarle — Pallant — Kappel — Schwartz — Berner — Adelens — Sturler — Black — Vegelin — Tuckelenbourgh — Rantzau — Seuch — Seckendorff — Bulau — Bilf — Dedem — Horden — Gronsau — Wurtemberg Holst. — Orkney — Leopoldsby — Swartsell — Vooght — North & Grey — Tatton — Farington — Meredith — Hess Homburgh — Rheeden — Hunnerbeen — Vittinghoff — Baldewyn — Canterstyn — Heyden — Bennis Drag^rs — Vander Nath Drag^rs

Lieu^t / Maj^r / Brig^r Gen^l

Duke Wurtemberg. Rantzou. — Rantzou. — Vyterwyck.

Brouxdorff.

DANISH HORSE

Bonnair Drag^rs — Lyff Regim^t — M.G. Rantzou — Smettau — Brouckdorff — Wyterwyck — Wurtemburgh — Dewitz — L.G. Rantzou

CONFEDERATES.

	Batt.	Squad.	Drag.
1	4 2	4 6	1 3
2	3 2	2 8	1 5
3		1 6	5
Total	74	90	33


Line

Kill'd 1066.
Wounded 2567.

FRENCH

Squad.	Batt.	
140	76	in the Field

8000 Kill'd, 6600 Prisoners } Amounted with Deserters to above 20000



ENCAMPMENTS, WINTER-QUARTERS, MARCHES, STRENGTH &c. from 1701 to 1713 of the ALLIES FRENCH.

	In ye Field. Country	Weeks	Days	Begun	Ended	In Garrison. Weeks	Days	Begun	Ended	Time. Years	Weeks	Days	March'd. Days	Leagues	Miles
1701	Brabant	6	1	7 June	22 7bre	23	2	22 7bre	9 Mar.		39	3	24	216	648
1702	D.e & Quart.d	33	5	9 Mar.	31 ... 8bre	24	2	31 ... 8bre	19 ...	1	5	6	43	140	420
1703	in Breda	27	2	19 ...	27 ...	25	5	27 ...	24 ... Apr	1		6	43	144	432
1704	Germ & 2 D.s	30	-	24 ... April	20 9bre	21	4	20 9bre	20 ...		51	4	94	410	230
1705	Lorr.e Brab.t Breda	27	5	20 ... April	31 ...	25	3	31 ... October	27 ...	1	1	-	66	142	726
1706	.....	26	2	27 ...	28 8bre	27		28 ...	5 ... May	1	1	1	39	132	396
1707	.....	24	-	5 ... May	29 ...	29	1	29 ... October	11 ...	1	1		25	90	270
1708	.....	32	5	11 ...	26 Dec.	23	1	26 Dec	6 Jun.	1	3	5	41	129	387
1709	Flanders & Ghent	19	3	6 Jun	20 8bre	23	4	20 8bre	8 ...		43		28	82	246
1710	.....	31	6	3 ...	29 9bre	21	4	12 9bre	12 ... Apr	1	1	2	32	85	255
1711	.....	27	6	12 ... April	24 ... 8bre	23	1	24 ... Octob	3 ...		51		34	94	282
1712	.....	25	6	3 ...	1 ...	35	-	1 ... Octob	2 Jn. 3	1	8	4	19	60	180
	Some Eng. in Ghent	to 1716.											12	12	36
	12 Campaigns	312	6	or 6 Years Camp.		312	6	or 6 Years in Garri.		12	1		500	1836	5508

Battles Sieges & Camps.	Generals & Comand.ts	Forces Batalion	Forces Squad.ns	Ordnance Cañon	Ordnance Mortars	Ordnance Pontoons
Breda 21 7ber	K.W.	Rev.d our Camp				
Duckenberg 26 June			76	120	62	8	24
Pier Cañonad.t 13 Aug.t	D. Marlbro & M. Over-		84	150	92	21	40
Maestricht 6 May		querque	66	136	88	20	44
Valnotred.e S. Ag.n 4 at Hug.			80	142	–	20	–
Gingen 16 June &c.	Marlb.r P. Lew.s		96	202	44	4	24
Hochstet B. 2 Aug.	Marlb.r & Eug.e		96	188	52	4	24
Elft 24 May	Marlbro'		84	126	50	8	24
Fr. Lines forc'd 7 July			104	168	108	20	40
Ramelies B. 12 May			74	123	100	20	42
Helsheim &c 4 July &c	Marlbro'		98	156	–	20	–
Meldart 21 May	& Overquerq		97	164	102	10	44
Oudenard B. 30 June			112	180	108	24	44
S. Lisle 31 Aug.			131	224	100	16	44
Tournay S. 16 June			194	320	104	24	42
Malplaquet B. 31 Aug.	Marlb.r Eugen.e		152	271	–	24	–
Douay S. 7 July			155	262	102	20	40
Leward.e 12 May			184	341	111	8	40
Lantz 3 June	Marlbro'		119	226	–	8	–
Sollein 16 May	Eug.e D. Orm.d		144	305	100	16	40
Landresie S. 10 July	D.e C. Tallar.d		148	292	100	60	32
6 July Allies left by ye	D. Ormond		24	25	66	10	18

Generals & Comand.rs	Forces Batalion	Forces Squad.ns	Ordnance Cañon	Ordnance Mortars	Ordnance Pontoons
Holl.rs					
D. Burgundy & Marq. Puysieux	80	150	92	21	32
D.e & C. Tallar.	94	192	88	16	32
Marq. Villars	70	140	80	20	32
	74	140	–	20	–
D. Bavaria	88	160	90	40	30
D.e & C. Tall.d	87	160	100	50	24
Marq. Villars	160	160	98	12	30
.....	108	160	100	24	36
Villeroy	76	132	66	12	36
& Bavaria	90	150	80	16	40
.....	102	168	72	16	36
Vendosm	132	207	98	12	36
& Bavaria	136	240	72	16	36
.....	200	340	98	12	–
.....	160	300	–	12	–
.....	204	300	96	16	36
Marq.s	192	348	90	12	32
Villars	132	204	–	12	–
.....	150	300	92	16	32
.....	150	300	–	16	–

A Batalion in 18 Platoons, told off in 3 Firings, 4 Men Deep, 2 Kneel, 2 Stand



Platoons Fire to ye { Right / Left } { By either Motion a Regt. gains or loses ye ground of 1 Platoon.

A Batalion making its 4 several Firings.



CARTEL to EXCHANGE PRISONERS of WAR

In 14 Days Officers &c of = Rank 1 for 1 or Pay for.

	Livres	L.	s.	d.
Mareschal or Comander	50000			
Capt. Gen.l	40000			
Gen. & Lt. Gen.l	20000			
Great M.r Ordnance	4000			
Mareschal de Camp Colonel Horse				
General Dragoons	3500			
M.r de Camp Horse				
General Dragoons	3000			
Comissary Gen.l Horse				
Intend.t Armies or Provinc	5000			
Comissioners under them	1500			
Lt. Gen.ls Ordnance	1000			
Maj. Gen.l Horse or Foot	1500			
Brigad.rs	800			
Major Brigad	600			
Q.r M.r Gl. s Adjut.t	300			
Adj.t Gl. King or Dauphin	500			
to y Gls in Chief Lt Gl & M.l de Cam	100			
Q.r M.r Gen.l Horse	500			
Adjutants	300			
Treas.r Gen.l *Extra Exp. War*	100			
First Comissary	1500			
other Army &c	500			
Gen.l Provost	50			
Kings Attorney	300			
Provost Lieut	250			
Clerks	100			
other Officers Council War	80			
4 *to* 15 Soldiers *under a* Brigade	18			

Exempt Lieut.t *or* Provost *with* Horses Arms *&c may* ESCORT *y* Attorney, Fiscal, Assessor & Clerks *unmolested to* Seize, Try &c. Thieves *keep* 2 *Leagues from either* Army &c *Over or Under said* Numb.rs *lawfull* Prisoners.

	Livres	L.	s.	d.
Wagon Master Gen.l	150			
His Lieut	80			
Comissary Gen.l Transports	150			
Lieut	50			
Conductors	10			
Judge	25			
Capt.s Guides	80			
Lieut.	50			
Cornet	35			
Horse Guides *as* Troopers	20			
Chief Ingineers	500			
Months Pay for others				
ORDNANCE				
Col.o or Partic.r Lieut.	400			
Provinc.l Comissary or Lieut. Col.o	250			
Comissary Ord.ry or Major	150			
Extraord.y	30			
Capt.ns	50			
Gunners &c.	7½			
GENS D'ARMS				
Brigad.r	1100			
Capt.ns Capt.s Lts &c 1.rs & 2.es Lieut.	2000			
Und.r Lieut. Scots Eng Queen Daup. Burgundy Anjou Bery & Orleans — Guards				
Major	1000			
Ens.ns Kings Guards du Cor				
Guidon Gl. Arms				
Scots Troop & Cornet				
Lt. D'Orleans Guard Ens.e Gend Arm				
Cornet Light Horse Guidon Scots Eng. & Gs. Arms Maj.r Gs. du Cor	600			
Exempts Q.r Mast. Brig.r Sub Do. said Troops &c. Granad.rs or Horse K.s or Queens Guards	Month Pay			

	Guards. Livres	L	s	d	Horse Livres	L	s	d	Dragoons Livres	L	s	d	Foot & Ordnance Livres	L	s	d
Colonel	3000				400				350				400			
Lieut.t Col.o	1500				250				250				250			
Major	600				220				200				150			
Captain	300				200				150				100			
Subalterns &c	one Months Pay															
Lieut.t					100				70				40			
Adjutant									60							
Cornet und.r Lt. or Ens.n					75				55				35			
Q.r Mast.r Regt									50				25			
					25				25							
Brig.drs or Corp.ls					22½	.	.	.	20	.						
Clerks Private Men					20	.	.	.	18	.			7½	.	.	.
Provost					40	.	.	.	40	.			40	.	.	.
Lt. Clerks &c					20	.	.	.	20	.			20	.	.	.

	Livres
Col.o Gen.l Swiss Guards	40000
Serj.t Foot	15
Capt. Gen.ls Guard 1 Months Pay	
Trumpeters return in 3 Days or p.d by y Detain.d	
GENT. CADETS	
Capt. 9 Companys	150
Lieutenants	80
Sub. Do or Ensigns	60
Serjeants	20
Corporals	12
Cadets	10

Trump.rs Drum.rs no Ransom unless they had Arms in hand when taken, then pay as Troop.rs or Sold.rs Prison.rs give notice where confin'd.

Gover.rs Com.rs K.s & L.ts Maj.rs Adjut.s Capt.ns Gates 1 Months Pay High.r Posts Volunt Court. of no Milit.e Post 2000 Almoners Minist.rs Physitians &c Directors Gen.l & Partic.r &c. Hosp.l Women Child.n 12 or und.r Post Boys Messengers Serv.ts with.t Ransom ——— None to be Strip'd or Press'd to Serve ——— Private Men to have 3 s. (Serj.ts 6.) & Bread ——— Off.rs treated as they can afford, if on Parole to surend.r 14 Days after Ratificat.n of y Treaty - if not clear'd, Acc.t every 6 Months. Lead Bullets only us'd none Ramm'd for Flying Parties ——— Parties und.r 15 Horse or y Punish.t unless Broke by Skirmishes

INCAMPMENT for a BATTALION of 10 or 13 Companies

COLONELS Lt. COLs MAJORS, and CAPTs of y RIGHT WING 1709.

	N°	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25
British	44																									
Prussians	18																									
Hanoverians	14																									

CAPTAINS and SUBALTERNS at TOURNAY 1709


	N°	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27
British	44																											
Prussians	9																											
Hanoverians	20																											
Dutch	10																											


	N°	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25
	1																									17
	2																									10
	3																									9
	4																									52
	5																									253

ROSTER. GEN.l to Detatch REGIMENTS

	No	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41	42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49	50
British	27	1			8			15			21			26			32			39			45			51		58			64			70			77			83			89			94			99			104
Prussians	14	2				10			18				27				35			41				49			56			63			72			79			85			91				95			103
Hanover	13	3				11			19				29				37			46				47			55			64			73			78			84			92				96			102
Dutch	50	4	6	7	9	12	13	16	17	20	22	25	28	30	31	33	36	38	40	42	43	45	48	50	52	54	57	59	60	63	65	67	69	72	75	78	80	81	84	85	88	90	93	98	100	104				
Danes	10	5				14				24							34				44						55						66						86						97						

INCAMPMENT of a REGIMENT of 9 Troops, 50 Men & Horses each.





DISCIPLINE

FOR A

Regiment of FOOT upon ACTION.

ALSO,

The moſt ESSENTIAL DISCIPLINE

OF THE

CAVALRY.

GREAT Pains have been taken to bring our Troops under one Method of Diſcipline, but moſt Officers perſiſting on having ſome trifling Motions perform'd after their own Whims, more than the eſſential Parts of Diſcipline, *i. e.* how they are to act when they come to face the Enemy. Our laſt formal piece of Diſcipline was entitled, *An Exerciſe for the Horſe, Dragoons, and Foot, By Authority*; which Words oblige the whole Army to conform.

It is ſurprizing, after two ſuch Wars as our Nation have been engaged in, that ſo poor a Performance ſhould be ſkreen'd by Authority. And it is ſtrange, that we have nothing relating to Action introduced into our Diſcipline. How prepoſterous is it to ſee ſome of our *Engliſh* Jack-Boot-Men, with all their Accoutrements, perform an Exerciſe on Foot! Was this ever known to be of Uſe upon Action? Is it poſſible for young Gentlemen that never ſaw any thing

thing of Action, (of whom the Army in a ſhort Time will be compoſed) to form an Idea of Action, out of this Book of Diſcipline?

Every one will allow, that 'tis abſolutely neceſſary that the Troops ſhould be brought under one Method of Diſcipline; that when His Majeſty ſhall pleaſe to order them together, or a General Officer is to receive them, they may perform a graceful Exerciſe. And were there 20 Battalions on one Field, they might anſwer each other in their Firings with all the Regularity imaginable; but then they are not to keep popping by ſingle Platoons.

Diſcipline of HORSE.

It is ſufficient for them to ride well, to have their Horſes well managed, and train'd up to ſtand Fire; that they take particular Notice what Part of the Squadron they are in, their Right and Left-Hand Men, and File-Leaders, that they may, when they happen to break, readily know to form. Breaking their Squadrons ought to be practiſed in their common Diſcipline. That they MARCH and WHEEL with a Grace, and HANDLE their SWORDS well, which is the only Weapon our *Britiſh* Horſe makes uſe of when they charge the Enemy; more than this is ſuperfluous. The Duke of *Marlborough* would allow the Horſe but three Charges of Powder and Ball to each Man for a Campaign, and that only for guarding their Horſes when at Graſs, and not to be made uſe of on Action.

DRAGOONS

Should be well inſtructed in the Uſe of Arms, having often Occaſion to make uſe of them on Foot; but when on Horſeback, they are to fight as the Horſe do.

I ſhall

I ſhall be as brief as the Nature of the Subject will admit; nor ſhall I take Notice of the Manual Exerciſe, or Evolutions, but refer to the Book of Exerciſe. I muſt ſay, there is no Occaſion for puzzling the Soldiers with more Evolutions than is neceſſary to form the Battalion for Action.

There is not yet any Method found to train up our Infantry for Action in the Field, otherwiſe than by repreſenting one Battalion engaging another; I ſhall therefore lay down the beſt Method I can for that Purpoſe. In order to which, I muſt firſt ſuppoſe our Battalion to conſiſt of 800, or 1000 Men. Let us ſuppoſe our Battalion drawn up with the Army on the Field of Battle, three deep, their Bayonets fix'd on their Muzzles, the Grenadiers divided on the Flanks, the Officers ranged in the Front; and the Colonel, or, in his Abſence, the Lieutenant-Colonel (who, I ſuppoſe, fights the Battalion) on Foot, with his Sword drawn in his Hand, about eight or ten Paces in the Front, oppoſite the Centre, with an expert Drum by him. He ſhould appear with a chearful Countenance, never in a Hurry, or by any Means ruffled; and to deliver his Orders with great Calmneſs, and Preſence of Mind.

The firſt Thing the Colonel ſhould do, is to order the Major and Adjutant to divide the Battalion into four grand Diviſions, which is to be the Groundwork of all our Performances, of which our *Martinet* gives but a faint Idea. I find he knows very little of the Conſequences attending our Grand Diviſions; for from them we form our Platoons, our Sub-Diviſions in all our Marchings; and from them we form the Hollow Square, as well ſtanding as marching; and that after a much more commodious and readier Way, than the round-about Way now practiſed; for each of our Grand Diviſions make a Front of the Square,

ſo

ſo that in marching out there, there is no further Occaſion for ſquare-marking out the Ground; and the Officers of the Platoons may at once know what Fireing they'll be off in the Square, as well as in the Battalion; which will ſave Time and Trouble. When Pikes were in Uſe, our Battalions were compoſed but of three Grand Diviſions, *viz.* one of Pikes in the Centre, and a Diviſion of Muſketteers on the Right and Left of them; but ſince Pikes have been laid aſide, a Battalion cannot be diſpoſed for Action, but by dividing it into four Grand Diviſions. Our Battalions thus divided, and each Diviſion diſtinguiſhed by the

$$\left\{\begin{array}{l} 1. \\ 2. \text{ the Right} \\ 3. \\ 4. \text{ the Left} \end{array}\right\} \text{Diviſion,}$$

Each Diviſion to be divided in four Platoons, which, with the Grenadiers will make up eighteen; but when our Infantry is on the low Eſtabliſhment, as in time of Peace, our Grand Diviſions will admit but of three Platoons to each, and thoſe but ſmall.

The Eighteen Platoons are to be divided into three Fireings, ſo that there will be ſix in each. And as it is abſolutely neceſſary to have a Fire in Reſerve, the Front Rank is to be reſerved for that Purpoſe, which on Occaſion will make a fourth Fireing; ſo that the two Rear Ranks are only to go on with the Fireings, until the Commanding Officer thinks fit to order the Front Rank to fire, either by themſelves, or to go on with the Rear Ranks of their Platoons; all which depends wholly on the Diſcretion of the Officer that fights the Battalion.

As the Commanding Officer will be expoſed to the Fire of his own Men, as well as that of the Enemy,

he is to take ſpecial Care that he keep oppoſite the two Centre Platoons while the other Parts of the Battalion keep Firing; and he muſt alſo take as great Care, that when it comes to the Turn of the Centre Platoons to fire, that both he and the Drum ſtep aſide, and return as ſoon as they have done, otherwiſe they muſt fall by their own Fire.

Note, that the Front Rank of the two Centre Platoons are to fire with their own Platoons, and not to be of the Reſerve, or fourth Fire, otherwiſe the Commanding Officer would have no Shelter from the Fire of the Front Rank.

Upon dividing the grand Diviſions into Platoons, place a Serjeant in the Interval of each Platoon, after which the Major appoints the Officers, and tells them what firing they are of, and how they are to behave; he then acquaints the Lieutenant-Colonel, and remaining Part of the Officers, that they are to march to the Rear when the others take their Platoons.

Note that, always upon Action, the Officers of the Platoons are to be poſted as near their own Companies as they can, without Regard to Seniority; this being done, the Colonel takes the Management of the Battalion upon himſelf.

When he finds there is no avoiding coming to Battle, he is to order the Soldiers to lay down their Knapſacks, Tent-poles, and what is cumberſome, and the Serjeant ſends them to ſome Place out of the Way, where a Serjeant with a few Men takes Care of them. If we win the Day, they will be ſafe; if not, 'tis no Matter what becomes of them.

When this is done, he, either by Word of Command, or the Signal of Drum, orders the Officers to take their Platoons; and when the Word *March*, or Signal of Drum is given, they march into the Intervals, and the Lieutenant-Colonel, and other Officers,

march at the ſame time to the Rear. The Lieutenant-Colonel, or, in his Abſence, the eldeſt Captain, poſts himſelf eight or ten Paces from the Rear Rank oppoſite the Center, the reſt of the Officers poſting themſelves four Paces from the Rear Rank, extending to the Right and Left to cover the Battalion, where they will be of as great Uſe as thoſe in the Front, in ſeeing that the Soldiers keep up in their Ranks and do their Duty. The Enſigns that carry the Colours ought to be able-body'd Men, who are to poſt themſelves in the Centre Rank, on the Right and Left of the two Centre Platoons, as they are mark'd in the Plan of the firſt Firing, which ſhews the whole; they are to carry the Colours always well advanced. When Muſters fall into their Platoons, the Serjeants that were plac'd there fall into the Intervals of the Rear Rank, where they are to be aſſiſting the Officers in ſeeing the Platoons do their Duty; the remaining Part of the Serjeants are to poſt themſelves on the Flanks and in the Rear between the Officers and Soldiers, where they will be alſo of great Uſe in ſeeing the Soldiers do their Duty. The Drums are to be divided into three Parts, on the Right and Left, and behind the two Centre Platoons, all to range in a Line with the Serjeants, but not to Beat without Orders. The Major and Adjutant having ſeen all theſe Matters ſettled, poſt themſelves on the Flanks, from whence they are to obſerve, as much as in them lies, the Behaviour of the Battalion, but to take great Care that they ride not into the Front while the Battalion is firing.

Our Battalion being thus form'd for Battle, and as it were riveted together, ſo that no Soldier can poſſibly miſbehave, but there will be an Eye preſently upon him; and nothing but the Want of Care and Reſolution in the Officers can make a Battalion thus form'd

form'd miſcarry, unleſs over-power'd by Numbers, or ſome unforeſeen Accident.

Before we enter upon Action, I muſt firſt take Notice of one Thing, hitherto overlook'd by all; that is, the Uſe of the DRUM on many more Occaſions than is generally made of it. For Inſtance, it is not every Commanding Officer that has a Voice capable to go through the Management of a Battalion when in common Exerciſe, much more in the Hurry of Action. Would it not be a Shame for him to order the Major or Adjutant, in the Day of Battle, to fight the Battalion, and he only a Cypher at the Head of it, and pretend he has not a Voice to go thro' it?

I am ſorry to ſay there has always been too many indolent Sparks in the Army, who would think it very hard ſhould a diligent experienc'd Officer be put over their Heads.

I was once at a Review, when the Commanding General of the Troops was reviewing a Regiment of Foot, where were preſent the Colonel, Lieutenant-Colonel, Major, and moſt of all the Captains, and yet not one of them capable of going thro' the Diſcipline of the Regiment, of which the General very juſtly took publick Notice.

This is only a Hint, to caution our young Gentlemen, even from the Colonels themſelves to the Enſigns, that none of them may think themſelves above learning their Duty. I am for introducing the more frequent Uſe of the Drum, as well upon Action, as in the common Exerciſe of a Regiment, to aſſiſt the Voice.

Suppoſe the Commanding Officer ſhould happen to be killed, the Voice of him that ſupplies his Place may be ſo different ſtom the other's, that it may occaſion a Confuſion; whereas the Drum is always the ſame, and much eaſier heard and underſtood, eſpe-

cially when the Men are train'd up by, and conſtantly us'd to it. A great deal more might be ſaid in Favour of this warlike Inſtrument; however I would not be ſo underſtood, as that the Drum is wholly to be depended on. No, I am only for introducing the more frequent Uſe of it purely to aſſiſt the Voice; for the Commanding Officer muſt, on all Occaſions, firſt apprize both Officers and Soldiers what they are about to do, and when he has done that, proceed as he ſhall think fit, either by the Word of Command, or by the Drum; ſo that, I ſay, 'tis abſolutely neceſſary for the Soldiers to be train'd up by both, ſince 'tis impoſſible that any Inconveniency can accrue thereby, and that it is moſt certain it may, on many Occaſions, be of great Uſe; wherefore I ſee no Reaſon why our Infantry ſhould not be train'd up by the Drum, as well in their Firings, or rather more, than the Manual Exerciſe; ſo that, as it often happens in the Hurry of Action, when it is not poſſible for the Voice to be heard, that then the Drum will be of the greateſt Conſequence.

Uſe of the DRUM *in Action.*

Suppoſe that the Signal for Battle is given: Upon this the Colonel orders his Drum to beat a Ruffle, which is as much as to ſay, *Take Care*; and then ſaying ſomething to encourage and excite the Men to the Performance of their Duty. This may ſeem ridiculous by ſome, yet I know 'twill animate and raiſe an Emulation among the Soldiers, eſpecially when they have a LOVE for their OFFICERS. I cannot but take Notice of ſome Gentlemen, who inſtead of treating their Men with GOOD NATURE, uſe them with CONTEMPT and CRUELTY; by which thoſe Gentlemen often meet with their FATE in the Day of Battle,

tle, from their own Men; when thoſe Officers who, on the other hand, treat their Men with JUSTICE and HUMANITY, will be ſure, on all Occaſions, to have them ſtand faſt by them, and even interpoſe between them and Death.

The Colonel having thus ſpoke cheerfully to the Men, he then gives the Word, MARCH; at which time the Drum beats to the March: and when the Battalion has got within four or five Paces of him, he turns to the Enemy, and marches ſlowly down (we will ſuppoſe to his oppoſite Battalion) till he finds they begin to fire upon him; upon which he orders his Drum to ceaſe beating, and turning to the Battalion, gives the Word, HALT; and then orders his Drum to beat a Preparative, upon which the ſix Platoons of the firſt Firing make ready, as in Figure A, as does alſo all the Front-Rank, except thoſe of the two Centre-Platoons, on which the two Rear-Ranks cloſe forward, keeping their Thumbs on the Cocks, and their Arms well recover'd; and the Front-Rank kneels, placing their Butts on the Ground by their Left-Feet, where all are to wait for the next Word of Command, or Signal of the Drum, from the Colonel himſelf; for we are not now to fire by ſingle Platoons, as is generally practis'd at Reviews, which will not do when we come to engage the Enemy; nor will they carry ſuch Weight with them, or do near the Execution that ſix Platoons will do, when pour'd in all together upon them: wherefore, 'tis the Colonel himſelf muſt give Orders for firing the Platoons, and not the Officers belonging to them, who are only to ſee that the Soldiers do their Duty, and obſerve ſuch Orders as the Colonel ſhall give, whether by his Voice, or the Drum. And let no one ſay, what Occaſion is there for Officers to the Platoons, when they are not to give the Word

of Command? But let them conſider, that both Officers and Serjeants will have enough to do to take Care that their Platoons perform their Duty in every Reſpect; and when they find it requiſite, they are to tell them ſoftly what they are to do, but ſo as none muſt hear them but their own Men; and if they perform this well it will be ſufficient, and will contribute much towards the Behaviour of the Battalion. The Commanding Officer is the beſt Judge when they are, or are not to fire; for, tho' our Platoons are made ready, yet perhaps the Enemy by this time may have retreated, and got out of Reach of our Shot: whereupon, inſtead of going on with our Firing, the Colonel orders them to half-cock their Fire-locks, *&c.* and proceeds in marching after them, rather than throw away his Fire, which would in Courſe be done, were the Officers of the Platoons to give the Word of Command for their Firing, as is done on Reviews. But let us ſuppoſe the Enemy ſtand their Ground, or perhaps advance to meet us; upon which our ſix Platoons being made ready, as above, and waiting the Colonel's Orders, who, if he finds his Voice not ſufficient to go thro' his Buſineſs, he then orders his Drum to beat a Flam; at which time the Front-Rank drop their Muzzles to the Ground, and the two Rear-Ranks preſent. Now the Officers and Serjeants of theſe Platoons are to take great Care that the Soldiers level well their Arms, ſo that their Fire may have Effect on the Enemy; as alſo caution them to wait the next Signal of Drum (here the Men ought in training them to be us'd to that of recovering their Arms ſometimes inſtead of firing, which will make them take Care in waiting for Orders to fire.)

The Platoons being preſented, the Colonel orders the Drum to beat a ſecond Flam, on which they fire,

fire, and immediately recover their Arms, fall back, and load as faſt as they can; which the Officers and Serjeants are to ſee done without Hurry or Diſorder. The Front-Rank remain with their Thumbs on the Cocks, and Muzzles to the Ground.

As ſoon as the firſt Fire is made, the Colonel, without making the leaſt Stop or Heſitation, orders his Drum to beat a ſecond Preparative, on which the ſix Platoons of the ſecond Fire make ready, and go on, as in Figure B: when they have fir'd he immediately beats the third Preparative; on which the ſix Platoons of the third Fire make ready, and proceed as in Figure C. And thus the Colonel continues his Firings ſtanding, without Intermiſſion between them; and if he ſees Occaſion for firing his Front-Rank, he then gives the Word, FRONT-RANK, TAKE CARE, PRESENT, FIRE, as in D.

Let us ſuppoſe that the Enemy be returning their Fire, and obſtinately maintain their Ground: In this Caſe the Colonel is to advance upon them; in order to which, he is firſt to apprize the Battalion of it, on which the Front-Rank ſtands up, keeping their Arms well recover'd: He then orders the Drum to beat a Preparative for the Platoons of the firſt, or next that are to fire, to make ready; which being done, he gives the Word MARCH; and when the Battalion has got within two Paces of him, he turns to the Enemy, and advances in this Poſture till he comes ſo near as he intends. Note, the nearer he approaches the Enemy, the nearer he is to keep to the Battalion; otherwiſe he would be a particular Mark to them; and then, if he finds they ſtand their Ground, he gives the Word HALT, on which the Front-Rank kneels, and the Rear-Ranks of the Platoons that are to fire, cloſe forward; he then orders the Drum to beat a Flam, on which the Front-Rank drop their

Muzzles, and the Rear-Ranks preſent; and on the next Flam they fire; and ſo he continues his Firings as faſt as he can, until he obliges them to give Way, or perhaps, ſeeing us advance upon them, after the above Manner, they have already given Way. It is not poſſible to foreſee what may happen at this critical Juncture, nor to lay down Rules how to proceed, but muſt leave it to the Diſcretion of the Commanding Officer to act as Things may offer, or according to ſuch Orders as he may receive from the General. However,

I will ſuppoſe that the Enemy has given Ground, and put themſelves on the Retreat, and are marching off as faſt as they can; and conſequently faſter than we can propoſe to follow, and keep our Order, which we muſt not break upon any Account; ſo that all the Colonel can do on this Occaſion, is to keep firing after them ſo long as his Shot will reach them, and then leave them to the Horſe. Thus much for Battalions firing Standing and Advancing.

How to act, if obliged to Retreat.

This is a Matter of the greateſt Conſequence, and requires the greateſt Conduct in a General, as well as Reſolution in both Officers and Soldiers; for the leaſt Miſmanagement puts all into Confuſion, eſpecially among the Infantry, the Officers of whom will find it a very difficult Matter to keep the Soldiers from breaking, eſpecially if they are hard preſs'd by the Horſe; and if they are once broke, not a Man in ten eſcapes: however, Reſolution and good Orders have ſurmounted great Difficulties.

In this Caſe, according to what I propos'd, I ſhall only touch upon the Retreat of our ſingle Battalion upon this grand Occaſion, *viz.* when our Colonel

lonel finds the Army giving Way, he then orders the Battalion to face to the Right about, upon which the Drum beats the Retreat. On this Occaſion the Generals are to draw as many of the Infantry together as they can, and alſo of the Cavalry, to aſſiſt the Infantry in getting off: But, as I am on the Retreat of our ſingle Battalion, ſo I ſhall proceed only upon it. Our Battalion being now on the Retreat, we are to march as faſt as we poſſibly can, ſo that we keep our Order, and avoid Confuſion, until we are got out of Reach of our Enemies Foot, the Lieut. Colonel and Officers in the Rear leading them with their Pikes under-hand. But thoſe Officers to the Platoons are to carry their Pikes upright in their Hands, by which they'll have much better Command of them, than either by trailing, or having them pinn'd to their Shoulders. As ſoon as we have got on the Retreat, the Colonel's Drum ceaſes beating, but ſtill keeps by him; and the Lieut. Colonel gets a Drum by him, who is now to beat the Retreat. While the Lieut. Colonel thus leads the Battalion, the Colonel keeps a watchful Eye on the Enemy; and the Major, Adjutant, and ſpare Serjeants, are to take great Care that no Diſorders happen on the March. If the Colonel finds the Enemy preſſing upon him, he orders his Drum to beat a Preparative, on which the ſix Platoons or next Firing makes ready. (Note, that no one of the Front-Rank make ready but what belongs to the Platoons that are to fire.) The Platoons being made ready, they immediately face to the Left about, at which time the Front-Rank kneels, placing their Butts by their Left-Feet, and the Rear-Ranks cloſe forward, keeping their Arms well recover'd.

The Lieut. Colonel is to take no Notice of this, or any other Preparative, but continues on his March, unleſs

unleſs the Colonel ſends him Orders to the contrary. The Officers and Serjeants, that are on the March with the Battalion, are to take great Care, that they keep open the Intervals of the Platoons that are firing, until they return; nor muſt the Colonel keep them too long abroad, but make them fire, if there is Occaſion, as ſoon as poſſible, and then march them briſkly back, keeping their Arms well recover'd till they get within their Intervals, and then load. Thus the Colonel keeps firing, and the Battalions marching, until we have got out of Reach of the Enemies Foot. We are not to loſe Time, which upon this Occaſion is very precious, by halting, and facing about, but to make the beſt Haſte we can to get clear; for, if we do not out-march the Foot, pray what muſt be the Conſequence when both Horſe and Foot are up with us? Why truly, we muſt either ſtand to be cut to Pieces, or throw down our Arms, and call for Quarters, which in a manner will be much the ſame: for, upon all warm Purſuits there is but little Quarter to be expected. Wherefore, the firſt Thing we have to do is to out-march the Enemies Foot; and when once got out of their Reach, if we have but Reſolution to keep our Orders, our Fire will keep off any reaſonable Body of Horſe, eſpecially when any Number of Battalions get together; for too often the Horſe take Care of themſelves on theſe Occaſions, and leave the Foot to do the ſame.

Suppoſe we have got clear of the Enemies Foot; but their Horſe having drove our Horſe out of the Field, are now marching down upon us; wherefore, to defend ourſelves againſt them, we muſt think of forming the Hollow Square; but muſt never attempt it, while the Foot are able to come up with us.

This

This was the Caſe of the *Dutch* Infantry on the Plains of *Fleury*, in 1690, where their Cavalry having miſbehaved, left the Infantry to ſhift for themſelves, where Prince *Waldeck*, who commanded the *Dutch* Forces, form'd 16 Battalions into one Square, who made their Retreat over thoſe Plains, till they got under the Cannon of *Charleroy*; notwithſtanding all the *French* Cavalry made ſeveral Attempts to break in upon them, yet could not, for want of their Foot, that were not able to come up with them. Another Inſtance of this Kind I was an Eye-Witneſs of, and that was, when the Duke of *Marlborough*, in 1705, paſs'd the *French* Lines in *Brabant*; where, after he had drove the Enemies Horſe out of the Field, there were ten *Bavarian* Battalions that ſtuck together, and form'd themſelves into a Square, our Infantry not being able to get up with them; ſo they defended themſelves againſt all the Cavalry of our Right Wing, until they got under the Walls of *Lovain*; which plainly ſhews, that if a Body of Foot have but Reſolution to keep their Order, there is no Body of Horſe dare venture within their Fire.

If our Battalion is under a Neceſſity of forming the Square by ourſelves, I preſume, any one will allow, that the moſt expeditious Way, and that which tends to the leaſt Confuſion, to be the beſt; and I believe, when every thing is conſider'd, they will find the following Method to be ſo, *viz.* when the Colonel finds he has no Way to ſave the Battalion, but by performing the Square, which is not to be attempted but upon the laſt Extremity, he ſends to the Lieut. Colonel to apprize him of it, who immediately orders the Battalion to Halt; which they are to do without altering their Aſpect, that no Time may be loſt; on which the Colonel, without any more to do, gives the Word, TAKE CARE TO FORM THE SQUARE; and

and then orders his Drum to beat a RUFFLE; upon which the firſt Diviſion, which is now on the Left of the Battalion, as they are fac'd, *face* to the *Right* on their RIGHT HEELS; the other three Diviſions ſtand faſt, until the Drum beats a FLAM; on which the firſt Diviſion MARCHES FORWARD, the ſecond WHEELS to the RIGHT by the RIGHT-HAND-MAN of the FRONT-RANK, as they are now fac'd; the third Diviſion MARCHES DIRECTLY FORWARD; and the fourth WHEELS *to the Left by the Left-Hand-Man of the Rear-Rank*: ſo the firſt Diviſion will take the Ground of the third, and join their three Ranks to the three Files on the Left of the fourth; and their three Files in the Rear will join the three Ranks of the Right of the ſecond. The third Diviſion marches on until their three Files on their Right are join'd by the three Ranks on the Right of the fourth; and their three Ranks on their Left join'd by the three Files on the Left of the ſecond, which cloſe the Square; all which, with a very little Practice, will be found very eaſy, and ready to perform. The Square being form'd, the Lieut. Colonel goes to that Face of the Square which is towards the Garriſon, or Place we are to march to, on which the Square face all that Way, and ſo proceed on their March: The Colours and ſupernumerary Officers get into the Square. The Officers to the Platoons are to march two Paces without their Intervals; as alſo the Serjeants within the Square.

The Colonel, who by this time has got on Horſeback, with the Major and Adjutant, are to keep without the Square, to have a watchful Eye on the Enemy; and to keep the Grenadiers by him, to oppoſe any ſmall Body that may be for making Attempts, or Feints, to retard our March.

In

In our March, let us ſuppoſe that the Enemies Horſe are come up with us, and are for attacking us; on this the Colonel ſends to the Lieut. Colonel to Halt, he orders his Drum to beat a RUFFLE, on which they FACE SQUARE, at which time the Officers and Serjeants of the Platoons fall into their INTERVALS, and the *Colonel*, *Major*, *Adjutant*, and Grenadiers get into the SQUARE, and the *Lieut. Colonel* falls into the CENTRE-INTERVAL of that Face of the Square he leads, that he may be ready to ſtep out, and march again the next Opportunity. On this Occaſion our Square is not to fire by Platoons; nor is it poſſible for the Colonel, or any in the Square, to give Orders and Directions to them to fire. For ſuppoſe the Square ſhould (as probably it may) be attack'd on all Sides, thoſe in the Square cannot attend all Parts of it; wherefore the Colonel is to appoint the eldeſt Officer of each Face of the Square to fight his own Diviſion, who are to ADVANCE two Paces before the Centre-Intervals, and are to fire by Ranks, the Rear Rank firſt; the Lieut. Colonel fights the Diviſion he is in.

Theſe four Officers have as it were four ſeparate Commands, and are to fight their Diviſions as they find themſelves attack'd, without waiting for, or taking the leaſt Notice of one another, or even ſo much as waiting for Orders from the Colonel. The Drum is by no means to be made uſe of, but all by Word of Command; and the Officers and Serjeants of the Platoons will be of great Uſe in ſeeing the Ranks do their Duty, and particularly in levelling their Arms, and waiting the Word of Command from their own Officers.

If we have Reſolution to keep Order, and avoid Hurry, there is no reaſonable Body of Horſe dare venture upon us. It is not to be imagined, how the Fire

Fire of one Rank will ſtop and diſorder Horſe; and then a ſecond, and a third on the Heels of it, will certainly ſend them a packing. Beſides; ſhould the Colonel ſee any one Part hard preſt, he has the Grenadiers to ruſh out, which will be no ſmall Surprize, on them: Nor has it been known, that ever a Body of Horſe alone, without the Aſſiſtance of Foot, brake in upon a Body of Foot, that with calm Reſolution made their regular Fires. So that the Havock which the Horſe generally make among the Foot, is when they find them broke.

The more Battalions that form the Square, makes it ſtill the ſtronger; and then every Commanding Officer fights his own Battalion on Foot, and fires by Platoons, as they ſhall ſee Occaſion; not by the Drum; for whenever the Square is attack'd, they muſt fire by Command.

Suppoſe we have obliged the Enemy to keep at a Diſtance; then the Colonel, Major, Adjutant, and Grenadiers, get out of the Square, and the Lieutenant-Colonel, with his Drum, to the Head of his Diviſion, and proceeds on his March; at which Time, the Colonel draws the Grenadiers to ſuch Part as may be in moſt Danger of being attack'd, and then we continue our March until we are out of all Danger.

Thus much for training up a Battalion, for their engaging another in a plain Field; as alſo in making their Retreat from Horſe: In which is ſhewn the abſolute Neceſſity of dividing our Battalions into Grand Diviſions. I am ſurprized the Army does not fall into it; which if they did, I am perſuaded they would ſoon leave off that round-about-way of forming the Square, that is now in Vogue. All that can be alledged for forming the Square after the preſent Manner, is, that they keep a Front of the fourth Part of

the Battalion againſt the Enemy, to defend them whilſt forming; but ſurely this is a very weak Argument, unleſs they firſt capitulate with the Enemy, to fall upon no other Part while they are forming; if they do, they'll find them in a very unguarded Condition.

Suppoſe the Enemy to be ſo near us, when we are about forming the Square, as to make a Puſh at us while we are forming (which, by the By, ought not to be done when they are ſo near) but ſuppoſe they are, the Thing is ſo ſudden, and ſo ſoon perform'd, without facing-about, or running round the Battalion to mark out the Square, that we are form'd before they can tell what we are about; and in Caſe they ſhould make an Attempt upon us, the Colonel, inſtead of dividing the Grenadiers to the Angles, draws them together, and makes a moving Front of them, to ſupport any Part that may be in Danger of being attack'd. The Method of firing our Platoons in the Battalion, after the Manner I propoſe, is undoubtedly the only Way for engaging the Enemy; and when there are any Number of Battalions together for a Review, they may with great Regularity anſwer each other after that Manner. As to the firing in the Square, when attack'd, there is no other Way to be made uſe of, than what I have propoſed. The firing of Platoons, as now practiſed, being only adapted for making a Shew on Reviews; nor are the firing by ſingle Platoons in the Battalion, or the Street-firing, of any other Uſe. Nor can I comprehend what Uſe any of them can be upon Action. The Manner of forming the Square by Grand Diviſions, when the Battalion is faced to their proper Front, is no more than facing the three Diviſions on the Left, to the RIGHT-ABOUT, and the Diviſion on the Right to face on their Right Heels to the LEFT; from

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from whence they all march, and wheel, and join, as above, and in reducing.

The firſt Diviſion face on their Left Heels to the RIGHT, the third to the LEFT-ABOUT, the ſecond and fourth STAND FAST (that is, ſuppoſing all to be faced ſquare) and then they all march and wheel to their proper Ground.

It rarely happens that two Armies meet in a fair Plain, but one or the other takes to ſome advantageous Piece of Ground, or throws up an Intrenchment to cover them, ſo that in attacking them there frequently happens great Diſorder and Confuſion: Wherefore, in this Caſe, I ſhall take Notice of another Branch of Diſcipline, which our authorized *Martinet* knows nothing of, nor has it been practiſed many Years; a Thing ſo abſolutely neceſſary, that all Battalions ought to be conſtantly train'd to the Knowledge of it; nay, even our Horſe and Dragoons too; and that is what we call breaking the Battalion, which was much recommended by Duke *Schomberg*. I ſpoke of it to ſome good Officers, at the Time the preſent Diſcipline was firſt introduced among our Troops, but they would by no Means hearken to it, leſt it might give the Men a Habit of breaking upon every trifling Occaſion, which was the Reaſon of its being laid aſide. But as 'tis impoſſible for Battalions to climb Trenches or Ditches, without breaking, and running into great Diſorder, and often ſeveral Regiments intermingling together, as I have, upon ſome Occaſions, known it; then, ſurely, a Method ought to be put in Practice, whereby Battalions may know how they may readily form, and draw up in Order again.

NOTE, In order for reviving this uſeful Branch of Diſcipline, the following Particulars are to be ſtrictly obſerved by all the Officers and Soldiers, whenever the

the Battalion is form'd, whether it be for Action, or any other Occaſion (*viz.*) *The Officers are to take particular Notice which of the grand Diviſions they belong to, and on which Side of the Colours they are, and who are the Officers on the Right and Left of them; on the exact Obſervance of this, depends the ready forming the Battalion whenever they happen to break. The Soldiers are alſo to take particular Notice of which Side the Colours the Diviſion they are in lies; they muſt likewiſe take Notice who are the Officers of their Diviſions, the Ranks they are in, their File-Leaders, and their Right and Left Hand Men.*

This at firſt may ſeem almoſt impoſſible to bring Men to; but when they are train'd up to it, they will find it as familiar to them as handling their Arms, and a Battalion ſo train'd will upon many Occaſions find great Advantage.

Suppoſe our Battalion to be thus train'd up, and that upon ſome Occaſion we have been oblig'd to Break, and run into great Diſorder, ſo that Officers and Soldiers are intermingled, and all in Hurry and Confuſion; this is a Conſequence which frequently attends the Foot, when they attack the Enemy that are poſted behind Intrenchments or Ditches, eſpecially after they have got within them; and how is it poſſible to be avoided, when perhaps the Enemy may have two or three Ditches to retire to, and we purſuing after this confus'd Manner? And ſuppoſe that we drove the Enemy out of all their Cover, and are purſuing them into a Plain; the firſt Thing we are to do is to put ourſelves in Order, leſt the Enemy's Horſe ſeeing us in Confuſion, come and cut us to Pieces. Wherefore when the Colonel finds the Action he's going upon, is like to occaſion this Diſorder, he apprizes the Battalion of it, and bids them mind their Colours, and keep as cloſe to them as poſſible. The

Colours ought to be carry'd by *ſtrong Men*, and kept always well advanced, to whom the Colonel gives ſtrict Orders to ſtick cloſe by him, whatever Way he takes; he alſo orders two or three of the ableſt Drummers, or more, to keep cloſe by him, and at the ſame Time acquaints both Officers and Soldiers, that whenever they hear the Drums beat to Arms, they immediately repair to their Colours, and whatever Way they find them draw up, or front, they are to range. When the Colonel is for forming the Battalion, he orders the Colours to draw up at their proper Diſtance the Way he would have the Battalion front, and then ordering the Drums to beat to Arms, the Officers by whom the Battalion is to be guided, immediately range to their proper Diſtance on each Side the Colours. The Officers Rank being thus form'd, the Soldiers knowing on which Side the Colours they are of, and the Officers they follow, will ſoon fall into their Places, and the Battalion be form'd in a ſhorter time than can be imagin'd, that is, when they are once thoroughly acquainted with the Manner. When ſeveral Battalions happen to intermingle, as upon theſe Occaſions often happens, the Commanding Officers inclining with their Colours, and Drums beating towards that Part where their Station is to be, will ſoon bring all into Order. The Major, Adjutant, and Serjeants are to beſtir themſelves on this Occaſion; and when the Battalion is thus form'd, the Officers and Serjeants may ſoon fall into their Platoons, and the Lieutenant-Colonel and other Officers take their Poſts in the Rear.

To DEFEND *a* BREACH *or* ENTRENCHMENT,

Which is perform'd by what we call the Parapet-firing. This, in time of Peace, is wholly laid aſide, on

on account of its irregular Firing, and its not making a Figure on our Reviews: However, as it often falls in our Way in Time of War, I think it ought not to be neglected, but practis'd by all Battalions ſometimes, tho' upon Reviews it may be omitted, unleſs the General require it. In this Caſe our Battalion will be drawn up Six deep, and the Files at ſuch a Diſtance, as thoſe that fire may have room to load before it comes to their turn to fire again. The Ranks are to keep at two good Paces diſtance, that the Soldiers may have room to be loading while they keep moving forward. Officers are to be poſted in the front Rank, each of them to have ſix or eight File, at moſt, under their Command; and in the Interval behind each Officer, as many Officers as can be allow'd, to take Care that the Soldiers keep their Diſtance and Order, and hand them up from one to the other, till they come to the Officers. The remaining Part of the Officers are to be poſted in the Rear, to ſee that the Soldiers perform their Duty, and avoid falling into Confuſion. The Colonel gets the moſt convenient Place he can, for having a View of the Action; the Lieutenant-Colonel, Major, and Adjutant are to keep moving about all Parts, to prevent Confuſion or Hurry; the Drums to keep out of the Way. When the Enemy begins the Attack, the Officers in the Front, without waiting for Orders, or ſtaying for one another, give the Word to the Front Rank to make ready, which being done, he advances with them up to the Parapet, and then gives the Word, *Preſent*. In this they muſt be very careful, that the Soldiers point their Arms down to the Enemy, or they will be apt to fire over their Heads; he then gives the Word, *Fire*; which having done, they immediately recover their Arms, and face, upon their right Heels, to the Right about, which bring them oppoſite the Intervals

of Fire they are to paſs through, and then they march briſkly, keeping their Arms well recover'd, until they paſs the Rear Rank two Paces; then they face again, on the right Heels, to the Right about, which brings them oppoſite the Rear of their own Files; and then, and not before, they fall to loading, in which they muſt be ſure to ram down their Cartridges, or they will be apt to drop out when they come to preſent briſkly down to the Enemy.

Upon the Front Rank's advancing up to the Parapet, the ſecond Rank marches up to their Ground, and then makes ready, without waiting the Word of Command, where a Serjeant ſtands to ſee them do it, and to hand them up to the Officer. Thus when the Front Rank has fir'd, the Second marches up to the Parapet, where the Officer ſtands to receive them, and give the Word, *Preſent*, and *Fire*; by which a conſtant Fire will be maintain'd, and the whole Battalion in conſtant Motion, and with due Care may be kept in very good Order. There are ſome who, in performing this Fire, are for having the Ranks, when they have fir'd, to face all to the Right, and to march after one another to the Interval where the Officer ſtands; but this takes up too much Time, becauſe the next Rank cannot mount the Parapet till the laſt Man has got off, which makes a Stop in the Firing, and certainly is moſt ſubject to Confuſion, particularly in taking up their Files, when they come to the Rear, and the Ranks cloſe on each other.

I ſhall only touch on one Thing more, and conclude.

The Army now abounds moſt with young Officers, that have not ſeen any Thing of Action, of whom, in Courſe, the Whole muſt be compos'd; wherefore my Deſign is to inform thoſe Gentlemen, how they are to behave when they come to have ſeparate Commands,

mands, and particularly in marching a Battalion or large Detachment from one Garriſon to another, or on ſuch Occaſions. We have had ſeveral gallant * Officers of long Experience, yet thro' Neglect have had their Regiments or Detachments cut to pieces, and themſelves kill'd, or ſhamefully taken, as they have been marching from one Garriſon to another, and that by inconſiderable Parties of Horſe, that durſt not have look'd them in the Face, had they kept that due Order in their March they ought to have done. Now, to guard againſt the like Misfortune, and caution all young Gentlemen, who in time may have the like Command, never to think themſelves over-ſecure upon any Duty or Command whatever, eſpecially when there is the leaſt Poſſibility of an Enemy coming to them; becauſe the Lives of ſo many Men, and their own Honour, which is much more valuable than Life, as alſo the Service of the Country, depends wholly upon their Care and Conduct upon all thoſe Commands: and let them not depend too much upon the Care and Judgment of others; for whatever Misfortune happens, the Blame will be laid at their Door,

I will ſuppoſe our Battalion to be in Winter-Quarters, and that the Governor has receiv'd Orders to ſend our Regiment, or a ſtrong Detachment to reinforce one of our Frontier-Garriſons, or perhaps, to eſcort Proviſions or Stores thither; this being a Thing very common in Time of War, the which ought to be managed with Caution and Prudence; for the Enemy never wants having Intelligence of thoſe Things; and, if poſſible, they'll ſend out a Party of Horſe to intercept us on our March: wherefore the Governor, if he has the leaſt Apprehenſion of Danger, ſeldom lets his Orders be known

* Col. *Babington*, &c.

till

till the Ports are ſhut, and the Keys brought to him; then he gives out his Orders for the Battalion to be on the Parade by Break of Day next Morning. 'Tis probable our young Gentlemen will think theſe ſudden Orders very hard: but whoever they are that take the Proſecution on them, muſt be ready to march at a Moment's Warning.

Our Battalion on the Parade at the Time appointed, the Colonel and all the Officers muſt not fail to be there at the ſame time, in order to get out of the Ports as ſoon as poſſible, as well to prevent the Men's drinking Drams, as for getting early on the March. The Battalion being ready, the Governor orders the Ports to be open'd, and the Colonel marches out, and draws up again on the Parade, where he's to make a Diſpoſition for his March with all the Diſpatch he can, by firſt drawing out his Advance and Rear-Guards, and then forms his Battalion or Detachment: but, as they are to fall into their March, neither Officers nor Serjeants fall into their Platoons until Occaſion offers; this being done, the Colonel ſends off the Advanc'd Guard, the Officer of which is to take Care that he does not keep at too great a Diſtance, nor yet too near the Battalion; three or four hundred Paces over a Plain will be ſufficient, but leſs within Incloſures. He's to look often behind him to obſerve the March of the Battalion, and to halt when they halt; and when he has got at a little Diſtance, he then ſends off a Serjeant and twelve Men, who are to keep about half the Diſtance before him as he does from the Battalion, who is alſo to look often behind him to ſee that he keeps within Sight of his Officers. They are both to be very careful in looking about them, eſpecially when they come near any Cover, or Riſing-Grounds; and if the Serjeant makes any Diſcovery of the Enemy, he

he is to fire a Shot, or two, or three, and then retire to his Officer; upon which the Officer is to halt, and acquaint the Colonel; and when the Serjeant has join'd him, if he finds the Enemy advance, he is to retire to the Battalion, and obſerve ſuch Orders as he ſhall receive from the Colonel. And as 'tis hardly poſſible for any but Horſe to come to intercept us upon this Occaſion, ſo the Colonel prepares to form the Square, as hereafter ſhewn.

So ſoon as the Colonel has ſent off his Advance-Guard, he orders the Officer of the Rear-Guard to take Care of the Baggage, or Convoy, and ſee that they keep good Order in their March, and cloſe to the Regiment. This Officer is alſo to detach a Serjeant and twelve Men to keep at a proper Diſtance in the Rear of him, and both of them to look ſharp leſt the Enemy may lye in Ambuſh by the Advance-Guard, and come out, in hopes of ſurprizing us in the Rear, they having no Buſineſs to think of attacking us, but by ſurprizing us on a diſorderly March. Nor is it to be conceiv'd what a Panick ſeizes a Body of Foot when they are ſurpriz'd after ſuch a manner; nothing but Confuſion attends them on ſuch Occaſions, and they are cut to Pieces before they can get into Order. Nor, on the other Hand, can it be conceiv'd with what Courage and Reſolution a Body of Foot will be animated, when they find themſelves in good Order, and Poſture of Defence.

The Colonel having diſpos'd Matters as above, and given ſtrict Orders to both Officers and Soldiers, that they keep good Order in their March, and not ſtir from their Diviſions, he then marches off in grand Diviſions three deep, if the Ground will permit; if not, in half Ranks, which will contain two Platoons; and if the Ground will not admit of that, he

he then ſubdivides into Quarter-Ranks, or ſingle Platoons, but never into leſs: and if he ſhould come to a narrow Paſs, or Defile, which will not allow of our marching thus, then the half Ranks of the Platoons double to the Right behind each other; for we are by no Means to break our Platoons any otherwiſe; and whenever the Ground will admit, they are to march immediately out, and form their Platoons; and as the Ground enlarges, they are to double up into half Ranks, which is the eaſieſt Way of marching: But, if there is any Apprehenſion of Danger, we are then to march up in grand Diviſions, wherever the Ground will allow of it. Note, that the Army always marches ſix deep; but as we are, on this Occaſion, in Danger of being attack'd by Horſe, ſo we are to march in the readieſt Poſture for forming the Square, or drawing up in Battalion.

Let us ſuppoſe our Battalion on the March in grand Diviſions over a Plain, with a Drum in the Front-Diviſion, and another in the Rear, beating a March; the Diviſions keeping at ſuch Diſtance as they may have Room to wheel in, either for forming the Battalion, or Square. While we are thus on the March, we will ſuppoſe the Colonel has an Account ('tis no Matter whether from Front or Rear) that a Body of Horſe are advancing towards us; he orders the Drums to ceaſe beating, and the Battalion to halt; on which the Drum of the firſt Diviſion comes out to him, he then gives the Word, TAKE CARE TO FORM *the* SQUARE; *and immediately after orders the* DRUM *to* BEAT *a* RUFFLE; *upon which the ſecond Diviſion* WHEELS *to the* RIGHT, *by the Right-Hand-Man of the firſt Rank, until their three Ranks on the Left* JOIN *the three Files on the* RIGHT *of the firſt Diviſion; the third Diviſion*

MARCHES

MARCHES *briſkly, until they come to the Ground of the* SECOND, *and then they begin their Wheel to the* LEFT *by the* LEFT-HAND-MAN *of the* REAR-RANK; *and when they have made their Wheel they edge to the* RIGHT, *till their three Files on the Right take up the three Ranks on the Left of the firſt; and the Rear-Diviſion all this While marches briſkly, and takes the Ground from whence the ſecond wheel'd, joining their three Ranks on the Right to the three Files on the Right of the ſecond; and the three Files on their Left take up the three Ranks on the Left of the third, which cloſes the Square.* All which, with a little Practice, will be perform'd in a ſhort Time. And in Caſe the Enemy ſhould be ſo near as to attempt falling on us while we are forming, the Grenadiers, with the Advance and Rear Guards, are to join, and make Head againſt them, which will ſtop any Body of Horſe that can poſſibly be ſent out on ſuch Occaſions; and when our Square is form'd, the Enemy dare not venture upon us, ſince they could not ſurprize us on a diſorderly March, which is all the Sign we are to apprehend. Nor has it been known that any on the like Occaſion did ever miſcarry, but by the Careleſſneſs and Neglect of the Commanding Officers, who have had Tails on their March ſome Miles long.

THE BAGGAGE muſt by no Means come into the Square, nor will there be any Danger of it. If they do but keep cloſe to the Square, the Grenadiers, with the Advance and Rear-Guards, will be ſufficient to take Care of them. THE ENEMY, when they find us in this Poſture of Defence, will ſoon make off, leſt our Frontiers hearing of their being abroad, might ſend out a ſuperior Force to intercept them. However, we are to continue our March in the Square,

till we get over the Plain, and come up with inclosed Grounds, where the Horse have no Business to come near us; and being come up to those Grounds, we must reduce the Square before they enter them; whereupon the Colonel halts the Battalion, and then gives the Word, TAKE CARE to *reduce the Square.*

NOTE, *That upon Halting we are not to Face Square, but continue as we were on the March, till the Drum beats a* RUFFLE; *on which the Rear-Division face to the* RIGHT-ABOUT; *the third face to the* RIGHT, *and edge away, to get clear to the Right of the Front Division, and the second face to the* LEFT; *and upon beating the Flam, the Rear-Division marches forward, the third wheels to the* RIGHT *by the same Man they wheel'd on before; and when they have made half their Wheel, the second begins their Wheel to the* LEFT *by the same Man they wheel'd on before. When the third Division has made theirs, they march forward after the fourth, to give Room to the second; and when the Major and Adjutant find, that the third and fourth Divisions have got to their proper Distance, and the second made their Wheel, they acquaint the Colonel of it, who then orders his Drum to beat a* RUFFLE; *upon which the three Divisions in the Rear* FACE *all to the* LEFT-ABOUT; *and upon the Drum's beating a* MARCH, *the whole Battalion marches off at once*; and on our entring the enclosed Grounds, we are then to march as the Roads will admit: And tho' we have got clear of the Horse, yet we must still be on our Guard against an Ambuscade. Wherefore we should be much more careful in marching thro' these Grounds, than over the Plain. And tho' it may seem impossible that a sufficient Body of Foot could be sent from the Enemy's Frontiers to way-lay us, yet as they always have a Number of Partizan Parties abroad, who may hear of our March, and so draw together,

gether, and lie hid in ſome cloſe Cover; and though they durſt not openly attempt us, yet if they find us on a careleſs March, may throw in among us, which would certainly put us under great Confuſion; and 'tis hard to ſay what may be the Conſequence; for I have known ſome of theſe impudent Fellows, that have lain hid in a Wood, fire upon the Skirt of our Grand Army, as we have been on the March: Wherefore, I ſay, great Care muſt be taken in marching thro' incloſed Grounds, where both the Advance and Rear-Guards ought to be more circumſpect in looking about them, and ſend Men off on every Side, to inſpect into all ſuſpected Covers. AND THEREFORE I cannot help recommending that moſt commendable Part of an Officer, of being diligent on all Duties and Commands, and not to truſt to others, as I have too often ſeen among our *Engliſh* Gentlemen; and am ſorry to ſay, that I have not known, among all the Nations I have ſerved with, any Officers ſo remiſs on Duty, as the Generality of our Countrymen; who, in other Reſpects, not only equal, but in a great meaſure excell. And why ſhould this ſupine Negligence blaſt thoſe other heroick Qualifications? And certainly, whenever a Gentleman takes the Profeſſion of Arms upon him, he ought to ſtudy all Parts of it, from the Centinel to the General: For there is nothing will recommend him more to his Prince, or General, than that of being known to be an expert and diligent Officer, the which has raiſed Numbers of Men from private Centinels, to be General Officers; when thoſe who have commanded them, have been at a Stand, and obliged to make their Court to them.

Thus have I gone through theſe Rules of Diſcipline, where I hope Hints will be found, that have not yet been touch'd on by any of our modern *Martinets*.

It

It may be expected that I ſhould ſay ſomething of the Behaviour of an Army in general; but that being an Affair that I can't pretend to, nor is it poſſible for the greateſt General to preſcribe certain Rules for fighting an Army; the Situation of Ground, the various Turns and unforeſeen Accidents, which frequently and unavoidably attend all Battles, eſpecially when an Enemy do obſtinately diſpute every Inch of Ground, are Things greatly depending on the ready Genius and Conduct of the General, and the Goodneſs of the Troops he commands. Beſides, in that of one Army attacking another, there is ſomething unaccountable in it; for though the Army attack'd has the Advantage of Ground which they have made Choice of, and very often more numerous in Troops, yet it is rarely known, but the Army which attacks does aſſuredly get the Victory.



FINIS.